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ABSTRACT 
The past decade has seen a proliferation of available predictive genetic tests. These are 
the result of one of the most significant scientific advances of the 21 51 century: the Human 
Genome Project. Social scientists have examined how the availability of genetic testing 
shapes the lived experience of at-risk people as well as subsequent health decision-
making. Little attention has been paid to how the embodiment of risk is (re)shaped in 
light of changing genetic technologies or how experience of risk may in turn shape the 
development of genetics. A grounded theory approach was used to gain a fuller 
understanding of how 29 individuals living in a family at risk for Arrhythmogenic Right 
Ventricular Cardiomyopathy, in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, construct 
the meaning of being at-risk prior to, during, and following genetic testing in relation to 
the various stages of gene discovery and test availability. Three phases of constructing 
meaning were identified: (1) Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Risk, (2) 
Deciphering the Meaning of Being At-Risk, and (3) Embodying a New Meaning of Being 
At-Risk. This study found that at-risk individuals ' understandings of the meaning of 
being at-risk both shapes and is shaped by the "lived experience" of the genetic testing 
process and also impacts (and is impacted by) health care decisions. The meaning 
assigned to being at-risk is pragmatic, transient, and .fluid. It is pragmatic in that the 
participants juxtapose three types of contextual dimensions (scientific knowledge, 
experiential knowledge, and phase of the genetic testing process) against the existing 
conditions, or specific factors that influence risk perception, as they assign meaning to 
being at-risk and make decisions, a process that is ongoing throughout the genetic testing 
process. The meaning assigned to risk is transient, in that as one' s risk perception 
lll 
fluctuates so do the contextual dimensions and conditions that influence participants' 
choices. It is fluid, in that the meaning of being at -risk is shaped and reshaped (and the 
decisions change), with each new experience and coincident with the particular stage of 
gene discovery. These findings lead to recommendations for genetic service providers, 
health policy makers, and genetic scientists on best practices for health care in the context 
of novel gene discovery. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Mary 1 was born and raised in outport Newfoundland, one of six children. She has 
personall y wi tnessed the sudden deaths of three of her brothers, each from a heart 
condition, each by their early 50s. As well, her father died suddenly at the age of 32 
while fishing. Her grandmother was only 43 when she collapsed one spring while 
hanging clothes on the line. Mary has three sons who have taken up the family tradition 
of fishing for a living. As they approach their late twenties, she wonders if they will live 
to see their children grow up. This dissertation shares the stories of women and men like 
Mary, whose entire li ves have been consumed with losses related to a particular form of 
heredi tary sudden cardiac death, as they engage in the predictive genetic testing process 
in order to identify who is at-risk and as a consequence construct what it means to be at-
risk in an ever changing landscape of new genetic discoveries. 
The past decade has seen a proliferation of available predictive genetic tests . 
These state-of-the-art tests are the resul t of one of the most significant scientific advances 
of the 2 151 century: the Human Genome Project, a ten-year 2.7 billion dollar, project that 
identified approximately 20,000-25,000 genes in human deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 
and the sequences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs, that make up human DNA (Venter 
et al. , 2001 ). Given the magnitude of the scientif ic advances, social scientists have begun 
the process of examining how individuals living in families at-risk for a fatal genetic 
1 This is a pseudonym. Throughout this dissertation identi fying gender has been removed except when it is 
necessary for understanding the context of the discussion. 
condition assign meaning to their risk and make subsequent decisions about their health 
throughout the genetic testing process. 
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A large body of research has explored the psychosocial and behavioural impacts 
of participating in predictive genetic testing for several genetically linked conditions (e.g., 
breast cancer [BRCAl/2], Huntington disease [HD] , and colorectal cancer [CRC]) (e.g., 
Cox & McKellin, 1999; d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2005; 2006b; Etchegary, 2006a, 2006b, 
2009, 2010; McAllister, 2003). This has done much to advance the understanding of how 
genetic technologies shape individual li ves in terms of the lived experience of being at-
risk. That research focuses on how the availability of a genetic test shapes everyday 
experiences and health decisions. Little attention has been paid to how a Jack of available 
technology, or sudden advances in an available technology, may shape and reshape the 
meaning of risk in relation to everyday lives and health decisions; virtually no attention 
has been paid to the important question of how those embodied experiences of risk may 
in turn to some extent shape the development of genetics. 
This study examines how individuals construct their ideas about risk alongside 
new gene discovery. It examines how the experience of being at-risk and meanings 
assigned to "risk" for a genetic linked condition are shaped by, and to some degree help 
to shape, the science of gene discovery and genetic testing. 
Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Cardiomyopathy (ARVC) is an ideal genetic 
condition through which to examine how the experience of risk is shaped by and reshapes 
genetic science. ARVC is a highly penetrable and fatal condition. ARVC is not 
susceptible to most lifestyle modifiable factors (e.g., diet). The gene mutation was 
isolated in NL; individuals and families living at risk for ARVC in this province were 
directly engaged in the scientific developments that led to increasingly accurate risk 
assessments for the condition. A focus on ARVC in the province of NL therefore 
provides a unique opportunity to gain insights into how ideas about being at risk for a 
genetically linked condition are shaped and reshaped in light of one's experiential 
knowledge and evolving scientific knowledge. 
Purpose of the Study 
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The purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of individuals living in a 
family at risk for ARYC as they move through the genetic testing process at different 
historical periods of gene discovery. 1t examines how individuals living in families at 
risk for a fatal genetic condition assign meaning to their risk and make subsequent 
decisions about their health at the intersection of science and life context. The intent is to 
highlight for health care professionals, health policy makers, and genetic scientists the 
potential health care needs facing at-risk individuals in the context of novel gene 
discovery. 
What is ARVC? 
ARVC is an autosomal dominant heart condition found primarily in young males 
that can cause sudden cardiac death (Hodgkinson et al. , 2009). Offspring of affected 
parents have a 50% chance of inheriting the condition. Although women can be affected 
with ARYC, they seem to experience symptoms to a lesser degree and later in life 
(Hodgkinson et al. , 2012). ARVC is genetically heterogeneous; the form of ARVC that 
one inherits depends on the gene affected, the location of the gene on the chromosome, 
the type of mutation, and the protein involved. At the time of this writing, twelve types of 
autosomal dominant ARYC and one type of autosomal recessive ARVC have been 
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identified. The participants in this study have ARVCS. The gene for ARVC, as shown in 
fi gure 1.1 , is located on chromosome 3p25 and is caused by a mutation in a 
transmembrane protein (TMEM43) (Merner et al. , 2008). 
Figure 1.1. Diagram of the position of the TMEM43 protein. National Library of 
Medicine. (201 2). Where is the TMEM43 gene located? Diagram retrieved from 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/gene/TMEM43 
In ARVC normal heart muscle is replaced by fibro-fatty tissue on the wall of the 
right ventricle. This fibro-fatty tissue impedes the cardiac cells' or myocytes' ability to 
generate normal electrical impulses throughout the heart, predisposing individuals to 
lethal ventricular arrhythmias that cause a sudden cardiac death (Cox et al. , 20 10; 
Fontaine, Fontaliran, & Frank, 1998; Hodgkinson et al. , 2009; Marcus et al. , 1982; 
Merner et al. , 2008; Theine, Nava, Corrado, Rossi, & Pennelli, 1988). The extension of 
this fatty fibrous tissue throughout all layers of the myocardium tissue leads to a thinning 
of the ventricular wall , the development of aneurysms, and creates what has been referred 
to in research literature as the "triangle of dysplasia" (see Figure 1.2) (Basso, Corrado, 
Marcus, Nava, & Thiene, 2009). As the disease progresses, the left ventricle can also be 
affected (Corrado et al. , 2000; Gerull et al. , 2004). The loss of myocyte adhesions during 
times of mechanical stress on the heart (e.g., exercise) explains the occurrence of ARVC 
during exertion and in athletes (Gerull et al. ). 
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Figure 1.2. An illustration of the Triangle of Dysplasia in the right ventricle .Reprinted 
from Anderson, E (2006). Arrhythmogenic right ventricular dysplasia. American Family 
Physician, 73(8), p. l 392. 2006 by Christy Krames. Reprinted with permission. 
Prevalence of ARVC 
The precise global prevalence of ARVC is not known because ARVC is difficult 
to diagnose (Corrado et al., 2000) and a definitive predictive genetic test for ARVC has 
only been available since 2007. The worldwide prevalence of ARVC has been estimated 
to be in the range of I: I ,000 to 1:5,000 (Gollob et al. , 201 1; Thiene, Corrado, & Basso, 
2007). A familial history of ARVC has been noted in 30% to 50% of documented cases 
of ARVC (Corrado et al. , 2000; Merner et al. , 2008). 
At the time of this research study, there were 15 families in NL with a 
documented history of ARVC. Of these 15 families, there were 284 suspected individual 
cases of ARVC (Hodgkinson, 2007). Although the prevalence of ARVC in NL remains 
unknown, estimates suggest it to be approximately I: 1,000 (K. Hodgkinson, personal 
communication, October 29, 201 2). What is known about ARVC in NL is that the 
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median life expectancy of affected and unaffected males is 4 1 and 83, respectively, and 
71 and 83 in affected and unaffected females (Merner et al., 2008). ARVC is 100% 
penetrance in males by age 63 and females by the age of 76, which means that if one has 
the gene they will have clinical signs of the disease regardless of gender and will 
eventually develop heart failure in the long-term (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; Merner et al. , 
2008) . Of those identified as having ARVC in NL, a sudden cardiac death occurred in 
86% of affected males and 42% in females. Thus, affected males were 6.8 times more 
likely in comparison to females to die from ARVC (Merner et aJ. , 2008). 
Diagnosis of ARVC 
Prior to the availability of a definitive predictive genetic test in 2007, clinical 
diagnosis of ARVC was based either on the presence of two major criteria, one major and 
two minor, or four minor criteria2. The diagnosis was made using multiple measures 
including electrocardiograms, signal averaged electrocardiograms, Holter monitors, 
cardiac ultrasound , and family history (see Appendix A\ Despite the availability of 
diagnostic criteria, the clinical diagnosis of ARVC prior to 2007 was difficult as it relied 
on physiological and pathological testing for structural changes in the right ventricle, the 
presence of myocardial fatty fibrous tissue, and the presence of ventricular arrhythmias 
and electrocardiogram changes (e.g. , T wave inversion, extended QRS, and epsilon 
waves) (Hodgkinson et al. , 2009; Merner et al. , 2008). 
2 ARVC Diagnostic Task Force Cri teria were proposed in 1994; however these have has been modi fied to 
improve diagnostic sensitivity for early disease and detection in children. 
3 Appendi x A: ARVC Diagnostic Criteria. 
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Added to this difficulty with diagnosing ARVC prior to 2007 was that the 
diagnostic criteria were "biased due to the skewed ascertainment of those presenting with 
severe disease and because many require tertiary-level cardiac testing. Subjects in NL 
often presented with death in rural areas, with no previous medical history" (Hodgkinson 
et al., 2012, p.7). As well, patients may have "concealed" or had absent clinical signs of 
the disease even with structural changes in the right ventricle (Nava et al. , 2000). In the 
case of children, absent or limited phenotypic expression of ARVC has been noted, 
because ARVC is a progressive disease that manifests itself predominantly in young men 
in their mid-forties (Basso et al., 2009). 
The discovery of a definitive genetic test in 2007 enabled health care practitioners 
to diagnose ARVC with certainty. A predictive genetic test refers to the examination of 
genetic material through blood analysis in order to predict the likelihood that an 
individual will or will not develop the condition in question (Davison, 1996). Predictive 
genetic testing is unique in that it can foretell the health outcomes or lifetime risk of 
acquiring a disease of an otherwise healthy, asymptomatic person. 
Symptoms and Management of ARVC 
ARVC penetrance is age-related. Clinical signs and symptoms of ARVC can 
occur from adolescence onwards (Basso et al., 2009; Nava et al. , 2000); however, 
symptoms get progressively worse with age, peaking in the forties for men and much later 
in life in women (Basso et al. ; Hodgkinson et al. , 201 2). The physical signs and 
symptoms of ARVC are variable, ranging from no symptoms to palpitations, chest pain, 
syncope, ventricular arrhythmias, biventricular heart failure, and a sudden cardiac death 
(Fontaine et al. , 1998). Anatomically, ARVC can cause structural changes in the right 
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ventricle, which over time may involve the left ventricle, causing ventricular arrhythmias 
(Marcus et al. , 2010). 
Recent research (Hodgkinson et al., 2012) on the history of ARVC in NL reported 
that affected men were hospitalized four times more frequentl y than affected women. 
Affected women not only lived longer, but also did not present with symptoms as serious 
as those in affected men. The men also had higher incidences of congestive heart failure 
and sudden cardiac deaths in comparison to the women. 
Primary management of ARVC includes the insertion of an implantable 
cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) to prevent arrhythmias; medications to control blood 
pressure, arrhythmias, and cholesterol; and restricted physical activity (Gollob et al. , 
2011 ). The ICD is a small device inserted under the chest wall. In the event of an 
arrhythmia, it deli vers an electrical shock to restore the heart to a normal sinus rhythm. 
History of ARVC 
The first historical reference to ARVC was noted by Lancisi in 1736 (Thiene, et 
al. , 2007; Thiene, Nava, & Marcus, 1997). Lanci si described a family whose members 
over four generations experienced symptoms similar to ARVC: heart palpitations, heart 
failure, and in some cases, a sudden cardiac death (Basso et al. , 2009). In 196 1 in 
Padova, Italy, researchers reported on two clinical cases wherein heart disease had 
affected the right ventricle, impairing its ability to effectively pump blood (Dalla-Volta, 
Battaglia, & Zerbini , 196 1 ). A group of French researchers coined the term "ARVC" as 
an arrhythmic disorder when, in 1977, they identified six patients who had sustained 
ventricular tachycardia (VT) resistant to antiarrhythmic drugs with signs of heart disease 
(Fontaine et al. , 1977) . Formal credit for the first clinical description of ARVC has been 
given to Marcus et al. ( 1982) who described 24 cases of right ventricular dysplasia. 
Shortly thereafter, ARVC was defined as something familial (Nava et al., 1988) that 
caused a sudden cardiac death in young people with little or no warning (Thiene et al, 
1988). 
History of ARVC gene discovery in NL 
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A history of sudden cardiac death was first noted in the 1970s in a NL family 
whose origins traced back to a couple born in 1799 and 1800 (see Figure 1.34 ) 
(Hodgkinson et al. , 20 12); however, it was not until 1988 that NL researchers reported on 
a local study wherein five patients had received a diagnosis of ARVC (Marshall et al. , 
1988). Included within the family cited in the study by Marshall et al. was one individual 
who had a surgical dissection of the right ventricular free wall as a treatment for 
ventricular tachycardia caused by right ventricular dysplasia in 1983 (Guiraudon et al., 
1983). 
In 1994, following funding for the Human Genome Project in 1990 (Anderson, 
2004), a US-based team began to conduct research on ARVC in NL. Three years later, 
local NL researchers began conducting research similar to that of the US team. 
Unfortunately, the blood samples collected by the initial NL research in the 1980s were 
destroyed due to a lack of storage facilities. This coupled with the fact that many of the 
original fami ly members who had given blood samples had died, left researchers with no 
source of DNA upon which to complete further analysis (Hodgkinson et al. , 2009). Using 
the blood samples attained in NL, the US research team completed DNA haplotype 
4 Fig ure 1.3: The History o f ARVC in Newfoundland and Labrador 
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analysis of the blood samples obtained in NL and identified the ARVC gene as being on 
the short arm of chromosome three in position 25 or 3p25 (Ahmad et al., 1998). 
Haplotype anal ysis refers to the identification of a series of genes inherited as a unit and 
not a definitive genetic test. 
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Figure 1.3 History of ARVC Newfoundland and Labrador (NL). This figure provides a 
chronological representation of ARVC gene discovery in NL. (* represents the number 
of participants in this study who entered the genetic testing process at the time of 
discovery.) 
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Research on ARVC in the late 1990s was the impetus behind the start up of an 
international genetic cardiomyopathy research group based in NL, whose goal was to 
isolate the gene responsible for ARVC. Haplotype analysis for ARVC was done in 
Germany until 2005, when a genetics lab was started in NL under the direction of Dr. 
Terry Lynn Young (Hodgkinson et al., 2012). Haplotype analysis enabled researchers to 
assign at-risk individuals a status of either "high risk" or "low risk," depending on if they 
had the disease-associated haplotype. A high-risk status meant that the likelihood of 
having the ARVC gene was 98% (Hodgkinson et al., 2009). There were still cases, 
however, where haplotype analysis could not assign risk status or where individuals were 
assigned a 50% risk of being positive or negative. In 2006, the Atlantic Medical Genetics 
and Genomics Initiative (AMGGI) supported Young's lab, as part of a four-year, $9.3-
million project launched by Genome Canada, to discover and identify the causative 
mutation for the ARVC gene (Genome Canada, 2009). In 2007, the causative gene for 
ARVC was isolated in 15 NL families (Merner et al., 2008). 
Parallel with the discovery of the haplotype for ARVC was the introduction of the 
lCD as first line treatment for the lethal cardiac arrhythmias causing death from this 
disease. Research on the efficacy of the lCD as a treatment for ARVC confirmed its 
effectiveness in young males in NL, as the five-year mortality rate post-lCD implantation 
in males was zero (Hodgkinson et al. , 2005). 
The heightened awareness of the presence of ARVC within NL following 
haplotype analysis, the knowledge of the potentially sudden outcome of ARVC, the start 
of the international genetic cardiomyopathy research group in NL, the development of a 
local research lab dedicated to ARVC, and the knowledge that the lCD provides a 
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effective treatment led to the development of a cardiac genetics clinic in 2004 within the 
Eastern Health Regional Health Authority of NL. The cardiac genetics clinic provides an 
array of services using a multidisciplinary approach to care and includes genetic 
counsellors, an ethicist, nurses, and a cardiologist. Any individuals li ving in families at 
risk for developing ARVC are referred to this clinic for assessment and counselling 
(Hodgkinson et al. , 2012). 
This research study is significant in that it examines how the embodiment of risk 
is (re)shaped in light of new genetic discoveries and treatments. To date, there is no 
research that has explored the "lived experience" of living in a family at risk for ARVC. 
This study not only the fills this gap but also offers recommendations for future health 
policy, education, research, and practice in order to meet the health care needs of this 
population. 
Overview of Chapter Contents 
Chapter two provides an historical overview of the concept of risk, and it also 
reviews four key theoretical approaches to understanding risk within the context of 
genetics: cultural theory, cognitive (psychological) theory, sociological theory, and 
governmentality. A common theme throughout this chapter is the contextual nature of 
risk construction. 
Chapter three is a review of the literature that examines how risk for a genetically 
linked condition is assessed and understood by laypersons and experts, how decisions 
about predictive genetic testing are made, how risk is communicated, and how the 
perception of risk shapes behaviour in those classified as at-risk. This discussion takes 
place under the umbrella of three genetically linked conditions: BRCA 112, CRC, and HD. 
These three conditions are used for comparative purposes throughout the dissertation, 
along with references to general (non-ARVC) cardiovascular diseases where relevant. 
This chapter highlights the fact that perceptions about risk do not develop solely in 
reference to numerical values but also in relation to subjective experiences. Therefore, 
individuals living in at-risk families take a pragmatic approach to assigning meaning to 
risk and to understanding and coping with their risk. 
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The purpose of chapter four is to discuss the body of literature that has explored 
the psychosocial impact of predictive genetic testing. The review of this literature 
includes a discussion of the presence and duration of psychological di stress experienced 
by carriers and non-carriers of genetically linked conditions. This includes the factors 
that influence psychological distress throughout the genetic testing process, and the 
impact of testing on families and individuals who have testing. 
Chapter five begins with an overview of grounded theory and the particular 
grounded theory method used in this study. Details are provided as to how I si tuate 
myself within the research process, drawing on the tenets of symbolic interactionism and 
pragmatism. Concluding this chapter is an overview of the ways in which I ensured 
rigour in the study and a description of the ethical considerations. 
Chapter six is the first of three chapters that focus on the research findings from 
this study. Chapter 6 starts with an introduction into the substantive theory, Constructing 
the Meaning of Being At-Risk (see Appendix B\ It describes the Rubik 's Cube as a 
model to understand how at-risk individuals juxtapose the three contextual dimensions 
5 Appendix 8 : The Theory: Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk 
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(scientific knowledge, experiential knowledge, and phase of the genetic testing process) 
against relevant conditions to construct ideas about risk (see Figure 6.1 6). The first 
theoretical construct, Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Risk, captured 
participants' experiences as they awakened to the idea that they may be at risk, prior to 
predictive genetic testing. The two categories that capture thi s experience are (a) making 
sense of numerous losses and (b) struggling to break the cycle of uncertainty. Evident 
within this chapter is how ideas about risk are understood in relation to social and 
scientific contexts. 
Chapter seven examines the second phase of the psychosocial process, 
Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk. The theoretical construct Deciphering the 
Meaning of Being At-Risk captures participants' experiences during genetic testing. This 
includes being offered a predictive genetic test, waiting to receive test results, and 
receiving the test results. The two categories (a) taking the first steps of the genetic 
testing process and (b) building one's risk portfolio reflect this experience. This chapter 
describes how individuals make a decision to have genetic testing or not. Part of making 
this decision includes the juxtaposition of one's scientific knowledge against one's 
experiential knowledge, and the conditions that hold relevancy at the time. Threaded 
throughout this chapter is the idea that objective risk alone is not enough to help at-risk 
individuals decipher their meaning of being at-risk. Furthermore, the psychosocial 
process of Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk is fluid , transient, and pragmatic. 
6 Figure 6. 1: The Rubik ' s C ube : Generic Model 
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Chapter eight is the last of the results chapters and represents the last phase of 
Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk. The theoretical construct Embodying a New 
Meaning of Being At-Risk describes participants' experiences post-genetic testing. This 
chapter describes how participants start to adjust to and cope with their experiences of the 
genetic test results in their everyday lives. The three categories (a) adjusting to living 
with or without a genetic condition , (b) recognizing the reality of living in a family at risk 
for genetic diseases, and (c) looking towards the future capture this experience. As in the 
other two phases of the genetic testing process (pre-testing and during testing), 
participants rely on their experiential and scientific knowledge to help them embody a 
new meaning of risk, cope with their experiences of living in an at-risk family, and 
overcome barriers to resources (e.g., human, physical, and fi nancial) and restrictions on 
their daily lives (physical activity, social activity, driving, education, and employment). 
This chapter highlights participant concerns for how their offspring will cope and manage 
being at risk for ARVC. 
Chapter nine concludes this disse1tation with a discussion of the findings and 
implications of this research study for education, research, and practice. Limitations of 
the study are addressed. 
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CHAPTER2 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING RISK 
The first documented illustration of risk is noted in the Tigris-Euphrates region of 
Mesopotamia in 3200 BC amongst the Asipu (Covello & Mumpower, 1985; Molak, 
1997). The meaning of risk has shifted throughout history from a neutral term that 
inferred the mathematical probability that an event would take place to a term that 
described harmful or adverse outcomes synonymous with a danger or hazard (Douglas, 
1990, 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982a; Fox, 1999; Lupton, 1993; Skolbekken, 1995). 
Over the last three decades research on risk and genetics has shifted from a quantitative 
approach of measuring risk to qualitative methods that acknowledge the intersubjective 
nature of how risk is embodied by individuals, families, and communities (Cox, 2003 ; 
d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2005; Etchegary, 2009, 2006a, 2006b; Gifford, 1986; Lock & 
Nguyen, 2010; Lupton, 1993, 1995; McAllister, 2002, 2003). 
I take the approach, following Lupton ( 1995) and other critical scholars of risk, 
that risk is a socially constructed concept with multiple meanings depending on the 
perspective of the one "at" risk and the one "measuring" risk. The meaning of risk is 
developed in relation to historical, social, and cultural contexts, and that holds true for 
individual perceptions of risk as well as for academic theories of risk. In this chapter I 
examine four theoretical perspectives that have made the largest contribution to our 
understanding of risk: cultural theory, sociological theory, cognitive-psychology theory, 
and governmentality. 
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Cultural Theory and Risk 
The earliest writings on risk in cultural theory are found in Douglas's (1966) work 
on Purity and Danger, Douglas examined how risk avoidance in ancient civilizations was 
a means to construct cultural boundaries and maintain social order. That is, objects or 
events thought to be contaminated or polluted were considered dangerous or "risky" to 
the social order and deemed taboo. According to Douglas ( 1985), risk acted like a 
"forensic resource" that provided explanations as to why mishaps occur. 
Cultural theorists view risk as a social process that varies according to context 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982a; 1982b; Rayner, 1992; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). The 
meaning of risk is constructed in relation to the values, belief system, ideologies, and 
structure of the social organization within which an individual interacts. Ideologies about 
risk are developed as collective beliefs of all members of a certain social group and not 
individually. Hence, people who do not share the same cultural belief patterns may not 
define the same behaviours as "risky" (Krimsky & Golding, 1992). Furthermore the 
identification of a specific risk factor and the meaning assigned to the risk is fluid, as it 
can change in response to its usefulness to an existing social system and the perceiver's 
social affiliation (Douglas 1985; Rayner, 1992). 
Douglas (1970, 1978), and later, in collaboration with Wildavsky (Douglas & 
Wildavsky 1982a), developed the grid-group approach to understanding risk perception 
and risk management in relation to the sociocultural context in which individuals find 
themselves situated. This grid-group approach describes the degree of social affiliation to 
a particular group and the strength of social interactions within that group. The grid 
represents the nature, the expectations, and the constraints (e.g., gender, age) of these 
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social interactions (Krimsky, 1992). A high group-grid infers a cohesive group that 
perceives and responds to risk in a uniform manner reflective of the social group. A low 
group-grid lacks group solidarity in lieu of a more individualistic self-regulatory approach 
to risk (see also Lupton, 1999). 
Douglas (1996) described this social process of assigning risk as similar to 
creating a taboo. A taboo is a practice where boundaries are set up as to how one 
interacts with the object considered taboo. Interactions with the taboo result in danger to 
oneself and can cause contamination of the community. The creation of a taboo is 
evident in the stigmatization of homosexual males living with Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (Farmer, 1992). The process of labeling something 
a taboo represents a visible attempt to provide some sort of structural dimension to at-risk 
populations in order to justify our collective rational thoughts and maintain societal order. 
As noted by cultural theorists, the identification of something "risky" within society 
serves to construct cultural boundaries between individuals, social groups, and 
communities (Douglas, 1996; Lupton, 1999). Groups that are assigned a social status of 
"risky," such as homosexual males, are therefore singled out because of their symbolic 
threat to society. Cultural theory helps us understand the contextual nature of risks, that 
is, how individuals' social relationships influence perceptions of risk and subsequent 
decisions. 
Cultural theory provides insight into how individuals might understand risk. 
However, it fails to fully explain why some individuals living in a family with a 
predictive genetic disease decline to participate in the predictive genetic process. 
Drawing on cultural theory, one might assume that individuals growing up in a family at 
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risk for a genetic condition would have comparable beliefs and therefore would respond 
to predictive genetic testing in a similar manner. This is not the case, as individuals living 
in these at-risk families do not consistently react in the same manner and engage willingly 
in genetic testing. Although cultural theory provides good insights into how individuals 
construct and respond to risk, it does not explain resistors to technology and why some 
individuals do not conform to collective beliefs of a social institution or group. 
Another assumption of cultural theory is that one's actual risk is not known until 
after the incident happens (Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999). This is not the case for 
individuals at risk for a genetic condition such as ARVC. These individuals may know 
their risk status and outcomes years prior to having any risk symptoms. Thus, the 
experience of being at risk for a genetic condition and the responses to that risk can be 
significantly different from being at risk for another chronic disease, as the element of 
uncertainty is removed in the former. 
Cognitive (Psychological) Theory and Risk 
Starr's ( 1969) paper, "Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk," was critical in 
setting the stage for the development of a new sub-discipline of risk perception, that is, 
technology and risk. Looking at what constitutes an acceptable technological risk, Starr's 
work sparked interest in understanding how individuals conceptualize risk. A conceptual 
framework that acknowledges the subjective nature of risk perception guides the 
cognitive paradigm. That is, individuals who are influenced by an assortment of 
psychosocial, organizational, and cultural factors subjectively define risk. It is through 
the use of psychometric instruments that these foregoing factors and their 
interrelationships are quantified and modeled in order to understand and predict 
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perceptions of risk and coinciding rationale responses (Slovic, 1992, 2000). Researchers 
have challenged the reliability of psychometric instruments to explain and predict risk 
responses, noting a significant difference between laypeople's perception of risks and that 
of experts when presented with the same information (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein , 
1979). Heuristics is thought to influence the meanings that laypeople assign to risk, 
particularly if these meanings differ from that of experts and existing quantitative 
research (Lupton & Tulloch, 2002). 
Heuristics are mental road maps that describe the process that indi viduals 
experience as they configure responses to risk (Lupton & Tulloch, 2002). An individual ' s 
road map is dependent upon his or her life experiences and personal frames of references 
that is then identified as risk attributes. These risk attributes help individuals then to 
understand and make decisions about their risk under certain circumstances (Krimsky & 
Golding, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974; Zajonc, 1980). Acknowledgement 
that decisions surrounding risks rarely occur in an emotionally neutral context (Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983), but are often in response to contextual variables in one's life, has 
contributed to the popularity of the heuristic paradigm. 
A key critique of cognitive theory in general is that it is guided from an 
individualistic paradigm and thus lacks generalizability at a population level. This 
individualistic approach makes it difficult to translate findings into healthy public policy. 
Others (e.g., Lupton, 1999; Slovic, 1992) criticize the psychometric paradigm in that does 
not take into account the broad contextual nature of risk. Some scholars (e.g., Slovic) 
challenge the ability of cognitive theory to explain why individuals define certain events 
as "risky" but ignore those factors labeled "risky" by others. 
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Cognitive theory provides insight into how individuals living in a family with a 
genetic condition understand their risk; however, it often fails to capture the fluid nature 
of risk, that is, how individuals ' perception of risk is shaped and reshaped over time. As 
well, it cannot account for many diverse contextual factors (or variance in these 
contextual factors) that influence risk perception, many of which cannot be quantified. 
Sociological Theory and Risk 
According to some sociological theorists, risk is a social process that evolves in 
response to the meanings that individuals assign to social relationships and interactions. 
It takes into consideration the lens through which individuals view the world and how 
individuals give meaning to their experiences, interpret knowledge, and respond to social 
relationships (Krimsky & Golding, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Lock & Nguyen, 2010). Lupton 
(1999) proposed that know ledge about risk is mediated through discourses or social and 
cultural frameworks of understanding. That is, the meaning an individual attributes to 
risk is in a constant state of flux and is historical and contextual in nature. Lupton forgoes 
the argument on rationality or irrationality of risk decisions to focus on how the meaning 
of risk operates as part of one's social relations and subjectivity. 
A key theoretical approach influencing sociological theory is that of a world risk 
society noted by Beck (1992) in the book Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity and 
threaded throughout Giddens's (1991) earlier work. This perspective examined the social 
construction of the concept of risk in the light of social and technological advancements 
in modern society, which have increased to such a magnitude as to be impossible to 
calculate, impossible to manage, and impossible to avoid (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003; 
Lupton, 1999; Wilkinson, 2010). According to Beck (1992) the concept of risk can 
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become tantamount with large-scale hazards that are difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify. These hazards lack accountability or compensation, and they can be considered 
the by-products of manufactured uncertainties. The label of being "risky" evolves as a 
result of discourse between producers of risk knowledge, disseminators of knowledge, 
and receivers of knowledge. These factors have led to what Beck refers to as the 
globalization and individualization of risk. 
Beck (2006) argued that risk has become so "global" that it impacts everyone's 
life to some point. Globalization is the impetus to society's constant state of risk that 
compels its members to engage in collaborative public forums on the future of society and 
risk management strategies characteristic of what Beck describes as a cosmopolitan 
society (Beck, 1992, 1996; Fox, 1999; Lupton, 2006; Wilkinson, 20 10). In contrast to 
this cosmopolitan society, individuals at risk for a genetic condition construct their own 
personal theories of risk in order to develop a more concrete meaning of risk for 
themselves and their families through the process of what Beck refers to as "becoming 
individual" : an individual who is in a constant state of risk awareness, disequilibrium, and 
experiences a non-linear existence that is at the interface of the social and technological 
world (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Becket al., 2003). This is a difficult task given 
the lack of control associated with risk and the breadth of its meaning (Zinn , 2008). As in 
the case of the Human Genome Project, the proliferation of genetic knowledge because of 
technological and scientific advancements upon which one had little or no control has led 
individuals to question their biological certainty and also sparked discussions regarding 
technological determinism, social reductionism, and the meaning of being at-risk. 
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Beck's idea of a risk society has influenced how the concept of risk is perceived in 
the 201h-2lseh century of environmental, political, and technological disasters. Disasters 
such as nuclear plants accidents of Chernobyl (1986) and Three Mile Island (1979); the 
chemical spill in Bhopal (1984); the explosion of methane gas in the Westray Mine 
disaster (1992); the spill of petroleum in the Love Canal disaster (2008); the Tsunamis of 
Thailand (2007), Japan (2010); and most famously the "911" terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Centre (200 1) have shifted the meaning of risk to include the need to prepare for 
the unpreparab!e. This has caused individuals to be in a constant state of risk anxiety, 
which is impossible to calculate, impossible to manage, and impossible to avoid (Becket 
al., 2003). Risk is no longer in relation to a specific object but linked to a variety of 
factors such as human error, technological malfunction, cultural and religious beliefs, and 
the unpredictability of "mother nature." These events have led to a flurry of activity to 
identify, decipher, and cope with potentia! risks in a broader global sense in areas such as 
acid precipitation, depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, second-hand smoke, 
biodegrading of waste, and genetic discovery. 
Sociological theory provides a good foundation upon which to understand how 
individuals living in families with a genetic condition conceptualize their risk. First, it 
accounts for the fluid and contextual nature of risk at a population and individual level. 
Second, it provides a !ens upon which to understand how individuals juxtapose competing 
ideas about risk in order to develop personal theories of risk. Third, it captures those 
factors influencing risk that are neither quantifiab le nor static. Finall y, sociological 
theory helps to explain how at-risk individuals make choices about their health and how 
these decisions fluctuate in response to social interactions. 
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Governmentality and Risk 
The concept of governmentality emerged from the work of Foucault ( 1977, 1991 ), 
Castel (1991), Ewald (1991 ), and O' Malley (2004). According to this perspective, the 
impetus behind how risk is understood and the template against one's conduct is 
measured is determined by those in positions of power (e.g., government experts, policy 
makers, and researchers). It is the experts' varied perspectives on risk that have led to the 
proliferation of risk definitions and the development of institutions dedicated to the 
construction, reproduction, dissemination, and practices of varying theoretical approaches 
to risk (Foucault, 1977, 1991 ; Lupton, 1999). Implicit within this perspective is the 
notion that risk is controllable, as long as experts can continue to identify what are the 
risk factors and society can employ methods to cope with the risk or at least the risk 
factors. 
According to Dean ( 1999a), in response, individuals interpret risk and the 
suggested health promotion and prevention activities as something that they want to 
voluntarily participate in as responsible moral agents of society. It is this sense of 
volunteerism and moral responsibility, not social pressures, gained through 
conceptualizing the social world in terms of risk that allows government to govern 
through society and guide the actions of self-regulating individuals (Foucault, 1991; 
Lupton, 1995; Rose, 1993; Wilkinson, 2010). Thus, to be identified as "at-risk" is to be 
the object of constant self-surveillance (Castel, 1991; Foucault, 1977, 199 1 ), because of 
the development of a risk consciousness (Lupton). This voluntary sense of surveillance 
and self discipline is salient within many health promotion and screening programs that 
individuals have grown to accept as routine or a normal part of everyday life (Bratich, 
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Packer, & McCarthey, 2003; Nadesan, 2008), such as prenatal screening (Lupton, 1999). 
If individuals fail to engage in preventive regimes, that failure can lead to punitive 
negative consequences, such as poor health (Nadesan, p.l 09). 
This neoliberal approach to health care management (Dean, 1999b) has existed in 
Canada since the 1970s with the introduction of a government-driven health promotion 
participation programs (Boyce, 2002). Experts in the field of clinical genetics have done 
a fantastic job in identifying genes that put one at risk for future development of a disease 
(e.g., CRC, BRCA 1/2, and cardiovascular disease) with predictive genetic testing. 
Simultaneously, health care professionals offer solutions to prevent the phenotypic 
expression of the disease, such as healthy eating guidelines, stress and coping techniques, 
and physical education. However, this approach has limitations, in that the responsibility 
to participate in these health programs is on the individual; this is often not feasible fo r 
those who are socially and economically disadvantaged. Furthermore, it does not address 
those cases where individuals have a genetic condition that has 100% penetrance 
regardless of participation in health promotion activities, such as in the case with ARVC. 
It also does not take into account how one's experiential knowledge can shape scientific 
knowledge or the implications that the rise of new discipline-driven biotechnologies (e.g., 
nanotechnology, genetic engineering) may have on at-risk individuals, as noted by other 
scholars (Duster, 2003; Rose, 2007). 
Governmentality offers insights into risk perception and risk management; 
however, it does not explain how resisters to technology and health promotion programs 
conceptualize risk or why they do not engage in health promotion activities. Thus, the 
layperson 's subjective interpretation of what constitutes risk or deviant behaviour is not 
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addressed. Also, if experts' opinions were the predominant factor shaping the meaning of 
risk, then one would expect that individuals would participate in surveillance programs 
and genetic blood sampling readil y; however, volunteerism in predictive genetic testing 
programs is not always the case, regardless of how well representations of the risk factor 
are orchestrated by experts and government. Finally, many autosomal dominant 
conditions, such as ARVC, do not fit comfortably under the health promotion umbrella. 
That is, despite engaging in health promotion activities, modifying one's lifestyle, and 
taking prescribed treatments, physical signs of the ARVC persist. One would argue that 
theory of risk is satisfactory, if the context of risk was predictable, measureable, and 
static, and laypersons were passive individuals. However, this is not the case. 
Chapter Summary 
There are four theoretical approaches to risk that shed light on the ways risk is 
constructed from a social, cultural, cognitive, and political stance. Cultural theorists link 
risk perception to the cultural patterns, values, and beliefs of one's allied social group. 
Cultural theorists refer to the grid-group framework as a method to explain how 
individuals conceptualize risk in relation to one's social interactions. The analogy of a 
taboo is used in cultural theory to describe how at-risk individuals assign meanings to 
being at-risk. Cognitive theorists describe risk in terms of a subjective experience, which 
can be measured using psychometric tools. Cognitive theorists believe that heuristics 
plays a significant role in conceptualizing risk and in identifying risk attributes. From a 
sociological perspective, risk perception is a social process that evolves in response to the 
nexus of one' s social relationships and interactions within society. Risk perception is 
viewed as something non-static, something not quantifiable, and something that can be 
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both individualized and global. Governmentality holds that, although those in positions 
of power or disciplines drive ideas about risk, it is the responsibility of the individual to 
govern their health through self- surveillance and voluntarily engaging in healthy 
activities. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 
Even though risk is a concept evident in the literature since the 14th century, ideas 
about the meaning of "risk" for individuals and families living with hereditary genetic 
conditions continue to be discussed, debated, and contested by scholars. Despite the 
strong presence of the rationalist perspective in the risk li terature, risk perception is a 
deliberate, logical, and conscious process based on one's appraisal of scientific evidence 
and events (Lupton, 1999; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Recent 
research highlights the subjective nature of risk and proposes an "experiential paradigm" 
for understanding risk (Cox, 2003 ; Cox & McKellin, 1999; d' Agincourt-Canning, 2005; 
Etchegary, 2010; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; McAllister, 2002, 2003). Within this paradigm, 
one's life experiences and social interactions influence how ideas about risk are 
constructed. 
The "experiential paradigm" does not supplant the notion of risk as being 
somehow real in the sense of greater or lesser degree of certainty but rather is used as a 
complementary framework to conceptualize risk. This shift is due to a growing 
awareness of the multifactorial nature of many genetic conditions resistant to traditional 
Mendelian theories of inheritance (Rose, 2007), inconsistencies in quantitative literature 
on what constitutes being at-risk (Sivell et al. , 2008), and a lack of understanding of the 
contextual factors that shape and reshape risk perception. Thus, there is a growing body 
of literature that suggests risk perception is a social process that is best understood using a 
pragmatic lens. That is, ideas about risk are shaped and reshaped in response to the nexus 
of one's social interactions, interpretations of these interactions, and available information 
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(Jeon, 2004; MacDonald, 2001). Throughout this literature review I draw on the tenets of 
symbolic interactionism (SI) (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1934) as my framework to discuss 
this body of literature. The meaning of being at risk for a genetic condition is understood 
in relation to the social interactions individuals engage in. The meaning assigned to being 
at-risk is in a state of flux; it is constantly being shaped and reshaped to reflect one's 
worldview, one existing reality, and the interpretive process. 
The following discussion includes five bodies of literature that facilitate an 
understanding of how risk perception is assessed, how representations of risk are 
understood by laypersons, how risk perception influences decisions surrounding 
predictive genetic testing, how risk is communicated, and, finally, how risk perception 
affects behavioural outcomes. 
It is only with a thorough examination of how individuals and families construct 
their notions about risk in light of competing subjective realities that health care providers 
can begin to tailor programs to meet clients' needs and facilitate their movement through 
the predictive genetic testing process in a positive manner. First, I provide a brief 
rationale for my selection of the content of this literature review. 
Rationale for Literature Review 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the experience of living in a 
family with a history of Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Cardiomyopathy (ARVC). As 
such, there is no existing body of literature on the psychosocial aspects of predictive 
genetic testing in this population. To contextualize my research I have drawn on two 
types of relevant research. First, I reviewed literature on patient and fami ly experiences 
of living with genetically linked cardiovascular diseases, (that is, not specific to ARVC), 
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in order to gain insight into the experience of predictive genetic testing among individuals 
and families with ARYC. Second, I examined the quantitative and qualitative literature 
primarily on three well documented genetically linked diseases: (a) HD, a degeneration of 
the nerve cells in the brain causing marked cognitive, affective, and motor impairments; 
(b) BRCA 1/2, which includes two mutated genes isolated on chromosomes 13 and 17; 
and (c) CRC, which includes hereditary non-polyposis colorectal cancer (HNPCC) and 
familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP). 
These three conditions were selected because they represent the majority of 
research in the field of predictive genetic testing, all have a predictive genetic test, and all 
are autosomal dominant conditions with a fifty percent chance of passing the disorder to 
one's offspring. HD, BRCA 112, and CRC all provide an excellent comparison group to 
ARYC. HD, like ARVC, is a fatal disease with high penetrance, earl y onset, and no cure. 
As with ARVC, most individuals with a positive genetic test will develop the disease 
independent of modifiable factors such as diet and exercise (Etchegary, 2009). By 
comparison, BRCA 1/2 and CRC are geneticall y linked diseases but are not necessarily 
fatal; they have varied penetrance, and treatment options are available. Furthermore, 
BRCA 112 and CRC are multifactorial in nature and less determinant; as a resul t, having 
the gene does not necessarily mean that one will develop the disease. For example, the 
life-time risk of developing CRC with an identified mutation is estimated to be between 
30-95% (Esplen et al. , 2007; Schneider, Kloor, Furst & Moslen, 20 12). For women, the 
lifetime risk of developing BRCA 112 with an identified mutation is 39-85% (van 
Oostrom et al. , 2003). Modifiable factors such as diet, environment, smoking, exercise, 
stress, and medications may prevent the manifestation of the gene or prevent the onset of 
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the disease. The reverse is also true; not having the gene does not necessarily mean one 
will not develop the cancer, as non-gene carriers remain at risk for cancer comparable to 
the general population. 
Shaping the Meaning of Risk: Risk Assessment 
Risk perception is the subjective assessment of the likelihood that an event will 
take place and the meaning assigned to the consequences of the event (S lovic, 1987). 
Given this definition one can easily understand how confusion about what constitutes risk 
exists. That is, depending on the paradigm or theoretical approach of the researcher 
(interpretive or empirical), risk has been framed primarily as either an objective or 
subjective concept in the literature, when in fact both approaches influence perceptions of 
risk. This study goes beyond this dichotomous approach to understanding risk; it 
examines how individuals at risk for ARVC juxtaposed objective and subjective risk. 
The meaning assigned to being at-risk, in this study, as a result of this juxtaposition, was 
significant in guiding participants' health care decisions. The following discussion 
provides an overview of the research that examines the accuracy with which individuals 
assess their risk status. 
Limited evidence suggests that at-risk individuals correctly estimate their risk 
status (Grover et al., 2009; Himmelstein, 201 0 ; van Dooren et al. , 2004 ). Most of the 
literature suggests that at-risk individuals overestimated their risk (Braithwaite, Sutton, 
Mackay, Stein, & Emery, 2005; Codori et al., 2005; Croyle & Lerman, 1999; Esplen et 
al. , 2001; Katapodi , Lee, Faciane, & Dodd, 2004; Lerman et al., 1995; Ozanne, 
Wittenberg, Garber, & Weeks, 2010; Sheinfeld, Gorin, & Steven, 2003; Shiloh, Pete!, 
Papa, & Goldman, 1998). By contrast, there is some evidence to suggest that those at risk 
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underestimate their risk (Katapodi et al., 2004) but this research is limited (Dorval et al., 
2005; Grover et al., 2009; van Maarle, Stouthard, & Bonsel, 2003). These accounts 
presume that risk is somehow value-free and that risk perception can be measured against 
a norm and be quantified as correct or incorrect compared to the "real" measure of risk. 
However, many critical theorists have argued that such measures of risk perception are 
inappropriate, because one's perception of being at risk for a genetically linked disease is 
influenced by many factors such as variability in disease patterns, treatment options, 
family history, and those variables that cannot always be quantified (Cameron, Sherman, 
Marteau, & Brown, 2009; Katapodi et al. , 2004; Sivell et al. , 2008). More importantly, 
an assessment of whether one ' s perception of risk is higher or lower than what it really is 
(in terms of percentage of qualifying as "at-risk" in a numerical sense) is beside the point. 
It is the meaning of risk that is important, not the degree to which the assessment of risk 
is higher or lower than the scientific clinical assessment. What is considered "risky" for 
one person may not be judged risky for another, because risk, being subjective, is only 
meaningful in relation to the riskiness of life (Rapp, 1988; Brunger & Bassett, 1998). 
These two points are supported in the body of literature that has examined the 
inconsistencies in what constitutes an accurate risk perception. 
How "Accurate" is Risk Perception? 
Two systematic reviews have examined inconsistencies in the evidence on risks 
perception. These reviews support the position of critical theori sts that risk is a subjective 
experience and not easily quantifiable (Katapodi et al. , 2004; Sivell et al. , 2008). 
Katapodi et al. conducted a meta-analysis (n=42 studies) in which they explored 
measurements of women' s perceptions of being at risk for BRCA 112. The consensus in 
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the literature they reviewed was that women do not have an accurate perception of their 
actual risk; in fact they often underestimated their risk when compared to assigned 
objective risk. This finding was contradicted in some studies that reported that a 
perception of high risk was associated with having a family history of BRCA l/2, having 
an affected relative, engaging in genetic counselling, and having a prophylactic 
mastectomy. A positive relationship was observed between perceived risk and intensity 
of emotional response to BRCAl/2 concern. Of those studies that examined the 
relationship between social demographics and risk, 12 studies reported a weak correlation 
between risk perception, age, and income; five of these found that young women and 
those with Jess than a high school education were either unaware or overestimated their 
risk. In all of the 12 studies, white women perceived their risk as higher than did women 
of minority ethnic communities. 
Although the review by Katapodi et al. (2004) provides insights into women ' s risk 
perception, the authors noted many methodological concerns with the reviewed literature, 
particularly in relation to measurement scales. Some studies (n=6) used numerical scales 
while others used verbal Likert-type scales (n=7) or single-item scales (n=2), which can 
bias results. Second, scales measured perceived risk as a one-dimensional concept (low 
or high) that remains static over time, which is not the case. Third, only eight of 42 
studies addressed re liability and validity of psychometric instruments. Fourth, the review 
included only cross-sectional studies, which are not representative of the transient and 
fluid nature or risk perception throughout the genetic testing process but are, rather, a 
snap shot of risk perception at a specific time. Finally, findings are limited in their 
generalizability, since the focus was on one population and one disease. 
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Sivell et al. (2008) completed one of the most comprehensive systematic reviews 
located (n=19 studies), using a multitude of genetically linked diseases and that included 
both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The goal of the review was to illustrate 
how individuals perceive, construct, and interpret genetic risk and thus make 
corresponding decisions about prevention and care. Although Sivell et al. cited evidence 
that supported the findings of Katapodi et al. (2004 ), that risk perception is not easily 
quantifiable due to its variability, they emphasized the multidimensional nature of risk 
perception and concluded that risk is a social process influenced by many factors. 
The majority of studies reviewed by Sivell et al. (2008), in contrast to Katapodi et 
al. (2004), reported that individuals overestimated their risk, particularly if they had a 
relevant family history. Of these 16 studies, six found that participants had difficulty with 
understanding objective risk, with only three studies reporting good recall of objective 
risk. A more accurate perception of risk was noted post-genetic counselling (n=l2 
studies). In studies it was noted that risk perception did not change over time. By 
compari son to the general population, participants in three studies perceived themsel ves 
as being at higher risk, with only one study reporting that participants perceived their risk 
as similar to that of the general population. 
Sivell et al.'s (2008) review also included nineteen studies that explored how 
individuals constructed their meaning of risk and made decisions accordingly. Evidence 
cited strongly suggested that the perception of risk is transient in nature and contingent on 
subjective interpretations of risk and heuristics, or "common-sense practical knowledge," 
rather than on objective estimates. Similar observations were noted in other studies (e.g., 
Cameron eta!. , 2009; Shedlosky-Shoemaker et al. , 20 10;). The consensus of these 
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studies is that perception of risk is shaped and reshaped in relation to personal theories of 
inheritance: the factors that help individuals construct their perception of risk include past 
experiences, disease patterns, environment, occupation, diet, stress, physical likeness of 
other affected persons, and family history. This review provides a glimpse into how 
individuals understand their risks. It also, however, solidifies the point that examining 
why risk perception is high or low may not be as relevant as examining the meaning those 
individuals assign to being at-risk, a point that is iJJuminated in qualitative studies of risk 
perception. 
Although the review conducted by Sivell et al. (2008) provides valuable insights 
into the subjective nature of risk, the authors have acknowledged its limitation. Firstly, 
despite the inclusion of other genetic conditions, the majority of cited studies (n=38) were 
on BRCA 112, which limits the generalizability of findings to other genetic conditions 
(Sivell et al.). Secondly, methods and instruments that were used to measure risk were 
inconsistent and employed at varying intervals (Sivell et al). Thirdly, the review 
contained limited longitudinal studies that would provide valuable insights into evolving 
perceptions of risk (Sivell et al.). Fourthly, as with the review by Katapodi et al. (2004), 
this meta-analysis included cross-sectional studies that do not give a fu ll account of the 
genetic testing process; this may account for the inconsistencies in the literature on risk 
perception. 
Some researchers offered insights beyond the preceding methodological critiques 
as to why inconsistencies in risk perceptions exist. Some suggest that, because many of 
the participants in these studies have Jived in these families for years, they have been 
exposed to an affected relative. Thus, they do not perceive themselves as being high risk; 
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having the disease is part of their expected life trajectory (Katapodi et al. , 2004). Others 
may have grown accustomed to the uncertainty in their lives and have accepted this as a 
part of their everyday norm. Meanwhile, some may be falsely reassured with an 
indeterminate genetic test result (Dorval et al. , 2005 ; Grover et al. , 2009). And, finally, as 
was the case with the review by Katapodi et al., the findings fail to take into account how 
individuals understand and attribute meaning to being at-risk (Sivell et al., 2008). The 
lack of attention to this critical social constructivist framework supports the further need 
for research to explore how risk perception and coinciding decisions regarding genetic 
testing, disease prevention and management are influenced by laypersons' everyday life 
experiences and interactions, particularly with experts. 
Representations of Risk: Laypersons and Experts 
Emerging literature on genetics suggests that-risk perception is an evolving social 
process that is socially constructed. Risk is not a concept that exists in a silo, or one that 
is easily quantifiable, but one that is influenced by interactions with other at-risk 
individuals and experts in the field of genetics. Thus, in order to understand how 
representations of risk are conceptualized and subsequent responses formulated, it is 
important to review the literature that examines how laypersons and experts perceive risk. 
Only by understanding how individuals construct their own ideas about risk will health 
care providers be able to develop collaborative and effective plans of care. This section 
starts with a review of the literature on laypersons' construction of risk, and how these 
constructions are followed by discussion of how laypersons' ideas about risk are 
influenced by that of experts' constructions of risk. The section concludes with an 
overview of the cardiovascular literature on risk construction. 
-------------------------------------------
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Laypersons' Construction of Risk 
Laypersons construct their ideas about risk in reference to factors outside the 
realm of numerical labels, drawing on the subjective nature of risk and their personal 
beliefs about inheritance (Cameron et al., 2009; McAllister, 2002; Norris, Spelic, Synder, 
& Tinley, 2009; Shiloh & Saxe, 1989; Smith, Michie, Stephenson, & Quarrell, 2002). 
Thus, in order to plan care for at-risk populations that will be reflective of their needs, 
health care professions need to have as full an understanding as possible of the varied 
methods in which laypersons construct, communicate, and perceive risk, and their 
coinciding behavioural responses (d' Agincourt-Canning, 2001 ; Cameron et al. , 2009; 
Cox, 2001, 2003; Cox & Starxomski, 2004; Etchegary, 2006a, 2006b; Frich, Ose, 
Malterud, & Fugelli, 2006; Hallowell, 1999; Klitzman, Thorne, Williamson, & Marder, 
2007; Lerman, Croyle, Tercyak, & Hamann, 2002; McAllister, 2003; Murray, Manktelow 
& Clifford, 2000; Rees, Fry, & Cull, 2001; Sivell et al., 2008). 
Evidence suggests that personal beliefs about inheritance and risk are constructed 
by drawing on factors that create mental representations of one's health, such as past 
experiences, disease patterns and causation, and growing up in an at-risk family 
(d' Agincourt-Canning, 2005; Etchegary, 2006b, 2010; Etchegary & Perrier, 2007; Hall, 
Suakko, Evans, Qureshi , & Humphries, 2007; Hallowell et al. , 2006; Hunt, Davison, 
Emslie, & Ford, 2000; Hunt, Emslie, & Watt, 2001; Marteau, Kinmonth, Pyke, & 
Thompson, I 995; McAllister, 2002, 2003; Ponder, Lee, Green, & Richards, 1996; Senior, 
Smith, Michie, & Marteau, 2002; Weiner, & Durrington, 2008). Some studies have 
found that individuals perceive their risk in relation to multiple lifestyle, environment, 
and psychosocial factors, and not as having a solely genetic basis (Shiloh & Saxe, 1989; 
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Walter, Emery, Braithwaite, & Marteau, 2004). Others have noted specifically that ideas 
about risk are related to the varying penetrance of genetic conditions, the knowledge 
regarding modifiable factors on genetics, the ability to control the trajectory of the 
disease, the difficulty with understanding objective risk, and the efforts to cope and 
manage the disease (Cameron et al., 2009; Etchegary, 2010). In keeping with these 
research findings , many scholars acknowledge the importance of having a good 
understanding of how laypersons construct their meaning of ri sk in order to provide 
individualized patient and fami ly care (d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2005 ; Cox, 2003 ; Cox & 
McKellin, 1999; Etchegary, 2006a, 2006b; Ozanne et al. , 2010; Parsons & Atkinson, 
1992; Richards, 1993; Shiloh, Gerad, & Goldman, 2006). 
D' Agincourt-Canning (2005) found that experiential knowledge (empathetic and 
embodied) was critical in shaping risk perception in individuals at high risk for breast and 
ovarian cancer (n=28 carriers; n=ll non-carriers). Empathetic knowledge (knowledge 
derived due to close social relations with individuals who have experienced a particular 
phenomenon) and embodied knowledge (knowledge obtained by actually living through 
the phenomenon) were described by d' Agincourt-Canning as co-existing in a symbiotic 
relationship. That is, both types of knowledge are shaped or reshaped in response to each 
other and variable experiences. An individual's perception of their own risk is dependent 
on the components of their knowledge at a particular point in time, reflecting the transient 
and contextual nature of risk as noted by other researchers (Shedlosky-Shoemaker et al. , 
2010; Sivell et al. , 2008). These findings support previous research that highlights the 
subjective nature of risk, the impact that living in a family with a genetic linked disorder 
has on shaping one's perception of risk, and the how one makes life decisions (Binedell , 
Soldan, & Haper, 1998; Cox, 2003; Cox & McKellin, 1999; Etchegary, 2006b; 
McAllister 2002, 2003). 
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Similarly, Cox, and McKell in ( 1999) argued that objective risk alone is not 
sufficient to explain the complexity of risk perception. Health care providers need to 
understand laypersons' habitual as well as rational understandings of risk by moving 
beyond traditional Mendelian theories of inheritance to incorporate the social, 
biographical, and temporal factors that exist within the context of one's everyday life. 
The authors' prospective qualitative study examined how individuals living in a family 
with a history of HD construct risk. Patticipants' narratives described individuals ' sense 
of risk as being transient in nature, going from being non-existent to a heightened state of 
awareness or relevancy. Relevancy of risk is attributed to a critical event such as a 
sibling being diagnosed, a relative dying from the disease, or the person approaching the 
age of onset. This transient nature of risk has also been reported for patients living with 
cardiac disease (e.g., Brorsson, Troein, Lindbladh, Selander, & Widlund, 1995) and in 
other studies on HD (Etchegary, 2006a, 2006b, 20 10). 
Recent work by Etchegary (2010) examining living at risk for HD referred to the 
conditions upon which laypersons' ideas about risk are constructed as "zones of 
relevancy." These zones of relevance sparked participants to rethink their personal 
perception of being at-risk. Zones of relevancy included such things as stage of life (e.g., 
nearing age of disease onset, marriage, and reproduction choices); family history of HD; 
news of another affected relative; one's intuition or belief as to their genetic status; and 
the experience of a critical event in one's life (e.g., onset of symptoms, starting school). 
53 
It is the transient and subjective nature of the zone of relevancy as described by Etchegary 
that helps us understand how risk construction is an evolving social process. 
The role of heuristics, subjectivity, and life-relevancy in shaping one's risk 
perception is also explicit in Sanders, Campbell , Donovan, and Sharp's (2007) study of 
the general public's accounts of hereditary risk perception. While participants were open 
to health education messages, they drew upon multiple sources of information that were 
personally relevant and accessible at the time in order to construct, control, and 
rationalize their personal sense of risk (that is, rather than relying solely on genetic 
information). Key sources of relevant information included family history, personal 
theories of inheritance, existing social relationships and, at times, existing scientific 
knowledge. Noteworthy is the fact that although participants were aware of the function 
of genetics in disease causation, they often downplayed its role or rejected genetic causes 
in favor of lifestyle and environmental factors in order to gain some sense of control over 
their risk. Despite this, many did not state that they would make the suggested 
behavioural changes. The authors suggested that this might be attributed to the fact that 
irrelevant knowledge or that which may sti ll be considered abstract causes a sense of 
disembodiment, having no personal meaning and thus requiring no action. 
A study by Kenen, Arden-Jones, and Eeles (2003) on women at risk for hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer (HBOC) supports Sanders e l. (2007), as to the significant role 
heuristics p lays in understanding one's risk and disease management. Kenen et al. also 
suggested that laypersons' perceptions of risk are strongly shaped by observing 
similarities amongst fami ly characteristics such as shared phenotypic features and shared 
personality traits, which has been reported by other scholars (Finkler, 2001, 2005).Finkler 
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(200 1) refers to the role of shared familial characteristics in defining risk as the 
medicalization of family and kinship. That is, people are considered "at-risk by 
association"; living in a family at-risk means one will most likely develop the condition. 
The participants in the study by Kenen et al. (2003) also considered pieces of family 
stories as ingredients to formulate their personal theories of inheritance and coinciding 
sense of risk. Woman referred to physical characteristics or circumstances of an affected 
person that was representative of their own current state of affairs, regardless of statistical 
probability, to shape their risk perception. For others, ideas surrounding risk were 
interpreted in relation to a critical event, such as the death of a family member that stood 
out in one's mjnd. For those with a heightened sense of fear, the illusion of having some 
control over their risk and disease management was an essential coping mechanism 
regardless of scientific merit. As had been previously reported by Marteau et al. (1999), 
Kenen et al. concluded that information about genetics is not processed in a silo but is 
superimposed on pre-existing perceptions of disease causation. That is, newly acqui red 
information is understood in light of pre-existing personal frameworks in the lay 
construction of risk. Understanding lay constructions of risk therefore can be 
challenging, given the complex nature of many diseases, as well as competing media and 
familial perceptions of disease causation. Kenen et al. (2003) and Sanders et al. (2007) 
support the work of other studies on HNPCC (McAllister, 2002, 2003) and HD (Cox, 
2003, Etchegary, 2006a, 2006b, 2010; Smith et al. , 2002) as to the vital role that lay 
models of inheritance play in the construction of risk. 
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Who are the "Experts"? 
The burst of technological advancements in recent decades has resulted in a 
proliferation of disciplines-deemed "experts" (Foucault, 1977). These experts are 
considered to have the most up-to-date knowledge and experience within a designated 
fie ld. In the context of genetics, this is a role that has traditionally been held by the 
scientific community and, more recently, other health care providers, such as genetic 
counsellors. Lippman (1994) intentionally moves away from the traditional scientific 
description of experts to depict them as storytellers who draw upon experiences, 
information, and knowledge to construct explanations and stories for diseases of interest, 
in a way that reflects not only their own views but also the current social and cultural 
context. Most of the literature that supports a social construction of risk perception 
perspective draws on Lippman's definition of experts and extends it to include the 
layperson as expert. Thus, the quandary that exists in the literature is how to account for 
the knowledge, experiences, and stories of laypersons that are critical to understanding 
how people's perception of risk is shaped and managed, given that a layperson's 
perception of risk is often different from that of experts (Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 
1980). I argue, following the work of critical theorists such as Lock and Nguyen (2010), 
that by using a social constructivist lens, health care providers can appreciate and merge 
the varying sources of expertise in order to understand how risk is constructed. To 
facilitate this discussion, an examination of the literature that highlights the existing 
contentions surrounding laypersons ' versus expert's knowledge, as well as how 
laypersons "trust" in technology and experts influence their risk perception, is helpful. 
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Expert and lay knowledge of genetics. One of the foremost differences between 
lay compared to expert knowledge surrounding genetics is, of course, the layperson's 
basic knowledge of the science of genetics. Some researchers have described laypersons 
as lacking an understanding of the core concepts used in genetics such as basic anatomy 
and physiology of genetic material, relevant terminology, and probability of transmission 
(Condit, 2010; Lanie et al., 2004; Richards, 1996). 
Research that emphasizes the lack of knowledge of genetic science on the part of 
non-experts unfortunately supports the assumption that laypeople who fail to follow the 
advice of experts do so because of a lack of understanding of the science that guides the 
decision or advised behaviour. Some critical theorists refer to this as the "knowledge 
deficit" framework for understanding lack of uptake of genetic testing services (Hansen, 
Holm, Frewer, Robinson, & Sandoe, 2003). Of those who adhere to the knowledge 
deficit understanding of genetic testing decisions, education of laypeople by experts is 
proposed to resolve the knowledge deficit (Hansen et al. , 2003). 
Although the literature depicts a clear discrepancy between laypersons ' and 
experts' understanding of the concept of risk, this does not equate a knowledge "deficit" 
of the layperson. Rather it reflects the diversity of the meaning assigned to risk based on 
competing types of knowledge; scientific versus embodied and practical knowledge. In 
fact, some researchers persuasively argue that laypersons do have a practical knowledge 
of genetics and are able to make decisions surrounding predictive genetic testing (e.g., 
Binedell et al. , 1998). It is this practical knowledge that leads to the development of lay 
theories of inheritance in lieu of traditional biomedical models of inheritance (Richards, 
1993) and that also disputes the proposed knowledge deficit model (Einsiedel , 2000). 
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In contrast to the knowledge deficit theory, other researchers have emphasized 
that discrepancies between lay and expert perceptions of risk are not strictly dictated by a 
deficit in knowledge, but linked to how one assimilates presented knowledge into existing 
personal frameworks of beliefs and values about genetics (Cox & McKellin, 1999; 
Ozanne eta!., 2010; Parsons & Atkinson, 1992; Richards, 1993; Shiloh eta!., 2006). 
Given the fact that individuals have different representations of disease causation and 
what it means to be at-risk, it does not suffice to provide information; rather, we need to 
explore further how these representations evolve in order to decipher and clarify any 
misconceptions (Shiloh eta!.), to move towards a more collaborative understanding of 
risk, and in order to facilitate informed decision-mabng (Cox, 2003; Cox & McKellin, 
1999; Etchegary, 2006a; Parsons & Atkinson, 1992; Richards, 1993; Ozanne eta!., 2010). 
Joffe (2003) further critiques the knowledge deficit theory in that it fails to take into 
consideration the diverse social contexts (i.e., symbolic, organizational , and political), in 
which laypersons construct their realities in lieu of the idea that they are a rational actor 
who will always engage in risk prevention activities. 
Ozanne eta!. (2010) offer some insights into how experts influence laypersons' 
beliefs about being at risk for BRCAl/2. They found that although physicians 
communicated risk information in a way that coincided with client preferences, the 
physicians had difficulty estimating the participants ' perceptions of lifetime risk. The 
findings questioned the abi lities of experts to tailor risk information to reflect individuals ' 
objective risk and facilitate informed decision-making. Also, having determined that 
counselling had no effect on women 's preferences for preventive interventions, the 
authors queried whether experts indeed clearly understood the pre-existing values and 
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ideas that guide participants' decisions about engaging in healthy behaviours and 
predictive genetic testing, as had been previously suggested by SiveH et al. (2008). 
Another qualitative study noted that risk communicated by experts was more meaningful 
when family histories were taken into account during risk assessments (HaH, Saukko, 
Evans, Qureshi, & Humphries, 2007). In that study, participants' ideas about risk and 
subsequent management of their condition was found to be more in alignment with 
experts when health care providers took the time to listen to and explore participants' 
concerns about being at-risk. 
Laypersons, experts, and technology: Who trusts whom? Research on 
differing perceptions of risk between laypersons and experts has demonstrated that there 
is a disconnect between the two sets of ideas about risk that has led to a sense of mistrust, 
predominantly in relation to new, innovative technologies, such as predictive genetic 
testing. Giddens ( 1991 ) argued that lay perceptions of modern technologies swing 
between support and doubt that are shaped by the discourse surrounding the risks and 
benefits of the technology under question. It is, therefore, no surprise that a difference 
between lay and expert understandings of risk leads to mistrust, given that new 
technologies such as predictive genetic testing and subsequent practices are controHed by 
the experts (Giddens, 199 J ), which in itself can spark a sense of uneasiness due to a lack 
of control for those designated to be at-risk. 
JaHinja et al. 's (1998) po]] on attitudes towards genetic testing (n= 1169) within 
the general population in Finland supports Gidden' s perspective on Jay perceptions of 
modern technologies. Participants spoke of ambiguity regarding the long-term 
repercussions of predictive genetic testing, such as eugenics. This uncertainty about 
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eugenics and the long-term implications of the technology fostered mistrust in the general 
population towards the advice of experts. Some participants in the study by Jallinja et al. 
disagreed with this opinion and took the approach that laypersons need to have 
confidence in the abilities of experts and technology if engaged in the predictive genetic 
testing process, in keeping with Giddens ' (1991) description of modernity that holds that 
trust is a process of mutual disclosure amongst laypersons and experts (p.6). 
Cardiovascular Literature: Being At-Risk for a Genetically Linked Heart Disease 
Little attention has been paid to how individuals at risk for a genetically linked 
cardiac disease understand and manage their own risk status. The majority of research 
related to coronary heart disease (CHD) and genetics is quantitative in nature, 
emphasizing gene identification, symptom management, and behavioural modifications. 
The management of CHD is discipline driven and comes from several theoretical 
standpoints: a genetics framework, a focus on the specific factors that cause CHD (e.g., 
diet and exercise), and a consideration of a broader range of risk factors that lead to CHD 
(e.g., access to resources) (Weiner & Martin, 2008). In addition to using competing 
frameworks about CHD, each disciplinary approach focuses on management approaches, 
prevention strategies, and the different causes of heart disease. Finally, each approach has 
projected different visions for the future of CHD reflective of the disciplinary knowledge 
that has shaped the particular model (Weiner & Martin , 2008). All of the above factors 
are apparent in the literature that describes the "coronary candidate" (that is, the typical 
individual that develops cardiovascular disease, i.e. obese, unemployed, smoker, and 
inactive) and the use of biomedical knowledge to construct risk. 
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The coronary candidate. While most of the literature on CHD does not attend 
specifically to the social construction of risk among patients or families living with 
cardiac disease, messages about "risk" that have been constructed within the medical 
model of cardiac disease are fairly clear. In particular, an analysis of the notion of a 
"coronary candidate" is a predominant thread in the literature, and illustrates how the 
concept of being at risk for coronary disease is constructed, conveyed, and taught to 
patients. Critical theorists have commented on how the notion of a "coronary candidate" 
in literature conveys specific meanings regarding being at risk for and managing heart 
disease (Davison, Frankel , & Smith, 1989, 1992; Davison, Smith, & Frankel, 1991 ; 
Emslie, Hunt, & Watt, 2001; Hunt et al., 2000; Walter & Emery, 2005) 
Davison et al.' s ( 1991) study was the first major study to explore the social and 
cultural context of CHD in relation to the notion of a coronary candidate. According to 
that study, the typical coronary candidate is one who is obese, unemployed, a smoker, and 
inactive. For laypersons, the mental representations of the coronary candidate function to 
provide retrospective explanations of heart illness for one's self and others as well as a 
means to predict others' and one's own risk of illness and death from heart disease. In 
order to assess one's candidacy for heart disease, the layperson assumes the role of the lay 
epidemiologist, deciphering various sources of evidence, such as direct observation of 
cases of heart disease, stories about heart disease, scientific knowledge, and the media in 
relation to their visible factors (Davison et al. , 1991 , 1992). Davison et al. ( 199 1) explain 
that the coronary candidate has four opposing outcomes regarding the status of being a 
candidate for heart disease: (1) the victim of heart trouble; (2) the lucky survivor, who has 
characteristics of coronary candidacy but no heart disease; (3) the survivor; and (4) the 
unlucky victim or the last person you would expect to have heart disease. Individuals 
draw on these outcomes in order to rationalize existing beliefs surrounding coronary 
candidacy and anomalies. 
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In his description of the coronary candidate, Davison et al. (1 989, 199 1, 1992) 
refer to the idea of fatalism to describe how individuals conceptualize anomalies or poor 
cardiac outcomes that are not explained by behavioural outcomes. This idea can be 
utilized when considering the case of the unlucky victim who is not obese, eats healthy, 
does not smoke, and exercises routinely but who has a myocardial infarction versus the 
lucky survivor: a 70-year-old who smokes, drinks, and eats a diet high in salt and fat but 
who has no medical problems. The role that fatalism plays in understanding being at risk 
for FH has been explored in several studies (Hunt et al. , 2000; Senior, Marteau, & Peters, 
1999; Weiner, 2009). 
Senior et al 's (1 999) study of parents who participated in neonatal screening for 
familial hypercholesterolerrlia (FH) found that those who interpreted the test as only 
identifying an elevated cholesterol level perceived the disease as familial but modifiable 
with diet and hence less threatening. In contrast, when the results were thought to be 
genetic in nature, then the elevated cholesterol was viewed as more threatening and not 
modifiable. The authors suggested that the latter view could lead to a fatalistic approach 
that negatively affects one ' s adherence to behavioural changes. Senior et al. concluded 
that when presenting genetic information, it is important that health care providers take 
time to understand laypersons' models of disease causation in order to plan realistic 
management strategies and avoid a fatalistic approach. 
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Weiner's (2009) study on participant experiences of living with coronary heart 
disease (CHD) reported findings similar to those of Davison et al. ( 1989, 1991 , 1992) in 
terms of participants' descriptions of models of inheritance and outcomes. Participants 
were found to oscillate between various accounts of disease causation for FH and CHD 
that fit within their existing personal theories of inheritance at the time. That is, CHD 
was not framed purely from a genetic standpoint but in regards to laypersons' 
understanding of the coronary candidate. While some participants did recognize that 
staying healthy was their responsibility, they did not see themselves as being responsible 
for having high cholesterol. Hence, having a genetic disposition for FH did not 
necessarily infer a fatalistic attitude. This pragmatic approach gave participants the 
option to relinquish responsibility for their carrier status and negative health outcomes 
while at the same time maintaining their dedication to a healthy heart lifestyle, congruent 
with heart disease management and defiant of the vision of the coronary candidate. 
The notion of coronary candidacy has also been gendered as a male concept 
(Emslie et al. , 200 1). Emslie et al. (200 1) examined the relationship between perceptions 
about heart disease, gender, and social class. Sixty-one men and women from various 
social econoTTlic situations were included. Participants' narratives revealed three key 
themes: (1) the mechanical versus the emotional heart, (2) the gendering of coronary 
candidacy, and (3) accounts of heart problems amongst women. The first theme 
summarized participants' perceptions of the heart as serving both a mechanical and 
emotional role. The gendered nature of coronary candidacy was highlighted in 
participants ' stories that depicted men as the typical coronary candidacy victim in keeping 
with Davison et al. , 1991, 1992. The final theme described participants' accounts of heart 
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disease in the family. Recollections of men with heart disease tended to focus on graphic 
accounts of mortality, whereas descriptions by women with heart disease centered on 
morbidity and framed it in light of a chronic illness that limited productivity. The authors 
concluded that laypersons' perceptions of heart disease are framed and continue to be 
framed within the strong historical context of a male disease. 
Using biomedical knowledge to construct risk. Another common thread 
throughout the literature, similar to but outside discussions of the coronary candidate, is 
that laypersons and experts draw upon traditional biomedical models of disease causation 
to inform themselves and others about the nature of CHD and subsequent management. 
These biomedical models are a reference point for risk construction and provide the 
framework through which many individuals begin to develop their sense of risk; however, 
it is the context of one's experiences that shapes and reshapes the meaning of being at-
risk. Furthermore, ideas about risk are intermittently superimposed on biomedical models 
of cardiovascular heart disease as an individual gives meaning to their risk status, makes 
lifestyle changes, and/or dismisses ideas about risk. This is evident in the literature that 
explores the construction of risk in other genetic linked diseases (Braithwai te, Emery, 
Walter, Prevost, & Sutton, 2004; Frich et al. , 2006; Hunt et al. , 2000; van Maarle et al., 
2003; Walter & Emery, 2005; Walter et al. , 2004; Weiner, 2009; Weiner & Durrington, 
2008). 
Walter et al. (2004), in a systematic review of qualitative research that examined 
laypersons' understandings of fami lial risk, included one study on FH (the study by 
Brorsson et al. , 1995). Their review of the study by Brorsson et al. supported previous 
findings that laypersons and experts do have varying perceptions of risk and, more 
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importantly, that risk perception is something that develops parallel to ongoing 
assessments of one's vulnerability to the disease, as was supported by subsequent studies 
(Farrimond, Saukko, Qureshi, & Evans, 2010; Finch et al., 2006; Walter & Emery, 2005). 
In other words, a layperson's risk assessment, as described by McAllister (2002, 2003), is 
informed by and grounded in a personalizing process that includes an awareness of the 
saliency of one's own family history, a reflection on personal experiences, and the 
development of personal theories of inheritance. For some, risk perception coincides with 
a sense of fatalism or luck as described by Davison et al., 1989, 1991 , and 1992, but for 
others risk is defined in terms of the consequences of and success in managing the 
disease. 
In a follow-up study to the original (2004) review, Walter and Emery (2005) used 
a comparable cohort to that of Walter et al. (2004 ). Although they reported related results 
to the 2004 study, several new themes emerged that strengthened their previous theories 
about risk-themes that were similar to results that had been reported in an earlier study 
by Hunt et al. (2001). Walter and Emery attributed participants' ideas about risk as being 
influenced by the number of affected relatives, whether the participants had witnessed the 
illness, the strength of their personal relationships with the affected person, and their 
perceived likeness to the affected person (i.e., personality, mannerisms, and physical 
appearance). Participants also described a type of bargaining to decrease their own sense 
of vulnerability and to justify not adopting a healthy lifestyle by the use of counter 
examples. This finding is similar to Davison et al' s (1991, 1992) descriptions of the 
lucky survivor. According to Walter and Emery, participants believed they could control 
their risk for the disease by modifying their behaviour and lifestyle. 
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Finch et al. (2006) also described layperson 's perceptions of vulnerability for FH. 
For these participants, their sense of vulnerability was shaped in relation to ideas about 
genetics and inherited risk. Participants identified a two- step process undertaken to tease 
out their susceptibility for heart disease. This approach taken by the participants in the 
study by Finch et al. supports the findings of Walter et al. (2004). The first step taken by 
participants included an appraisal of factors that would serve as a reference point to guide 
one's risk assessment, such as family history, patterns of disease (i.e., morbidity and 
mortality rates), and personal experiences. These factors were all critical in order to 
configure mental representations of the families' coronary candidacy. These mental 
representations were then used as a framework to construct participants' own evolving 
sense of vulnerability in response to biographical and social contexts. In contrast to 
earlier studies (Walter & Emery, 2005), participants did not make reference to physical or 
mental similarities to relatives as being imperative to risk construction. Age of onset of 
disease was the primary factor drawn upon to solidify vulnerability to heart disease. The 
significance of age as an appropriate evaluative measure of cardiac mortality and risk has 
been noted in two earlier studies (Emslie et al, 2001 ; Weiner & Durrington, 2008). 
A Canadian study (Angus et al. , 1995) explored the experiences of individuals as 
they tried to assess their own risk for coronary heart disease in lieu of visible physical 
signs of heart disease. Participants described difficulty understanding how they could be 
labeled "at-risk" for coronary heart disease when they had no visible symptoms for the 
disease. Accepting the label of being at-risk meant modifying lifestyle factors thought to 
cause CHD. In order to deal with this "abstract" sense of risk, participants sought 
evidence to support the fact that they were indeed at-risk. Hence, many looked to their 
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family histories, lifestyle habits, and characteristics of the coronary candidate to negotiate 
ideas about risk. Others used medical hermeneutics to conceptualize their risk. That is, 
they drew on the knowledge of physicians and diagnostic tests in an effort to quantify 
their risk. Finally, they measured their risk according to whether they had had a 
myocardial infarction or not. For some, they saw this critical event (the myocardial 
infarction) as the impetus for behavioural changes and as altering their future. These 
findings might explain why individuals who have no outward physical signs of a genetic 
condition do not engage in behavioural management regimes. That is, one 's "genes" are 
something invisible and abstract, requiring no immediate intervention. It is only with the 
onset of physical symptoms (e.g., chest pain, shortness of breath) that these at-risk 
individuals start to reconceptualize what it means to be at-risk. This reliance on visible 
physical factors as a measurement of one ' s risk has been reported in several other studies 
(Chan, Lopez, & Chung, 201 2; Marteau et al. , 1995). 
Hunt et al's (2000) study, which spanned nine years, found that having a family 
history of heart disease was a significant factor in the construction of a layperson' s 
perceptions of risk. Over time the meaning of living with heart disease in these families 
was continuously juxtaposed against other risk factors in order to make behavioural 
decisions. Family history has been noted by other researchers as being a more important 
indicator of coronary candidacy than epidemiological trends and/or invisible measures 
such as blood pressure or cholesterol (Marteau et al. , 1995; Ponder et al. , 1996). By 
comparison, one systematic review of the literature on perceptions of risk factors for heart 
disease identified lifestyle, stress, and heredi ty as having the biggest impact on one ' s 
perception of being at risk for heart disease (French, Senior, Weinman, & Marteau, 2007) 
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How individuals cope with the news that they are at high risk for CHD has also 
been examined in the literature. Farrimond et al. (20 10) explored how individuals 
conceptualized and responded to the news that they were at high risk for CHD. A variety 
of coping strategies were employed to decrease the sense of susceptibility to heart disease 
and to retain health status. Participants compared themselves to the traditional coronary 
candidate. Some evaluated their risk of getting heart disease in light of more pressing 
factors that required their intention. Others normalized their risk and prescribed 
treatments (i.e. , cholesterol-reducing medications) in terms of the aging process or made 
downward comparisons, where they compared themselves to others less fortunate in order 
to judge their own situation. The contextual nature of one's vulnerability was another key 
theme. Participants emphasized the symbolic representations of aging and CHD in 
reference to their sociocultural environment. Vulnerability to CHD was framed in 
reference to the physical context of their wellbeing, identified risks status, and expected 
life trajectory such as age, in order to make decisions surrounding their risk. The final 
theme reflected participants' efforts to retain and embody a healthy identity by adhering 
to any recommended behavioural and lifestyle changes such as diet and exerci se. 
Findings suggested that heart prevention programs needed to be context-sensitive to the 
aging process and the sociocultural context in which individuals at risk for heart disease 
exist. The interplay of social and cultural meanings of CHD disease was also evident in 
several other cardiovascular studies (Emslie, Hunt, & Watt, 2003; Hunt et al. , 2001; 
Murray et al., 2000). 
From this discussion it is evident that ideas about being at risk for CHD are 
contextual in nature. In order to personalize the meaning of being at-risk, individuals take 
a pragmatic approach. That is, they juxtapose various sources of scientific knowledge 
against their own experiences. It is this juxtaposition that facilitates individuals in 
decision-making as they move through the predictive genetic testing process. 
Predictive Genetic Testing Decision-Making Process 
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There have been copious studies that have attempted to identify key factors 
influencing decisions surrounding the predictive genetic testing process. While some 
studies reported that a positive correlation exists between risk perception and making the 
decision to participate in predictive genetic testing (Armstrong et al. , 2000), others 
suggested that this is not always the case (Cameron, et al., 2009; Shiloh et al. , 1998), 
arguing instead that a heightened sense of risk could in fact lead to disengagement or 
refusal to paJticipate in the process (McAllister, 2002) . There is a large body of literature 
that explores the factors that impact the decision to participate in predictive genetic 
testing or not. However, the literature does not focus on the social process of decision-
making in genetic linked conditions but instead looks at how specific variables (e.g., age) 
impact the decision-making experience. This gap fragments our understanding of the 
predictive genetic testing decision-making process. The following discussion begins with 
an overview of the literature that has explored why people engage or disengage in 
predictive genetic testing, and it is followed by an examination of existing qualitative 
research that highlights the contextual issues that infl uence the predictive genetic testing 
decision-maki ng process. 
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Why Do People Participate in Predictive Genetic Testing? 
There is a large body of research that attempts to discover key factors that 
motivate people to participate in the predictive genetic testing process. Findings suggest 
that one of the primary motivators is an increased awareness of one's risk status as a 
result of growing up in a family with a history of a genetic linked disease (Armstrong et 
al., 2000; Cox, 2003; d' Agincourt-Canning, 2005; Etchegary, 2006a; McAllister, 2002; 
Norris et al., 2009) or having a first-degree relative affected with the disease under 
investigation (Lerman, Daly, Masny, & Balshem, 1994). Another key motivating factor 
is a sense of relational responsibility (d' Agincourt-Canning, 2001; 2006a, 2006b; 
Etchegary, 2006a; Etchegary & Fowler, 2008; Hallowell , 1999; Hallowell et al., 2006; 
KJitzman, Thorne, Williamson & Marder, 2007) that extends to include concern for other 
family members ' risk status, particularly that of children (Andersen, Oygen, Bjorvatn, & 
Gjengedal, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2000; Binedell et al., 1998; Bruno et al. , 2004; 
Chivers Seymour, Addington-Hall, Lucassen, & Foster, 2010; d' Agincourt-Canning, 
2006a, 2006b; Decruyenaere et al. , 1997, 2003; Douma, Aaronson, Vasen, & Bleiker, 
2008; Evers-Kiebooms et al. , 2002; Esplen et al., 2001 ; Etchegary, 2006a; 2009; Haddow, 
2009; Lerman et al. 1994; Meiser et al. , 2007; Norris et al., 2009; Smart, 2010; Smith et 
al. , 2002; Weiner & Durrington, 2008). 
Critical events, such as the onset of disease symptoms or the death of a family 
member, have also been found to increase risk awareness and thusly motivate individuals 
to participate in the predictive genetic testing process (Armstrong et al., 2000; Etchegary, 
2006a, 2010; KJitzman, Thorne, Williamson & Marder, 2007; Smith et al., 2002). This 
has been explained as relieving feelings of uncertainty about carrier status (Armstrong et 
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a1, 2000; Binedell et al., 1998; Christiaans et al., 2009; d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b; 
Decruyenaere et al., 1997, 2003; Douma et al., 2008; Evers-Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 
1998; Evers-Kiebooms et al., 2002; Lerman et al., 1994, Meiser et al. , 2007). Some 
theorists describe participant choices to participate in predictive genetic testing as a 
means of obtaining information about disease management and gaining easier access to 
resources such as screening protocols, prophylactic surgeries, and lifestyle management 
(Armstrong et al. , 2000; d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006a, 2006b; Esplen et al. , 2001; Lerman 
et al. , 1994; Meiser et al., 2007). Other theorists have reported that knowing one's risk 
status is in itself a coping mechanism-an opportunity to acquire a sense of control over 
life and to plan for future life experiences such as marriage, reproduction, finances, and 
employment (Binedell et al. , 1998; Decruyenaere et al., 1997; Etchegary, 2009; Evers-
Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 1998; Evers-Kiebooms et al. , 2002; Lerman et al. , 1994). 
Some studies found that the decision to participate in predictive genetic testing was based 
on recommendations of physicians (Esplen et al., 2001 ; Madlensky, Esplen, Gallinger, 
McLaughlin, & Goel, 2003), in response to genetic counselling (Christiaans, Birnie, 
Bonse1, Wilde, & van Lange, 2008), and to advance research (Esplen et al. , 2001). 
From this overview, it is quite evident that decisions to undergo predictive genetic 
testing are contingent upon a multitude of factors, some of which have strong historical 
roots in biomedical models of inheritance, and others that reflect the contextual and 
experiential nature of risk. Unfortunately, biomedical and social motivators for 
participating in predictive genetic testing have tended to be discussed in isolation from 
each other in the literature. As a result, health care providers are neglected a full 
understanding of how biomedical models of di sease causation are superimposed and 
integrated into one's everyday "practical" knowledge and life experiences in order to 
understand, cope, and make decisions about their own risk. 
Why Do People Refuse to Participate in Predictive Genetic Testing? 
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Despite the abundance of research that explores factors influencing an individual's 
willingness to engage in the predictive genetic testing process, there is a scarcity of 
literature asking whether and how individuals make the decision to forego predictive 
genetic testing. The principal reasons cited as to why at-risk people do not participate in 
predictive genetic testing are as follows: concerns about being stigmatized, concerns over 
the financial impact of having tests, and concerns about loss of health insurance 
(Armstrong et al., 2000; BinedeJJ et al., 1998; KJitzman, Thorne, Williamson, & Marder, 
2007; Landsbergen, Verhaak, Kraaimaat, & Hoogerbrugge, 2005; Lerman & Shields, 
2004; Meiser et al., 2007; Quaid, & Morris, 1993; Weiner & Durrington, 2008). 
Additionally, distress anticipated with the predictive genetic testing process was 
noted by some studies to be a deterrent to participation (d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b; 
KJitzman, Thorne, Williamson & Marder, 2007; Landsbergen et al. , 2005; Lerman, et al., 
1998; Meiser, 2005; Smart, 20 I 0). In several studies participants were apprehensive 
about their ability to cope with the uncertainty of the test result (Binedell et al., 1998; 
d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b; Decruyenaere et al., 1997; Evers-Kiebooms & 
Decruyenaere, 1998; Lerman & Shields, 2004), as well as the ability of other family 
members to cope with the genetic test result (BinedeJJ et al., 1998; d' Agincourt-Canning, 
2006b; Evers-Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 1998; KJitzman, Thorne, Williamson, Chung & 
Marder, 2007; Lerman & Shields, 2004; Meiser et al., 2007). Thus, in order to avoid or 
defuse the distress associated with knowing the test result, many participants declined to 
engage in the predictive genetic testing process (d' Agincourt-Canning 2006b; 
Decruyenaere et al., 1997; Evers-Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 1998). 
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Lack of participation in predictive genetic testing has also been attributed to the 
fact that knowing one's risk status does not benefit certain individuals, including those at 
risk for diseases considered deadl y, with high penetrance and having no known cure, such 
as HD (d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b; Binedell et al. , 1998; Evers-Kiebooms & 
Decruyenaere, 1998; Quaid & Morris, 1993), BRCA 112 (d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b) 
and this would also be the situation for ARVC. Anticipated difficulties with disease 
management was also identified as a deterrent to testing, such as access to resources 
(Kiitzman, Thorne, Williamson, & Marder, 2007) and adherence to screening protocols 
(Evers-Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 1998). Other deterrents included having a negative 
perception of the benefits of technology (d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b), lack of trust in 
predictive genetic testing (Meiser et al. , 2007), and lack of relevancy at the time-for 
example, those who have no children to whom to pass the gene on, those who are 
asymptomatic or those who are young and do not see predictive genetic testing as 
something important for them at that particular point in time (Landsbergen et al., 2005; 
Smith et al., 2002; Weiner & Durrington, 2008). For the participants in one study, the 
fact that life decisions were not contingent on predictive genetic testing results made it a 
non- priority at the time (Decruyenaere et al., 1997). In order to fuJJy appreciate the 
contextual nature in which decisions about predictive genetic testing are made, it is 
imperative to examine qualitative literature that takes a closer look at the decision-making 
process as opposed to literature that looks mainly at the reasons fo r choices in isolation 
from the process of decision-making (Etchegary, 2006a). This includes exploration of the 
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broader social, political, and familial context in which decisions about genetic testing take 
place (d' Agincourt-Caning, 2006). 
The Decision-Making Process in Predictive Genetic Testing. 
The preceding discussion highlights the multitude of factors that may influence 
one's decision to engage in the predictive genetic testing process at any point. Although 
research indicates that experiencing a critical life event or having to make life decisions 
(i.e., marriage, reproduction) triggers engagement in the predictive genetic testing process 
(Armstrong et al., 2000; Binedell et al., 1998; Decruyenaere et al., 1997; Evers-Kiebooms 
& Decruyenaere, 1998; Evers-Kiebooms et al., 2002), there is limited research addressing 
how decisions about genetic testing evolve over time. There is also a dea1th of literature 
that takes a closer look at the contextual nature of the decision-making process for 
predictive genetic testing. Qualitative research that explores the decision-making process 
in genetics provides a good lens through which to gain a fuller understanding of how 
decisions related to predictive genetic testing are made. Threaded throughout much of the 
qualitative literature are the impacts that personal stories have on the decision-making 
process and the diverse social contexts in which decisions are undertaken (Boenik & 
Vander Burg, 2010; Cox, 2003; Etchegary, 2006a; Smith et al. , 2002; Taylor, 2005). 
Qualitative studies on HD conducted by Cox (2003), Etchegary (2006a), Smith et 
al. , (2002) and Taylor (2005) bring to light how at-risk individuals develop a sense of 
readiness to participate in the predictive genetic testing process in relation to the context 
of their everyday lives. In Cox 's study participants described the decision to have 
predictive genetic testing as an evolving conscious awareness that happened over time. 
For others, this decision was something unconscious and in many regards a non-event-
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something that required little thought or discussion but that was accepted as being 
necessary at the time. This was also reported in Smjth et al' s (2002) study on HD and 
Taylor' s (2005) research on HD. Unique to Taylor's (2005) study is the inclusion of 
individuals who made the decision not to be tested at that time (i.e., those who made the 
decision not to having genetic testing right now but who did not exclude it as an option 
later in life, and those who were undecided). Participants describe an emergent sense of 
test readiness that reflects the emotional readiness, informational readiness, and 
circumstantial readiness of oneself and others to participate in the predictive genetic 
testing process. 
Etchegary's (2006a) research in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador 
offers many excellent insights into the meaning of being at risk for HD and how decisions 
to participate in predictive genetic testing, or not, are made. Similarly to Cox (2003), 
several participants in Etchegary's study described their decision as "a non-decision," 
requiring little conscious effort. Other participants spoke of the decision to have 
predicti ve genetic testing as being self-constraining. That is, the decision to engage in 
testing was not perceived as an opportunity or choice for them but rather a moral duty to 
their children. Some participants were described as constantly " re-evaluating the 
decision." For these participants the decision oscillated between wanting the genetic test 
and deciding against it, to refusing to have testing and making the decision to be tested. 
Finally, "test-triggers" such as onset of what was perceived by participants as signs of HD 
prompted some to request testing. 
Scully, Porz, and Rehmann-Sutter (2007), similar to Cox (2003), found that the 
decision to participate in genetic testing for BRCAl/2, CRC, and HD is a conscious 
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process that evolves over time. The researchers found that individuals either engage in 
incremental decision-making for late onset conditions such as HD or make a conscious 
decision to narrow the temporal depth of field of the issue, particularly when faced with 
decisions that are time sensitive, such as prenatal testing. Scully and colleagues (2007) 
noted that these coping mechanisms are strategies not only to maintain a sense of control 
over the decision process but to manage segments of the decision that participants are 
emotionally prepared to address and to provide an opportunity to closely examine the 
situation from a moral standpoint. Hence, when providing care for individuals faced with 
the decision to have genetic testing or not, it is important to recognize the context of the 
decision-making process and have resources to support the individuals throughout the 
entirety of the process. As suggested by Scully et a l. (2007), counselling programs need 
to have time built into them for individuals to reflect on the meaning and consequences of 
their decisions so their consent is truly informed. Finally, health care providers need to 
support individuals to align decisions with their personal construction of reality at the 
time. This means appreciating the complexity of factors influencing the predictive 
genetic testing decision-making process. 
The multifactorial nature of making the decision to engage in the predictive 
genetic testing process for HNPCC has also been described in McAllister's (2002) Theory 
of Engagement. Engagement "reflects the degree of cognitive and emotional involvement 
with cancer risk in individuals from these families, and models the psychosocial process 
of engaging with cancer risk" (McAllister, 2002, p. 42 1 ). The level of engagement is not 
static; it is contingent upon one's personal perceptions of risk and one' s life experiences. 
The level of engagement oscillates between partial , intense, and disengagement. In that 
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study, individuals who perceived their risk as low were partially engaged in the process of 
predictive genetic testing, and hence only engaged at the cognitive level. Participants 
who perceived their risk as high described some distress as to their carrier status but were 
intensely engaged at the cognitive and affective levels. Disengagement describes 
intensely engaged participants who, due to some critical event nonetheless felt it more 
appropriate to withdraw from the genetic testing process. Critical events and distress 
were found to be either the impetus to engagement or disengagement. These findings 
support the fact that in order to support decisions made throughout the process of 
predictive genetic testing, it is imperative that health care professionals understand the 
varying personal experiences of those involved in the process and factors that impede 
engagement in this process. 
McAllister (2002) further identifies three interacting moderating factors that at 
any point can individually or collectively influence risk perception and the level of 
engagement: ( 1) casual conditions that facilitate the process such as previous knowledge, 
personal experience of family history, stage of adult development, gender, family talk, 
family history of diagnosis delay, and risky age; (2) intervening conditions that impede 
the process such as life stressors, ignorance of fami ly history, impersonal knowledge of 
family history, geography, experience with sporadic cancers, and cancer taboo; and (3) 
individual psychological factors such as personal theories of inheritance, ideas about luck, 
confidence about carrier status, and coping strategies. This study is significant in that it 
challenges the assumption that a perception of high risk will result in desirable health 
behaviour. That is, an increased sense of risk can result in disengagement in the genetic 
testing process. 
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Bombard et al.'s (2008) research draws on McAllister's (2002) concept of 
engagement in order to understand individuals ' experiences of being at risk for HD. 
Participants described doing a mental survey of contextual variables to assess their risk 
status, consequences, and coinciding decisions. Engagement with the predictive genetic 
testing process was found to occur in two phases: (1 ) making meaning of genetic disease 
and defining it; and (2) validating its threat and personalizing the risks and consequences 
to oneself and one's family. 
Shiloh and n an's (2005) work on risk perception and BRCAl/2 is significant in 
that it reinforces McAllister's (2002) Theory of Engagement. In order to understand how 
individuals make decisions surrounding predictive genetic testing, one needs to be aware 
of the collaborative role of moderating factors on this process. A heightened risk 
perception alone did not predict interest in predictive genetic testing; however, in 
conjunction with moderating variables that focus on illness prevention, health orientation, 
and decreasing anxiety level , a willingness to participate in predictive genetic testing was 
evident. This study clarifies inconsistent findings surrounding the correlation between 
risk perception and engaging in predictive genetic testing. For example, if the moderator 
is "emotional reassurance," despite being at low risk, one may engage in health 
behaviours such as screening to receive this reassurance. Without an understanding of 
individuals ' moderating factors, it is difficult to anticipate responses to predictive genetic 
testing and to develop counselling services. This study suggests that in order to increase 
uptake for predictive genetic testing, health care providers need to spend time with these 
families and identify moderators that are barriers to positive health outcomes. Included in 
this is an understanding of the moral and sociocultural factors that impact risk perception. 
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Although limited, there are several studies that specifically draw attention to the 
moral and sociocultural contextual factors that influence engagement in the genetic 
testing process (d'Agincourt-Canning 2006a, 2006b; Etchegary, 2006a; Etchegary & 
Fowler, 2008; Hallowell et al., 2006; Ho, Ho, Chan, Kwan, & Tsui, 2003; Klitzman, 
Thorne, Williamson, & Marder, 2007). D' Agincourt-Canning's (2006b) narratives of 
individuals living in families at risk for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer (HBOC) 
described how they made the decision to engage in genetic testing. For these people the 
meaning of being at-risk was found to take shape in relation to the self, which includes 
(1) the embodied self, (2) the familial-relational self, and (3) the civic self. The 
embodied, or physical, self emphasizes how one constructs ideas surrounding risk in 
relation to factual information and relationships with other at-risk family members. The 
familial-relational self reflects the sense of responsibility and duty to get tested for the 
health of other family members, which has also been noted in several studies on HD 
(Etchegary, 2006a; Etchegary & Fowler, 2008), on HBOC and HNPPC (Etchegary et al., 
2009), and BRCA 1/2 (Hallowell et al. , 2006). The civic self refers to the benefits to 
society at large. It is this interconnectedness between the embodied self, the familial-
relational self, and the civic self that shapes the meaning of illness and its significance, 
and frames one's decisions surrounding the predictive genetic testing process. 
There was one cardiovascular study that contributed to our understanding of the 
factors that can influence participation in predictive genetic testing for individuals at risk 
for two genetic linked heart diseases hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM) and long QT 
syndrome (LQTS) (Smart, 2010). Making the decision to participate in predictive genetic 
testing consisted of weighing the benefit of knowing one's risk status versus the 
79 
psychosocial impact that the knowledge will have on their lives. Uncertainty surrounding 
the reliability of accuracy of the test was evident in those with an inconclusive test and in 
non-carriers. Despite these reservations, the majority of participants described predictive 
genetic testing as a way of obtaining family health information and something they would 
be willing to do. Imperative throughout this process was appropriate communication of 
risk. 
It is clear from the above discussion that making the decision to engage in 
predictive genetic testing is complex. For some the decision evolves over time; however, 
for others, it is something that is seemingly more instantaneous in nature, perhaps 
requiring less thought. Regardless of how the process evolves in order to make the 
decision to have genetic testing or not, it is clear that this decision reflects the meanings 
that one assigns to their at-risk status, social interactions, acquired knowledge, life 
experiences, and ability to cope with the news of their genetic test result. A large part of 
making this decision is how risk is understood and communicated between health care 
providers and laypersons. 
Risk Communication 
There is a large body of literature that has addressed how risk communication 
influences risk perception. Researchers have noted that obtaining health information 
about and communicating an individual's risk status is generally understood to be the 
responsibility of the heath care provider (e.g., genetic counsellor). Despite this, there is 
an appreciation of informal methods of risk communication as the "unsaid" responsibility 
of the proband, or the first fami ly member identified as being at-risk. 
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Health Care Providers and Risk Communication 
Discussions about using heuristic devices to aid in the communication of risk 
statistics were pioneered in the 1970s within the field of psychology and were the impetus 
for health care providers to revaluate their own methods of communicating risk in 
appreciation of the subjective nature of "risk" in the context of health (Sjoeberg, Moen, & 
Rundmo, 2004). Hence, there was a shift from the traditional sender-receiver model of 
communication, wherein the health care provider simply disclosed the results, to a more 
holistic model of disclosure (Wilson et al., 2004). Another key shift was the introduction 
of professional genetic counsellors who, in Canada, are prepared with a Master's degree 
in the field of genetics and counselling (Cowan, Morales, Dagua, & Ray, 2008). Given 
that the role of the genetic counsellor in communicating risk accounts for the largest body 
of literature on risk communication in genetic conditions, this section will focus on the 
impact that genetic counselling has on risk. 
Genetic counselling refers to the interactive process that occurs between the 
counsellor and the individual and family at risk for a genetic linked disease. It is the 
process that provides education, support, and knowledge about one's at-risk status in 
relation to family history, inheritance, genetic testing, disease patterns, disease symptoms, 
and available treatment options. Its overall goal is to faci litate the informed consent 
process (Biesecker, 1998; Braithwaite, Emery, Walter, Prevost, & Sutton, 2004; 
Wiseman, Dancyger, & Michie, 2010). 
A large amount of literature has explored the role genetic counsellors play in 
shaping risk perception. A synthesis of this literature is presented in a brief summary of 
six systematic reviews spanning the last 16 years (Butow, Lobb, Meiser, Barratt, & 
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Tucker, 2003; Braithwaite et al. , 2006; Kaphingst & McBride, 2010; Meiser & Halliday 
2002; Sivell et al., 2008; Smerecnik et al., 2009) 
Meiser and Halliday's (2002) meta-analysis of 16 prospective and randomized 
controlled trials (RCT) in women at risk for BRCAl/2 found that genetic counselling 
decreased anxiety related to perceived risk and led to a 23.4% increase in risk accuracy. 
A systematic review by Butow et al. (2003) of quantitative research on ri sk perception 
and psychological outcomes, post-genetic counselling of women at risk for BRCAl/2, 
reported results similar to those of Meiser and Halliday (2002), in that improvements in 
risk perception were noted post-genetic counselling; however, these were found in the 
short term. In fact, longitudinal studies reported that 22% to 50% of women continued to 
overestimate their risk up to one year post-counselling. Results varied in relation to 
psychological outcomes ranging from some reduction in psychological distress to no 
reduction at all. Unlike the findings of Meiser and Halliday, the study by Butow et al. did 
not find that psychological di stress was related to a change in risk perception. 
Braithwaite et al. (2006) conducted a meta-analysis and systematic review of 21 
studies on BRCAl/2, HBOC, and CRC, of which 5 were randomized controlled trials and 
16 were prospective studies. They examined the impact of genetic counselling on three 
outcomes: cognitive (i.e., level and accuracy of risk perception and knowledge), affective 
(i.e., distress, anxiety, depression, and cancer specific worry), and behavioural (i .e. , 
appropriate screening and surveillance). Findings suggested that genetic counselling 
increased knowledge of cancer genetics and did not cause adverse affective outcomes. 
The randomized controlled trials reported in this review contradicted earlier findi ngs by 
Meiser and Halliday (2002), in that the former did not find any reduction in some 
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affective outcomes post-counselling. Prospective studies up to one year post-genetic 
counselling offered a different picture; not only was there an increase in the accuracy of 
risk perception, but an intermittent reduction in cancer worry and anxiety. Sivell et al. 
(2008) also noted these contradictory findings- that in some cases genetic counselling 
did facilitate an understanding of one's risk-but this was not always the case. 
A more recent systematic review (n=l9), by Smerecnik et al (2009), builds on 
earlier reviews of both Meiser and Halliday (2002) and Butow et al. (2003) to include 
other genetic conditions. Prospective and randomized controlled studies were included in 
the review. Most studies supported previous research, in that counselling was found to 
cause a 25% increase in the number of individuals who had an accurate risk perception up 
to one year. However, some studies still found that an average of 25% of individuals 
continued to overestimate their risk, 19.5% underestimated their risk, and only 8% of 
participants reported a decrease in overestimation of risk post-genetic counsell ing. The 
authors concluded that the varied findings as to the effect of genetic counselling on 
producing accurate risk perception may be attributed to numerous factors : discrepancies 
between one' s subjective versus objective risk, the content of counselling session, the fact 
that the majority of existing research is on BRCA 1/2 and HNPCC, a lack of consensus on 
what the appropriate measurements of risk perception and accuracy should include, and 
variations reporting terminology. 
The most recent systematic review by Kaphingst and McBride (2010) of research 
on HBOC (n=l2) and HNPCC (n=5) concluded that although genetic counsell ing appears 
to improve participants understanding of being at risk for a genetic linked disease, it is of 
concern that participants still do not consistently interpret their predictive genetic testing 
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results appropriately. The literature on cardiovascular disease sheds some light on this 
concern, proposing that it is the inconsistency of information that exists amongst health 
care providers-and the dissemination of such inconsistencies to the public-that 
contributes not only to inaccurate risk perceptions but also to the reluctance of at-risk 
individuals to engage in health promoting behaviours such as diet (Goldman et al., 2006). 
That is, in a kind of snowball effect, these misconceptions are spread in communication 
amongst family members and across generations. This warrants a close examination of 
how families communicate risk amongst themselves. 
The above six systematic reviews, while offering insights into understanding how 
risk is understood, presuppose the knowledge deficit model of risk perception. That is, 
laypersons lack an understanding of the science surrounding genetics, and, once the 
experts educate them, this deficit will resolve (Hansen et al. , 2003). I agree with other 
scholars (Cox & McKellin 1999; d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2005; Einsiedel, 2000; Ozanne et 
al. , 2010; Parsons & Atkinson, 1992; Shiloh et al. , 2006) in that laypersons do have a 
unique body of knowledge that is subjective and contextual in nature and that does not 
rely on objective measures of risk as the primary source of their knowledge and that it is 
important to their decision-making process. Furthermore, being that the majority of 
studies included in these systematic reviews are quantitative in nature, they do not capture 
the complexity of laypersons' knowledge. My research study has the potential to fi ll this 
gap and offer a plausible explanation for how laypersons draw on and develop diverse 
sources of knowledge in order to understand their risk and to make decisions about their 
health. 
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Family and Risk Communication 
There are three recent systematic reviews that provide further insights into the 
challenges faced by at-risk individuals as they make the decision to communicate genetic 
risk information to family members (Gaff et al., 2007; Chivers Seymour, Addington-Hall, 
Lucassen, & Foster, 2010; Wiseman eta!., 2010). 
Gaff et a!. (2007) conducted a systematic review of 29 peer-reviewed papers of 26 
studies that investigated the process and outcomes of communicating genetic risk in 
inherited cancer syndromes. Of these studies, 17 were qualitative. In terms of three 
phases, the authors described the challenges that at-risk individuals faced as they prepared 
to communicate risk information to other family members: (1 ) deliberation before 
communication, (2) communication strategies, and (3) outcomes of communication. 
Deliberation before communication (that is, how individuals collect and organize 
their thoughts prior to disclosing risk information) included factors such as being clear 
about one's own personal risk, making the decision as to what information needs to be 
communicated and when, and anticipating potential outcomes of disclosure. During this 
phase, individuals attempted to balance their desire to avoid harm with the need to inform 
a relative of their risk status. This required an assessment of their family member' s 
ability to understand and cope with the news. Participants also described being selective 
in the information they disclosed in terms of family versus personal information. Timing 
of the disclosure was contingent on what participants sensed was the right time- a critical 
event or a social interaction. Communication strategies were described as being spread 
across the continuum of no disclosure, partial disclosure, and cautious disclosure, to open 
and supportive communication. At times disclosure is delegated implicitly or explicitly 
85 
to intermediaries deemed responsible to disseminate the information. There are, however, 
times that this communication does not happen. The final theme discussed by Gaff and 
colleagues-outcomes of communication--considers the impact of disclosure on 
participation in predictive genetic testing, the knowledge level of recipients, and the 
impact of participation in predictive genetic testing on familial relationships. In light of 
their review, the authors suggested that genetic counsellors do play a more active role in 
supporting the sender and receiver of at-risk information throughout the entire disclosure 
process. 
The systematic review by Chivers Seymour et al. (20 1 0) was the first to look at 
factors that facilitate or impede family communication post-predictive genetic testing for 
cancer. The qualitative research reviewed (n=l4) was analyzed in terms of six core 
themes: (1) reaction to being the informant, (2 ) relevancy of information and anticipated 
responses of relatives, (3) closeness of familial relationships, (4) timing and content of 
disclosure, (5) the role of health care providers in disclosure, and (6) famjly rules and 
patterns of disclosure. These themes support the significance of having a good 
understanding of the contextual factors that influence communication between at-risk 
fami ly members (e.g. , a sense of relational responsibility) and being able to communicate 
knowledge about risk in a confident and appropriate manner. These points have also been 
made in studies on individuals living with genetic linked heart conditions such as FH, 
(Weiner & Durrington, 2008) HCM, and LQTS (Smart, 2010). Thus, when planning care 
for individuals living with ARYC, health care providers need to consider the social and 
moral context of family relationships. 
86 
The third systematic review (Wiseman et al. , 2010) on the dissemination of at-risk 
information and the factors that influence the process of risk communication builds on the 
two previously cited reviews. Peer-reviewed articles (n=33) from 1985-2009, using a 
variety of methodologies, were included in their review. Wiseman et al. reported that 
there are several consistent threads in the literature on risk communication. First, 
dissemination of risk information is influenced by a combination of individual, relational, 
and contextual factors. Second, desirability to communicate risk information depends on 
the closeness of familial relationships. Findings, however, were inconsistent as to the 
impact of genetic risk information on family relationships and the family unit, warranting 
further research. 
By comparison to the three above systematic reviews, a recent study took a 
somewhat different approach and looked at the effects of the process of disclosure of at-
risk information on family members' risk perception (Vos et al. , 20 11 ). This is the first 
study to examine the impact of communicating genetic testing information by a proband 
to an at-risk relative in a population with BRCA 112. Participants had received either an 
unclassified variant test, a finding that they had a genetic mutation for which the meaning 
is not known, or an inconclusive test. Vos and colleagues found that relatives of the 
proband did not make their health decisions primarily based on the information 
communicated by the proband but rather on the "art" of communication by the proband. 
That is, the less understandable and reassuring the communication from the proband was, 
the higher the relative's perception of being at risk for cancer was. This supports the 
position that other critical theorists and I hold: that "objective" risk is not the most 
significant concern when constructing ideas about risk. 
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It is evident from this discussion that risk communication is complex, and its 
effectiveness is contingent upon a multitude of factors. This body of literature strongly 
suggests the need for more research that illuminates challenges in the dissemination of 
risk information across the continuum of the genetic testing experience. Furthermore, in 
order to plan for and predict psychosocial and behavioural responses, it is imperative that 
health care providers first take time to explore how risk is being communicated and 
received amongst family members. Finally, given the dearth of literature that looks at 
risk communication in genetic linked cardiovascular disease, more research is critical in 
order to plan for psychosocial and behavioural responses that will add to the existing 
body of knowledge about risk communication. 
How Does Risk Perception Influence Behaviour? 
There is an inference within the literature that knowing one 's genetic risk status 
leads to increased participation in behavioural and lifestyle changes that can minimize 
one's risk (Senior, Marteau & Weinman, 2000), however, this relationship still remains 
unclear (van Maarle et al., 2003). This ambiguity is partly due to the lack of 
understanding of the relationship between objective risk and subjective risk (Kaphingst & 
McBride, 2010; Pilarski , 2009). The literature that has examined individuals' behavioural 
responses to living in a family at risk for a genetic condition has also examined the 
correlation between risk perception and behavioural responses of carriers and non-
carriers, including hypervigilant and hypovigilant behaviours. There is also a small body 
of cardiovascular literature that has addressed behavioural responses to being at risk for a 
genetically linked cardiovascular disease. 
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Risk Perception and Behavioural Responses. 
Although some studies report that an increase in risk perception, or a positive test, 
motivates behavioural changes (Beery & Williams, 2007; Codori, Petersen, Miglioretti, & 
Boyd, 2001; Collins, Meiser, Gaff, John, & Halliday, 2005; Halbert et al., 2004; Johnson, 
Trimbath, Petersen, Griffin, & Giardiello, 2002; Sheinfeld Gorin & Steven, 2003; Van 
Roosmalen et al. , 2004; Watson, Foster, et al., 2004 ), others report that this is not always 
the case (Lerman et al. , 2000, 2002; Marteau et al. , 2004; Marteau & Lerman, 2001 ). In 
fact, the findings from studies suggest that a positive correlation between risk perception 
and levels of psychological distress compromises compliance to surveillance programs 
and increases the likelihood that one will disengage in the genetic testing process 
(MacDonald, Doan, Kelner, & Taylor, 1996; McAllister, 2002). Others argue that 
knowing one' s genetic status results in fatalism due to a sense of lack of control over the 
disease and its outcomes, and hence a feel ing that there is no point in making behavioural 
changes if ones' destiny is, in fact, predetermined (Davison et al., 1989, 1991, 1992; 
Marteau & Lerman, 2001 ; McAllister, 2002, 2003; Senior et al. , 1999; Senior et al, 2000). 
Sivell et al. ' s (2008) systematic review (n= 12) fou nd that research that examined 
the correlation between risk perception, screening and surveillance uptake, and 
willingness to engage in other health-related behaviours (e.g., diet and exercise) is 
inconsistent. Although several studies in this review supported earlier research that an 
increase in stress can lead to disengagement in prescribed treatment regimes (MacDonald, 
Doan, Kelner, & Taylor, 1996; McAllister, 2002) and survei llance (Heshka, Palleschi, 
Howley, Wilson, & Wells, 2008), this was not always the case. 
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Rees, Martin, and Macrae's (2007) literature review, which included research that 
spanned over 12 years (n=30), examined participation in screening by individuals with a 
family history of CRC and supported the observations of Sivell et al. (2008), in that 
research is inconsistent in its findings about at-risk individuals' adherence to 
recommended screening behaviours. Rees and colleagues suggest that there are key 
predictors of adherence to recommended screening: the advice of a health care 
professional, a strong family history of disease, and easy access to screening. In contrast, 
a more recent study that looked at BRCAl/2 noted that although women who had an 
elevated risk perception were more likely to participate in health preventive behaviours, 
there is a threshold: the more invasive the procedure, the less likely one is to engage in 
the activity (Ozanne et al. , 20 10). This finding might explain some of the inconsistencies 
in behavioural responses noted in the literature. 
Living in a family with a genetic linked disease has been found to have a 
significant behavioural impact on all members of the family unit. Taoqiet, Ingrand, 
Beauchant, Migeot, and Ingrand (2010) conducted a cross-sectional survey of siblings 
(n= 172) of patients who had undergone surgery for CRC, examining their willingness to 
undergo a colonoscopy. Sixty-six percent of siblings declared they would participate in a 
colonoscopy. Factors influencing this decision were simi lar to those cited by Rees et al. 
(2007), including reduced barriers to screening, ease of access to resources, 
recommendations of the physician, and discussions with siblings and with health care 
providers. Social support and a sense of pressure to undergo screening were other factors 
identified that impacted screening behaviours. 
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Findings are also controversial as to the correlation between carrier status and 
adherence to recommended management regimes. Some of these findings suggest that 
individuals continue to participate in appropriate screening regardless of carrier status 
(Kaphingst & McBride, 20 10; Meiser, 2005; Meiser et al, 2004). Other studies found that 
behavioural responses to predictive genetic testing change over time and between carriers 
and non-carriers. This may be linked to the changing contextual nature in which one 
constructs their sense of risk, the trajectory of the disease, and relevancy of predictive 
genetic testing (Brorsson et al., 1995; Sanders et al., 2007; Chivers Seymour, et al. , 2010). 
Foster et al. (2007) measured behavioural changes at baseline and at three years in 
women at risk for BRCAl/2 (n=53 carriers; n=lOl non-carriers). They found no 
differences in behavioural management at baseline, regardless of genetic status, but at 
three years mammography rates were higher in carriers (89%) compared to non-carriers 
(47%). Carriers also reported an increase in breast self-exams and opted for more risk 
reducing surgeries such as oophorectomy ( 43%) and mastectomies (34% ). In 
comparison, 36% of non-carriers did not have a mammogram post-testing. Others have 
also reported similar delays in screening up to one year with HNPCC (Bieiker et al. , 
2005). Some studies found that 80% of unaffected carriers tested for HNPCC had a 
colonoscopy within 1-2 years post-testing (Ponz et al. , 2004), with 65% following 
recommended screening guidelines over the immediate 12-month period post-testing 
(Hadley et al. , 2004). 
Carriers and non-carriers both have huge variations in terms of their behaviours 
post-disclosure of predictive genetic test. Wainberg and Husted (2004) conducted a 
systematic review (n=7) on the choices of women post-disclosure of a positive BRCAl/2 
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test. They noted that between 0-54 % of unaffected BRCA 112 carriers opted for a 
prophylactic mastectomy, with 13-53% having an oophorectomy. Of those who did not 
have surgical intervention, 57-93% complied with suggested mammographic screening. 
Meanwhile, non-carriers post-BRCA 112 screening reported no changes in their screening 
practices (Lerman et al., 2000). Similarly, other studies have reported that BRCA 112 
carriers had more prophylactic surgery in comparison to non-carriers and in some cases 
valued it higher (Beery & Williams, 2007; Van Roosmalen et al. , 2004) 
Hypervigilant and hypovigilant behaviours. A body of literature has reported 
that in some cases individuals living in at-risk families exhibit hypovigilant or 
hypervigil ant behaviours in response to the uncertainty of predictive genetic testing 
results and beliefs that the disease is not solely due to genes but a combination of 
modifiable factors (Collins et al. , 2005, 2007; Hadley et al. , 2004; Michie, McDonald, & 
Marteau, 1996; Michie, Weinman et al. , 2002;). 
The systematic review by Heshka et al. (2008) of 30 studies reported in 35 
published articles examined the impact of carrier status on risk perception and 
psychological and behavioural outcomes in HNPCC, HBOC, and Alzheimer disease. 
Most studies in the review concluded that carriers exhibited some limited changes in 
behaviour. There were only two studies on HBOC that reported carriers and non-carriers 
making lifestyle changes to reduce risk (e.g. , diet, exercise and smoking cessation). 
Adherence to suggested surveillance regimes increased in carriers up to one year post-
disclosure of test results compared to pre-disclosure and compared to non-carriers; 
however, they were not as high as expected, and they varied. For example, rates for 
mastectomy and oophorectomy amongst carriers ranged from 0- 51% to 13- 65% amongst 
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those at risk for HBOC. One study on HNPCC reported that 20% of all participants were 
non-adherent with recommended screening practices up to 12 months after receiving 
results. As well, 35% of carriers did not adhere to screening programs post-testing, with 
only 50% having recommended colonoscopy. In non-carriers 13% did not adhere to 
recommended screening and 40% did not have recommended colonoscopy. A few 
carriers (18%) and non-carriers (8%) were hypovigilant and hypervigilant in screening 
behaviours. 
Hypervigilant behaviour was noted in Michie, Weinman et al. 's (2002) cross-
sectional quantitative study. They found that FAP non-carriers (n= l27) still perceived 
themselves as being at high risk for developing FAP. Of those, 42% wanted to continue 
with screening despite their identified low risk. This was attributed to the beliefs that the 
predictive genetic testing was inaccurate and that the FAP disease trajectory was not 
solely due to genetics but to diverse lifestyle factors, as well. These fi ndings were noted 
in earlier research (Michie et al., 1996; Reeve, Owens, & Winship, 2000). 
High levels of psychological distress associated with an elevated sense of risk 
have been linked to what some might consider extreme, or hypervigilant, behaviours. In 
one study, 23% of individuals at risk for HBOC elected to have prophylactic surgery prior 
to predictive genetic testing; subsequently onl y 47% were found to be a carrier. In 
contrast, another study that measured psychological consequences of waiting for test 
results for women at risk for HBOC at various intervals post-testing up to one year 
reported no change in frequency of their monthly breast exam (Broadstock, Michie, Gray, 
Mackay, & Marteau, 2000). Of these women, only three entertained the idea of having a 
prophylactic mastectomy. Only one woman had planned a mastectomy. Ten women felt 
that prophylactic mastectomy was a very drastic measure and would only consider it if 
they knew their test results. 
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Cardiovascular Literature. In the cardiovascular literature, behavioural 
responses have also been linked to one's sense of control over the disease and model of 
risk communication. In a quantitative study by Senior et al. (2000), participants were 
asked to envision how they would respond to the news that they were at risk for heart 
disease or arthritis. Findings reported that participants were more likely to perceive the 
disease as being less preventable through behavioural and lifestyle factors when disease 
causation was framed in a genetic perspective. These findings suggest that providing 
genetic risk information may lead to fatalism due to a lack of control over the disease, 
resulting in a lack of participation in health prevention behaviours. Other studies have 
reported comparable results (Marteau & Lerman, 2001; Senior et al., 1999, 2000). In 
keeping with research by McAllister (2002, 2003), Senior et al. (2000) found that 
individuals have pre-existing models to explain the factors influencing risk of heart 
disease, including personal behaviour (e.g., diet, lifestyle, stress), contextual factors (e.g., 
environment, character), and chance (genes) that they draw on in order to develop their 
own sense of risk. 
In a follow-up study to that of Senior et al. (2000), Senior and Marteau (2007) 
conducted a study to measure the relationship between illness perceptions and behaviours 
of individuals with FH at one week and at six months post-assessment. The authors 
supported the earlier (2000) study in that individuals who perceived FH as having a 
genetic basis held behavioural risk-reducing strategies, such as diet, as less important in 
lieu of more traditional biomedical approaches, such as cholesterol-reducing drugs. In 
comparison, those who attributed FH as having a behavioural influence were more 
inclined to participate in behavioural activities. 
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One study specifically measured behavioural changes in carriers of FH seven 
months post-genetic testing (van Maarle et al., 2003). In this study carriers were noted to 
have used more medication in comparison to baseline (58% up to 77% ); however, there 
were no changes found in smoking or body mass index regardless of carrier status. 
It is quite evident from the above literature that risk perception does impact one's 
behavioural response, but there is no consensus in the literature as to the strength of this 
correlation. For some participants, a high perception of risk motivates one to engage in 
healthy behaviours for a while, but the longevity of this relationship is not fully 
understood. Furthermore, there is evidence that participants do not necessarily adhere to 
recommended behavioural treatments regardless of their carrier status. There are also 
cases of hypovigilant and hypervigilant behaviours that are not fully explainable. Evident 
throughout the literature is the fact that one's responses to being at-risk are constructed in 
a pragmatic way. 
Chapter Summary 
The literature discussed in this chapter highlighted the five key bodies of research 
on risk perception, which includes risk assessment, laypersons' understanding of risk, risk 
and decision-making, risk communication, and behavioural responses to risk. A critical 
look at this research revealed that individuals living in families at risk for a genetic linked 
disease do not conceptualize their risk solely in relation to numerical values, but as a 
subjective experience that is socially constructed. Researchers have proposed the 
"experiential paradigm" as a complementary framework to understand how risk is 
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conceptualized. Threaded throughout the literature reviewed is the fact that risk 
perception is something transient, fluid , and contextual in nature, which cannot be 
captured fully with objective measures. This explains the many inconsistencies noted in 
the literature surrounding risk perception and behaviour responses. 
Being that ideas about risk are shaped and reshaped in relation to one's "lived 
experiences," recent research has used qualitative methods to examine this phenomenon. 
This body of literature makes evident that the knowledge acquired through livi ng and 
witnessing the dynamics of being in a famjJ y at-risk is a key factor that influences ideas 
about ri sk, one's willingness to participate in the genetic testing process, and how one 
copes with the genetic test result. This experiential knowledge gained through these 
"lived experiences" is transient in nature; it gets reshaped in light of new knowledge, new 
experiences, new interactions, and over time. My study goes beyond existing research 
and captures this transient nature of risk-that is, how individuals at risk for ARVC 
juxtapose scientific knowledge against changing experiential knowledge, phase of the 
genetic testing process (pre-testing, during testing, and post-testing), and the specific 
conditions that explain the variations in one's experiences at a particular moment. Out of 
this juxtaposition emerges an understanding of the meaning of being at-risk that 
participants rely on to make decisions about their health. 
Although the literature acknowledges the positive infl uence that experts in the 
field of genetics (such as the genetic counsellor) has on helping individuals understand 
and cope with their genetic status, the longevity of these effects remains unclear. It is 
clear that laypersons draw on the expert-provided information and superimpose it upon 
their own beliefs, experiences, and knowledge about risk in a pragmatic manner (such as 
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in the case of the coronary candidate) in order to understand their personal risk. ln doing 
so, the layperson takes on the role of the expert, dismissing the knowledge deficit model. 
Research also remains controversial as to the behavioural responses of carriers and non-
carriers. Although hypervigilant behaviours have been noted in both carriers and non-
carriers, the opposite is also true; hypovigilant behaviours exist in carriers and non-
earners. 
One's family history, growing up in a family at-risk, a sensed relational 
responsibility, how risk is communicated, the relevancy of the factor considered "risky" 
to one's life, critical events (e.g., onset of physical signs of disease, death of a family 
member), and the belief that one is able to cope with and manage the outcomes of the 
genetic test result have all been noted in the literature as significantly influencing risk 
perception, behavioural responses, and the decision to engage in the genetic testing 
process or not. This research captures this decision-making process and how laypersons 
draw on di verse sources of knowledge in order to understand their risk. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF PREDICTIVE GENETIC TESTING 
The Human Genome Project has crystallized the paramount role that genetics 
plays in the health of individuals, families, communities, and populations. Although 
predictive genetic testing has led to increasingly rapid translation of genomic information 
into clinical application, there has been limited opportunity to examine how individuals 
living in these families assign meaning to being at-risk as they move through the genetic 
testing process. Despite the large number of studies that have attempted to describe, 
explain, and predict the variables that influence one's psychosocial responses to the 
genetic testing process, we still do not have an adequate understanding of how the 
experience of being offered and undergoing genetic testing shapes the meaning of the 
illness experience. The many inconsistencies in the literature describing the various 
psychosocial responses to predictive genetic testing, as well as the inability of existing 
quantitative studies to fuJJy capture these experiences, reflect this lack of understanding. 
In order to develop a plan of care reflective of the needs of individuals at risk for a 
genetically linked condition, it is critical that health care providers have an understanding 
of how individuals cope with and assign meanings to being at-risk. 
This di scussion is framed in relation to three prevalent genetic linked conditions 
(previously discussed in chapter three): (CRC) which includes HNPCC and FAP, 
BRCA 112, and HD. Relevant literature on the meanings of risk in relation to cardiac 
disease will be threaded throughout the discussion. Given the obvious similarities and 
significant differences between these three diseases and compared to ARVC, the literature 
surrounding these genetically linked conditions provides a fertile ground to explore the 
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psychosocial impact of predictive genetic testing on individuals living through the genetic 
testing process. It will also be useful to inform my analysis of the psychosocial 
experiences of living with ARVC and how these individuals assign meaning to being at-
risk as they engage in predictive genetic testing. 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature that explores the psychosocial 
impact of the predictive genetic testing process. This literature review is divided into 
three sections: (1) quantitati ve literature that explores psychological distress in carriers 
and non-carriers, (2) qualitative research that explores the individuals ' experiences with 
predictive genetic testing, and (3) the psychosocial impact of predictive genetic testing on 
members of the family unit. 
Psychological Distress: Quantitative Literature 
Quantitative studies hold strength in identifying trends, patterns, and correlations 
between variables. The largest body of quantitative literature that reports on the impact 
of the predictive genetic testing process is in relation to the magnitude and duration of 
psychological distress in carriers (that is, individuals who have a positive predictive 
genetic test) in comparison to non-carriers (individuals who have a negative predictive 
genetic test). That research indicates that there is a wide variation in the psychosocial 
impact of predictive testing and a wide range of psychological reactions to being 
informed of one's hereditary risk. While some studies report no difference between 
carriers ' versus non-carriers ' responses to notification of genetic status, others make a 
clear distinction. There are varied findings as to whether psychological distress increases, 
remains the same, or decreases across time following disclosure of predictive genetic 
testing in comparison to baseline pre-test measurements between carriers and non-
carriers' responses to learning the test result. 
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Below, I examine the body of quantitative research on the presence and duration 
of psychological distress in carriers and non-carriers. Following that, I review the factors 
that influence psychological distress throughout the predictive genetic testing experience. 
Literature that focuses on BRCA 112, HD, and CRC are presented under each subsection. 
The section concludes with a brief overview of relevant quantitative cardiovascular 
literature. 
Psychological distress. The literature on responses to genetic testing from a 
quantitative perspective has established that the predictive genetic testing process does 
not cause significant psychological distress (Aktan-Collan, Haukkala, Mecklin, Uutela, & 
Kaarianem, 2001; Arver, Haegermark, Platten, Lindblom, & Brandberg, 2004; 
Braithwaite et al., 2004; Broadstock, Michie, & Marteau, 2000; Claes et al., 2004; Collins 
et al., 2007; Decruyenare et al., 1995; Evers-Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 1998; Gritz et 
al. , 2005 ; Kinney et al. 2005; Meiser, Collins et al. , 2004; Meiser et al., 2004; Murakami 
et al., 2004; Reichelt, Heimdal, Moller, & Dahl , 2004; Schwartz et al. 2002). That 
research indicates there is little difference in the level of psychological distress (e.g., 
anxiety, depression, and worry) throughout the genetic testing process between carriers 
and non-carriers; that is, regardless of genetic status, predictive genetic testing did not 
cause any significant adverse psychological outcomes. Several studies also reported that 
unaffected carriers and affected carriers had no significant changes in psychological 
distress in measures taken pre-test and post-disclosure (Croyle, Smith, Botkin, Baty, & 
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Nash, 1997; Lerman & Croyle, 1996; Ladder et al., 2001; Reichelt et al., 2004; Schwartz 
et al., 2002). 
The literature indicating that predictive genetic testing does cause some distress is 
inconsistent in its illustration of how this distress manifests itself in carriers and non-
carriers, particularly in the context of onset and duration of the disease. Some researchers 
have noted that even though psychological distress was found to increase immediately 
post-disclosure of test results in carriers (but not in non-carriers), this difference subsided 
within a year (Aktan-Collan et al., 2001; Almqvist, Brinkman, Wiggins, & Hayden, 2003; 
Arver et al., 2004; Claes et al., 2004; Codori, Slavney, Rosenblatt, & Brandt, 2004; 
Collins et al. , 2007; Gritz et al., 2005; Heshka et al., 2008; Meiser & Dunn, 2000; Meiser, 
et al., 2002, 2004; Shaw, Abrams, & Marteau, 1999; Watson et al., 2004). However, for 
some individuals, the psychological distress experienced after genetic testing continues to 
extend further than the first year-up to and beyond five years (Taylor & Myres, 1997; 
Timman, Roos, Maat-l(jevit, & Tibben, 2004; van Oostrom et al., 2003). Of these, there 
were only three longitudinal studies: one on BRCA 112 and two on HD. 
Breast cancer (BRCAl/2). The impact and duration of predictive genetic testing 
has been explored with individuals at risk for BRCA 112 (Foster et al. , 2007; Schwartz, 
2002; van Oostron et al., 2003; van Roosmalen et al., 2004). Schwartz (2002) measured 
pre- and post-levels of psychological distress in women at risk for BRCA l/2 (n=79 
carriers; n=58 non-carriers; n=143 inconclusive) at one month and six months. Results 
suggested that these women did not exhibit any increased psychological distress up to six 
months post-disclosure of genetic testing. Those who had a negative test, however, 
described reduced feelings of risk and distress. Other researchers noted that individuals at 
.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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risk for BRCA 1/2 could experience psychological distress for upwards of one year (van 
Roosmalen et al., 2004), and in some cases, up to three years (Foster et al. , 2007). Foster, 
et al. (2007) reported no differences between BRCA 112 carriers and non-carriers at 
baseline. Notably, at three years post-predictive genetic testing, mammography rates were 
higher in carriers (89%) in comparison to non-carriers (47%). Also, carriers reported a 
higher level of distress than non-carriers, had engaged in more risk management 
strategies, and had opted for more risk-reducing surgeries (e.g., oophorectomy and 
mastectomy) (Foster, et al., 2007). 
The one longitudinal study on BRCA 112 (van Oostrom et al., 2003), which 
extended up to five years post-genetic testing, reported that there is little or no difference 
in overall levels of psychological distress scores in carriers and non-carriers for cancer 
worry, avoidance, general anxiety, depression, and cancer-related intrusions. 
Furthermore, any increase in anxiety and depression reported was triggered by critical 
events such as having a family member diagnosed with cancer. 
Huntington Disease (HD). The quantitative literature on HD has shown that 
long-term psychological reactions to predictive genetic testing process does differ 
between carriers and non-carriers and can last up to one year (Decruyenaere, Boogaerts, 
Cloostermans, & Demyttenaera, 1999; Foster et al., 2004; Gargiulo et al. , 2009; Timman, 
et al. , 2004; van Oostrom et al. , 2003) and returns to baseline measurements at varied 
intervals (Decruyenaere et al., 2003; van Oostrom, 2003). 
Decruyenaere et al. (1999, 2003) conducted two consecutive studies measuring 
the psychological impact of participating in the genetic testing process for HD. The 
initial study (n=29 carriers; n=40 non-carriers), reported that 10% of participants tested 
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for HD, regardless of carrier status, experienced mild depression, a high score for anxiety, 
or both at one year (Decruyenaere et al., 1999). In the follow-up study participants' 
(n=24 carriers; n=33 non-carriers) mean test scores were within normal range five years 
post-testing. Carriers did report having some negative feelings post-testing 
(Decruyenaere et al., 2003). In a similar vein, Codori et al. 's (2004) retrospective chart 
review of individuals tested for HD (n=50 carriers; n=l03 non-carriers) found that up to 
one year post-disclosure of test results, depression occurred more frequently in carriers. 
Other studies on HD that provided evidence of the predictive genetic testing 
process being responsible for long-term adverse psychological impact also noted that this 
impact varies. Gargiulo et al. (2009) used self-reporting scales and structured interviews 
in asymptomatic individuals (n=62 non-carriers; n=57 carriers), post-disclosure of 
predictive genetic testing results within a mean of 3.7 years. Depression was reported in 
both asymptomatic carriers (58%) and asymptomatic non-carriers (24% ). Scores for 
social adjustment remained within the normal range for both groups. Similar results were 
reported by Cordi and Brandt (1994); although high risk individuals described feelings of 
worry and guilt, those at low risk also experienced some stress related to adjusting to their 
new risk status up to two years post-predictive genetic testing. 
Only one Canadian study, by Almqvist et al. (2003), measured the psychological 
effects of being tested for HD (n=202) at baseline and post-disclosure of test results at 
one to two weeks, two months, six months, one year, two years, and five years. Despite 
the fact that psychological distress had decreased when compared to pre-test disclosure 
measurements, participants who had been assigned a high-risk status did experience 
higher incidences of adverse psychological events (e.g., depression, suicide, substance 
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abuse, etc) within the first two years. Of those affected adverse events, 21.8% occurred 
within the first year. In comparison, an older study reported the presence of 
psychological distress post-genetic testing at six years post-predictive genetic testing 
(Taylor & Myres, 1997). In that study, those considered at low risk for developing HD 
experienced fewer feelings of uncertainty, anxiety, and worry about their children ' s 
genetic status than their high-risk counterparts, who experienced chronic depression. 
Colorectal Cancer (CRC). Quantitative studies that have explored the 
psychological impact of predictive genetic testing on individuals at risk for CRC support 
the majority of research done on BRCA 112 and HD; that is, individuals who engage in 
predictive genetic testing for CRC may experience some transient psychological distress, 
however, it does not persist or cause any significant adverse psychological effects within 
the first three years post-testing (Aktan-Collan et al., 2001; Arver et al. , 2004; Claes et al. , 
2004; Collins et al., 2007; Gritz et al., 2005; Meiser et al. , 2004; Murakami et al. , 2004). 
Furthermore, any difference in psychological distress between carriers and non-carriers 
was noted to subside within the first one to three years (Ciaes et al. , 2004; Collins et al. , 
2007). 
Several studies have shown that individuals at risk for CRC may have an initial 
increase in di stress (e.g., anxiety, depression) immediately post-disclosure of test results, 
which resolved within the first year (Aktan-Collan et al. , 2001 ; Coll ins et al. , 2007; Gritz 
et al. , 2005 ; Meiser et al. , 2004).). Included within this population, however, were several 
subgroups of individuals who may be more vulnerable to psychological distress and who 
might require more intense psychological screening and support both pre- and post-
testing (Landsbergen, Prins, Brunner, Kraaimaat, & Hoogerbrugge, 2009). These were 
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asymptomatic carriers (Gritz et al., 2005), who experienced depression prior to predictive 
genetic testing, reported a lower satisfaction wi th social supports, had an escape-
avoidance coping style, had a famil y history of CRC, and predicted that they would be 
depressed if they had a positive test (Esplen et al. , 2003, 2007). 
Despite the fact that debate exists in the literature as to the presence and duration 
of psychological distress experienced by carriers and non-carriers, the consensus is that 
psychological support is equally important for both groups throughout the genetic testing 
process. AJJ agree that, in order to provide this support, health care providers need to be 
cognizant of the many factors that influence the predictive genetic testing experience. 
Factors Influencing Psychological Distress. 
Although predictive genetic testing results have been noted to influence the 
presence of and duration of psychological distress experienced by individuals at risk for a 
geneticaJJy linked di sease, there are several other factors that impact how one experiences 
the predictive genetic testing process. These include the individual's pre-testing level of 
distress, having an inconclusive test, demographics, and psychosocial factors . 
Baseline level of psychological distress. Regardless of the inconsistencies noted 
in the literature as to the existence, duration, and clinical manifestations of psychological 
distress in response to predictive genetic testing, there is overwhelming evidence that the 
best predictor of psychological distress is the pre-test psychological state. People who 
experienced distress throughout the genetic testing process reported higher levels of pre-
test distress at baseline measurements (Bieiker, Han, & Aarson, 2003; Broadstock, 
Michie, & Marteau, 2000; Codori, Slavney, Young, Miglioretti , & Brandt, 1997; Croyle, 
Smith, Botkin, Baty, & Nash, 1997; Decruyenare et al. , 1999; Gargiulo et al. , 2009; 
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Hendriks et al., 2005; Lodder et at., 2001; Meiser & Dunn, 2000; Murakami et al., 2004; 
Reichelt et al., 2004; van Oostrom et al., 2003; van Roosmalen et at., 2004 ). These 
studies suggest that individuals found to have psychological chalJenges in pre-genetic 
testing may benefit from intensive counselling services prior to testing in an effort to 
facilitate a smooth transition through the genetic testing process (Meiser & Dunn, 2000). 
Knowledge of the pre-test psychological state can help plan for resources to manage any 
arising issues, particularly in the case of those who are trying to cope with an 
inconclusive predictive genetic test result. 
Inconclusive predictive genetic testing. There is a paucity of literature 
examining the psychosocial impact of receiving an inconclusive test result. It is unclear if 
being in a continuous state of uncertainty contributes to one's level of distress, given that 
for many individuals the rationale for participating in genetic testing is to decrease 
uncertainty (Claes et al., 2004 ). It is also unclear if clients are misinterpreting 
inconclusive test results. Researchers who have studied how individuals react to 
receiving an inconclusive or uncertain test result (Hallowell et al. , 2002; Meiser, 2005) 
have found those individuals to be falsely reassured that they do not have the condition 
under investigation. Others have reported that such individuals feel frustrated (Frost, 
Venne, Cunningham, & Gerritsen-McKane, 2004) and distressed while waiting for the 
results (Broadstock, Michie, Gray et al. , 2000; Meiser, 2005). 
A pilot study by Broadstock, Michie, Gray, et al. (2000) measured the long-and 
short-term psychological consequences of predictive genetic testing in individuals at risk 
for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer at one week, six months, and twelve months. 
Noteworthy is the fact that study participants did not report any increase in outcome 
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variables (e.g., general anxiety, general distress about cancer, and cancer specific 
worriers) up until twelve months. It was only after 12 months that the women reported an 
increase in general anxiety. The authors suggested this might be credited to an escalating 
concern about the uncertainty of their results. Thus, this group may be vulnerable to 
psychological distress (Bieiker et al., 2003) when the results are not available 
immediately or are inconclusive (as also is typically the case with ARVC). It is in cases 
such as this that it is important to be aware of the demographic and psychosocial factors 
that have been noted in the literature to compound stress. 
Demographics and psychosocial factors. The most common individual 
characteristics that have been cited in the literature that correlate with higher levels of 
psychological adverse responses include being a middle-aged female, having poor social 
support networks, poor communication skills, anticipating a positive result, having an 
affected relative, a low social economic status, a low self-esteem, having children, a poor 
coping style, and developing the disease prior to testing (Bieiker et aJ, 2003; Esplen et al. , 
2003, 2007; Gritz et al., 2005; Hendriks et al., 2005; Landsbergen, Prins, Brunner, 
Kraaimaat, & Hoogerbrugge, 2011; Michie, Bobrow, & Marteau, 2001). 
Other research has shown that high levels of psychological distress are related to 
worry over a Joss of income, Jack of eligibility for health insurance coverage (Lynch et 
al., 2006; Watson et al. , 2004), reluctance to disseminate genetic risk information to other 
family members (Holt, 2006; Riedijk et al., 2005), guilt about passing the gene on to 
children (Lynch et al. , 2006), feelings of uncertainty about one's risk (Cordi & Brandt, 
1994; Michie, French, & Marteau, 2002), and worry regarding children's risk status 
(Aktan-Collan et al. , 2000; Lynch et al. , 2006; Matteau & Croyle, 1998). 
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Genetically linked cardiovascular disease. Individuals at risk for developing 
Hypertropic Cardiomyopathy (HCM) have been noted to experience psychosocial 
responses to genetic testing similar to those at risk for other genetic conditions (e.g., 
BRCA 112, HD, and CRC). HCM, like ARVC, is an autosomal dominant genetically 
linked heart disease that results in hypertrophy of the ventricle wall. HCM has no cure 
and can cause sudden cardiac death at a young age. Treatment is based on a combination 
of pharmacological interventions and an lCD. Christiaans et al. (2009) did a cross-
sectional study using questionnaires that compared quality of life, anxiety, and depression 
in individuals (n=228) who participated in genetic testing for HCM to the general 
population . Participants in this study were classified into three groups: symptomatic 
HCM carriers who had diagnosis confirmed with predictive genetic testing, HCM carriers 
who developed symptoms post-testing, and asymptomatic HCM carriers. Findings 
reported that, overall , quality of life and distress did not differ significantly in HCM 
carriers in comparison to the general population. Quality of life and distress were, 
however, found to be worse in symptomatic HCM carriers who had symptoms prior to 
genetic testing but better in asymptomatic carriers of HCM. Thus, knowing one's genetic 
status may instill a sense of control and reassurance in lieu of feelings of uncertainty that 
often lead to psychological distress (Aatre & Day, 2011 ; Christiaans et al. , 2009). 
Quality of life was also explored in another cross-sectional study in adul ts (n= 174) 
with Marfan syndrome (n=l74), an autosomal domjnant genetically linked condition that 
affects connecti ve tissue including the cardiovascular system (Peters, Kong, Hanslo, & 
Biesecker, 2002). Findings are somewhat consistent with other previously cited studies 
on HCM, in that, overall, participants did not describe a lower quality of life in 
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comparison to similar population surveys that looked at quality of life in those with 
cardiovascular disease. Participants' mean scores on the psychological/spiritual subscale 
of the QLI-Cardiac III, however, were lower than other populations with cardiovascular 
disease. Concerns raised were in relation to their personal health such as sexual wellness 
and reproductive choices. 
Individuals' Experiences with Predictive Genetic Testing: Qualitative Literature 
Predictive genetic testing is a social process; quantitative methodologies are not 
well suited to capture the lived experience of predictive genetic testing. Qualitative 
research extends beyond examining the psychosocial impact of the predictive genetic 
testing process; it provides an understanding of the meaning individuals assign to being at 
risk for a genetic condition . Here I examine (a) qualitati ve literature on individuals' 
experiences of living in a fami ly at risk for a genetically linked condition and (b) 
qualitative literature on cardiovascular disease and genetics. 
Genetically Linked Conditions. 
The grounded theory study by McAllister, Davies et al. (2007) provides excellent 
insights into the emotional effects experienced by individuals who have multiple genetic 
conditions such as HD, Marfan Syndrome, and Duchene Muscular Dystrophy. Eight core 
emotional effects were identified: anxiety, worry regarding risk of offspring, guilt, anger, 
uncertainty, redemptive adjustment, sadness and grief, and depression. The degree of 
psychological distress and ability to cope was shown to depend upon the meaning 
assigned to the variability of genetic condition (e.g., penetrance and expressivity), 
availability of a diagnosis, and perceptions of care. As found in two other studies 
(McAllister, 2002; van Oostrom et al. , 2003), participants spoke of a continuous state of 
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anxiety that fluctuated and became more intense during critical life events (e.g., becoming 
symptomatic and family planning). Then, ability to cope with having a genetic disease 
correlated with the amount of control participants felt they had over the disease (van 
Oostrom et al., 2003). This correlation was also reported in other research on BRCA 1/2 
(Howell et al., 2006; Yodermaier, Esplen, & Maheu, 2010) and in HD (Sobel & Cowan, 
2003). 
The importance of being able to instill a sense of control over one's environment 
is clear in Bandura's social cognitive theory (2004). According to Bandura a high level 
of self-efficacy or the belief that one possesses the attributes to achieve a desired outcome 
motivates one to reach goals or change behaviours. The reverse is also true in that a low 
level of self-efficacy results in a lack of confidence in one's abilities, contributing to 
feelings of depression, low self-esteem, anxiety, and lack of motivation. Thus, if 
individuals believe they can control some aspects of their health, then they will engage in 
healthy behaviours and cope better with challenges they may encounter (Shaw et al. , 
1999). 
The concepts of coping and uncertainty described by McAllister, Davies et al. 
(2007) were core themes in other qualitative studies. Sobel and Cowan (2003) examined 
the impact of predictive genetic testing on families with a history of HD. Two themes 
were identified: (a) the nature of the loss and (b) coping with the Joss and ambiguity. 
Nature of the loss refers to how participants felt about the loss of the assumption they 
were positive. Some participants had assumed they were positive, had planned their lives 
around this expectation, and had experienced depression as a result of their negative 
status. Although non-carriers described a sense of relief with a negative test, they also 
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felt guilty about their predictive genetic testing result and found themselves being 
segregated by the other members of the family who were positive. In contrast, carriers 
described feelings of anger, ambiguity regarding their future and changing roles, and 
uncertainty as to the meaning of being at-risk for themselves and their offspring. SimjJar 
feelings were described in other studies (Cordi & Brandt, 1994; Cox & McKellin, 1999; 
Decruyenaere et al., 1999; Gargioulo et al., 2009). 
The second theme identified by Sobel and Cowen (2003), coping with loss and 
ambiguity, highlights the behavioural, cognitive, and emotional responses of family 
members. Family members spoke of being pressured to get testing and feeling helpless 
because of their lack of control over the disease. Others described their genetic risk as 
bringing the family either together or further apart; family rituals were either formed or 
given up. Reactions of carriers were divided; some spoke about embracing life. 
Meanwhile, others described having a sense "anticipatory loss," similar to that described 
in the work of McAllister, Davies et al. (2007). 
Howell et al. (2006) conducted research on males' experiences of living with 
BRCA 112. Participants spoke about feelings of guilt because they could pass the BRCA 
112 gene on to their children and grandchildren. Individuals in that study described the 
decision to engage in the genetic testing process as part of their familial responsibilities 
and roles, similar to what d ' Agincourt-Canning (2006b) referred to as a sense of familial 
relational responsibility (p. 106). 
Several authors have discussed the phenomenon of survivor guilt-the feelings of 
guilt that accompany a negative test result, knowing that other farruly members have 
tested positive (Codori & Brandt, 1994; McAllister, Davies et al. , 2007; Duncan et al. , 
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2008; Hallowell et al., 2006; Mireskandari et al., 2009; Murakami et al. , 2004; Sobel & 
Cowan, 2003; Tibben et al., 1993). In several studies, participants spoke of not being 
able to celebrate their negative status when other family members had received a positive 
test result (Hallowell et al. , 2006; McAllister; Davies et al., 2007 Tibben et al. , 1993). 
Scholars (Finkler, 2005; Rose, 2007) argue that survivor guilt has the potential to disrupt 
traditional meanings of the family, as the focus turns to biological rather than social 
relationships; hence, family members can find themselves segregated into a subgroup 
defined by their carrier status. 
Cardiovascular Disease and Genetics 
There are limited qualitative studies that have explored the psychosocial impact of 
predictive genetic testing on individuals li ving in a family with a history of a geneticall y 
linked cardiovascular disease. The largest body of relevant cardiovascular li terature that 
sheds some light on the potential challenges faci ng this population is LQTS. 
Psychosocial impact of living with LQTS. LQTS is an autosomal dominant 
genetically linked cardiac disease, identified primarily by a long QT interval due to 
interruption in ion channels. Signs and symptoms of this disease vary from nonexistent to 
sudden cardi ac death depending on the specific ion channel affected (e.g., sodium or 
potassium). As with ARVC, there is a predictive genetic test for LQTS. The condition 
can be diagnosed at an early age, has varying levels of penetrance, and can be fatal if 
untreated. Its main treatment modality is the ICD. LQTS has a mortality rate of 6-13% 
because of sudden cardiac death prior to 40 years old (Farnsworth, Fosyth, Haglund, & 
Ackerman, 2006; Modell & Lehman, 2006). Thus, this population provides a good 
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reference for examining the potential challenges that individuals living with ARVC may 
encounter. 
Andersen et al.'s (2008) study provides an in-depth examination into the lives of 
seven individuals living with LQTS. Participants' narratives highlighted four themes: (l) 
positive responses to the diagnosis; (2) causes of anxiety, worry, and risk;, (3) limitations 
and loneliness; and (4) risk and existentiality. Participants described being relieved in 
knowing their risk status. For many, knowing their carrier status was seen as an 
opportunity to take responsibility for their own health and that of their children. Despite 
restrictions imposed by the disease (e.g., challenges with work, sleep, reproduction, and 
activity), many have grown to accept this condition as part of their everyday normal life. 
This sense of normalcy transcended to carriers' children, as parents described efforts to 
balance over-protectiveness with concern for the child ' s wellbeing. 
Psychosocial Impact of Predictive Genetic Testing on Family 
Living in a family with a genetically linked condition can have lasting 
psychosocial effects on the entire family unit. This section provides an overview of the 
qualitative and quantitative research that has examined (a) the psychosocial impact of 
predictive genetic testing in young adolescents, young children, and parents, and (b) the 
psychosocial impact of predictive genetic testing on partners of at-risk individuals. 
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Young Children, Young Adolescents, Parents, and Partners. 
Given the transgenerational impact of predictive genetic testing, it is imperative to 
have a good understanding of the psychological impact of testing on young children and 
young adolescents. There are few studies that explore what life is like for children in 
families with a genetically linked disease and even fewer studies on children with 
hereditary cardiovascular disease. The majority of existing literature that does exist 
highlights the psychosocial impact on children from the perspectives of the parents or 
young adolescents (Andrews et al. , 2006; Codori, Petersen, Boyd, Brandt, & Giardiello, 
1996; Codori et al., 2003; Duncan et al., 2007, 2008; Michie et al. , 200 1; Smets et al. , 
2008). That research concluded that predictive genetic testing has had adverse 
psychological consequences on young adolescents and their parents (Andrew et al. , 2006, 
Duncan et al. , 2007, 2008; Farnsworth et al. , 2006; Hendriks et al. , 2005; Mireskandari et 
al. , 2009). However, the testing led to little or no psychosocial distress on young children 
(Cordori et al. , 1996, 2003; Michie et al. , 2001 ; Smets et al. , 2008). The duration and 
magnitude of any distress noted remains a contentious issue in this literature. 
Young adolescents and parents. Andrew et al. (2006) used self-administered 
questionnaires to assess the views about genetic testing and information and support 
needs amongst young adolescents (n=88) ages 18-35 who had either been diagnosed with 
FAP or were at high risk for the disease. The findings of that study are sign ificant in that 
they provide insights into the challenges faced by young adolescents as they mature. 
Findings noted participants, as they matured, experienced anxiety, including that related 
to not knowing the risk status of their young children (39% ), fear of developing cancer 
(28% ), dealing with the uncertainty of the impact of living with FAP (23% ), difficulty 
with obtaining information about FAP (20.5% ), and difficulty with understanding the 
information given (18.2% ). 
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Using the same FAP cohort as Andrew et al. (2006), another qualitative study 
found that eleven individuals at risk for, or diagnosed with, FAP had diverse experiences 
depending on whether they were clinically unaffected or clinically affected (i.e., had 
bowel surgery) (Mireskandari et al., 2009). Those who were clinically unaffected spoke 
of concerns related to infertility and how to enjoy life while healthy. Those clinically 
affected raised concerns about their body image, reproduction, maintaining employment, 
their ability to engage in social activities and sustain relationships, their ability to disclose 
their diagnosis to their partners, their body image, and about reproduction. The findings 
of Mireskandari et al. (2009) support those of Andrew et al. , suggesting that long-term 
psychological support is imperative for addressing the ongoing challenges with knowing 
one's genetic status and living with FAP. 
Duncan et al. (2007, 2008) conducted two studies using a grounded theory 
approach to examine young peoples' experiences with predictive genetic testing for HD 
and FAP. These studies provide much needed information about how young people 
construct their meaning of the genetic testing process in the broader context of growing 
up in fami lies with hereditary illness. In the first of the two studies, Duncan et al. 
explored the genetic testing experience and its impact on young adolescents (n=2 carriers; 
n=6 non-carriers) who had predictive genetic testing for HD. At the time of testing, 
participants were between 17- 25 years of age. Findings were focused on themes pre- and 
post-genetic testing. Prior to genetic testing, young adolescents described living their life 
as if they were a carrier. Many spoke of engaging in risky behaviours (e .g., drugs) as 
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they tried to assign some meaning to and cope with living in a family at risk for HD. For 
many, this was not easy, as they witnessed first-hand famil y members becoming ill , had 
difficulty understanding information about HD, and experienced frustration with not 
being able to have testing performed earlier. In post-genetic testing the focus was on 
balancing one' s new identity of having a positive or negative genetic test with living life. 
This meant moving forward with life in a positive manner regardless of one's genetic 
status. 
Building on that previous work, Duncan et al. (2008) conducted a second study 
with the same participants but included an additional ten individuals who were asked to 
reflect on their earlier experiences with genetic testing for FAP (n=5 carriers; n=5 non-
carriers). Results highlighted the harms and benefits of participating in the genetic testing 
process in relation to test results. Harms, described in relation to having a positive test, 
included psychological distress, a negative impact on fami ly and friend relationships, 
distress of parents, feelings of regret knowing their risk status, anxiety related to others' 
responses to news of the test results, concern for future employment, an awareness of 
future health issues, and a conscious awareness of disease potential at difficult points in 
one's life . Harms associated with having negative test result included survivor guil t, 
worry about other family members and the impact on family relationships, and dealing 
with unexpected negative emotions. Harms related to the overall genetic testing process 
included family stress, being irritable, feeling anxious while waiting for results, lack of 
control over the process, anxiety related to the actual blood retrieval, and having to 
confront the issue of genetic status. 
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Benefits associated with a positive test included the following: relief from 
uncertainty, the ability to move forward with life, a sense of clarity, strengthened 
friendships and family relationships, and a sense of control in the context of disease 
management (FAP only). Benefits of a negative test result included the following: 
knowledge of not having the disease, relief for themselves and their parents, and a feeling 
of being able to move on with their lives in a positive manner. Benefits related to the 
overall process included feelings of empowerment, benefit related to accessing genetic 
counselling, and enhanced famjly relationships (Duncan et al. , 2008). 
Young children and parents. Few studies in the literature examine the 
psychological distress experienced by parents and youth. One prospective study explored 
the psychological effects (e.g., anxiety, depression, behavioural problems, and 
competency), on genetic testing for FAP in young children (n=l9 carriers; n=22 non-
carriers), ages 6-17 years (Codori et al. , 1996). At three months there was little change 
from baseline levels of outcome measures; however, children who were carriers and had 
mothers who were carriers experienced the highest level of anxiety and depression . At 
varied intervals over three years, no psychological distress in the children was reported, 
regardless of risk status or sex of affected parent. Those children who did have some 
anxiety had a sibling who tested positive (Codori, 2003). 
The impact of predictive genetic testing on young children in relation to parents 
has been noted in other research studies. Michie et al. (200 1) measured the emotional 
state (e.g., depression and anxiety) in children tested for FAP (n=29 non-carriers; n=31 
carriers) compared to adults tested for the mutation (n= 125 non-carriers; n=23 carriers) , 
in two studies- a cross-sectional and a prospective study. Resul ts of both studies 
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supported the findings of Codori et al. (1996, 2003) in that children did not show 
clinically significant distress during the first year post-genetic testing nor did they have 
more anxiety or depression than adults. Children ' s self-esteem remained within the 
normal range regardless of test result; their perception of health was ranked high 
regardless of test results, as well. Noteworthy is the fact that the study by Michie et al. 
(200 1) found that children who tested negative for F AP had a momentous decrease in 
distress compared to pre-testing, while the study by Codori et al. (2003) reported no 
major changes in the level of pre-testing and post-testing distress. This decrease in stress 
noted by Michie et al. may reflect a transient sense of relief felt by the children as they 
were told they were negative for FAP. This may mean that the children did have some 
psychological distress that was not captured in data analysis. 
Several studies have investigated the psychosocial impact of living with a 
genetically linked cardiovascular disease. Smets et al. (2008) measured health-related 
quality of life in young children (n=35) ages 8-18 with genetical ly linked cardiac diseases 
including FH, HCM, or LQTS. Findings showed that there were no significant 
differences in the scores when compared to the general population, suggesting that 
genetic testing does not have a big impact at this stage. A limitation of this study, 
however, is that 80% of this sample was asymptomatic; thus, the experience of these 
participants may be significantly different that those individuals who become 
symptomatic with HCM, as described in other studies of adults who exhibit signs of 
HCM (Christiaans et al. , 2009). 
There are two studies that have looked at the impact of having a young child with 
LQTS syndrome (Farnsworth et al. , 2006; Hendriks et al. , 2005, 2008) that used 
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completed semi-structured interviews with parents of children who were HCM carriers at 
18 months post-disclosure of genetic testing results. Distress, anxiety, and depression in 
parents were measured within two weeks of first consultation, at four weeks post-test 
disclosure, and at 18 months post-test disclosure amongst both carriers (n=24) and non-
carriers (n=12). Findings showed that parents of HCM carriers do have difficulty 
adjusting to the news of their child's genetic test result in comparison to non-carriers. 
Parents' anxiety was correlated to their experiential knowledge such as being familiar 
with HCM, having experienced a sudden cardiac death in the family, being dissatisfied 
with knowledge provided about HCM, and having previous distress pre-testing. 
Responses of parents in these two aforementioned studies provide insight as to 
how parents cope with the news of having a young child with a genetically linked 
condition who is asymptomatic (Hendriks et al. , 2005). Although all children were 
asymptomatic and receiving prophylactic treatment, 75% of parents remained focused on 
the clinical manifestations of the disease, with only 20% reporting full confidence in the 
prescribed treatment. Of those parents, 55% described prophylactic treatments as a 
burden, and 30% thought it was beneficial to the child. Parents also voiced concerns 
about the future of their children with regard to relationships (54%), career choices 
( 46% ), impact on puberty (54%), and stigmatization ( 46% ). Another area of contention 
was the lack of information about the disease, as well as the lack of support and 
knowledge of attending physicians. In keeping with those fi ndings, congruent in other 
studies, parents did not regret participating in the genetic testing process despite these 
challenges (Anderson et al. , 2008; Duncan et al. , 2007, 2008; Smets et al. , 2008). 
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Farnsworth et al. (2006) did a secondary analysis of interviews (n=31) that 
explored parents ' perceptions of LQTS. Findings echoed those of Hendriks et al. (2005). 
Three core themes were identified: (a) concerns for their offspring, (b) quality of life of 
the family unit, and (c) uncertainty of their children's health. In order to cope with their 
concerns, many lifestyle adjustments were made to ensure the child's safety such as 
giving the child a cell phone, instituting treatment regimes, having a baby monitor in the 
child's room while sleeping, bringing a portable defibrillator to events, and educating 
others (i.e., teachers, primarily physicians, and counsellors) and the child regarding 
symptoms of the disease requiring management. Concerns about quality of life were 
addressed by making behavioural changes and restrictions to one's daily routines. Parents 
initially attempted to keep children safe by controlling factors that might trigger the 
disease (e.g., physical activity); however, these restrictions dissolved as parents became 
more knowledgeable and experienced in LQTS management. Living with and managing 
LQTS, for the parents, became a normal part of daily life. 
The two studies discussed above show similar findings to others. That is, in order 
to understand the genetic testing experience through the lens of those receiving care and 
to ensure that people move through the genetic testing process in a positive manner, 
health care providers need to co-situate themselves within the social context of 
individuals and families (Cox & McKellin, 1999; d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006a, 2006b; 
Decruyenaere eta!. , 1999; Etchegary, 2006a, 2006b). Such research supports the 
perspective that health care providers must attend to the needs of parents of children who 
are tested; parents are not on! y the core decision makers in relation to the child ' s 
psychosocial development, but they also experience psychological distress related to their 
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child's experience of testing. Given the dearth of literature exploring what life is like to 
live in a family at risk for ARVC from the perspective of the child and the parent, this 
body of literature sheds light on the potential challenges facing this population. 
Family Members and Partners. 
A dominant theme in the predictive genetic testing literature is the fact that 
individuals rarely go through the process of testing in isolation. There is a small body of 
literature that demonstrates that family members do experience psychosocial distress as 
they move through the predictive genetic testing process adjacent to their significant 
others. An understanding of this perspective is important for several reasons. First, 
family members are generally called upon to be key psychosocial supports for these 
individuals. Second, one of the key sources of distress facing many in this population is 
the decision to have children. Third, the spouse or partner is quite often the caregiver for 
the affected individual. Fourth, the spouse or partner is often the initial responder to any 
medical crisis, which can be very distressful not only at the time of the event but in the 
period pre- and post-event. Finally, family members' li ves are often dictated by the 
illness trajectory of their family member's chronic disease. 
In the following section I give a brief overview of how the predictive genetic 
testing process impacts at-risk individuals' partners and spouses. In conducting this 
review I anticipated it would help conceptualize how individuals living in a family at risk 
for ARVC assign meanings to their experience. 
Being a partner or spouse of an individual at risk for a genetically linked 
condition. Research supports the fact that pmtners of carriers with a genetically linked 
disease experience a high level of psychosocial distress (Douma et al. , 2010; Hendriks et 
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al., 2008). Hendriks et al. (2008) conducted a prospective study over 18 months that 
measured disease-related anxiety and depression in individuals (n=77) and partners 
(n=57) who engaged in predictive genetic testing for LQTS. Partners of carriers reported 
higher levels of disease-related anxiety than non-carriers over the long term. This is not 
surprising given that psychological distress has been noted to extend up to periods of five 
years post-predictive genetic testing (Codori & Brandt, 1994; Decruyenaere et al., 2003; 
Foster et al., 2004; Gargiulo et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 2002; Timman et al., 2004; 
Meiser et al., 2002; van Oostrom et al., 2003). 
Other studies report similar results to those of Hendriks et al. (2008). The cross-
sectional study by Douma et al. (2010) used self-reported surveys to measure 
psychological distress and quality of life of partners (n=129) of individuals with FAP. 
They found that 30% of participants experienced distress equal to that of their affected 
partner, including distress over having children and feelings of guilt warranting 
professional services. There was little difference between the participants and the general 
population in measures of quality of life; however, 9-21 % of participants reported that 
their work, leisure time activities, and relationships were affected. These findings are 
significant given the fact that partners are often a key part of these individuals' support 
networks; if the partner is experiencing anxiety, then it may have a negative impact on the 
affected individual. Thus, it is important to include the partner throughout the entire 
predictive genetic testing process, particularly in genetic counselling. 
Chapter Summary 
The majority of quantitative research has shown that predictive genetic testing 
does not cause significant adverse psychological distress, regardless of carrier status. The 
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few quantitative studies that have reported the presence of psychological distress post-
genetic testing remain inconsistent as to its clinical manifestations (e.g., onset, duration, 
and magnitude). What is known, however, is that any psychosocial distress experienced 
throughout the predictive genetic testing process appears to be transient in nature and 
often sparked by a critical event such as having to make reproduction choices. Pre-testing 
levels of psychological di stress, having an inconclusive test, demographics, and 
psychosocial factors have been noted to significantly influence how individuals 
experience this phenomenon. 
Qualitative literature examining individuals' experiences with predictive genetic 
testing shows quite a different picture than the quantitative research. Qualitative research 
has found that these individuals do experience psychological distress throughout the 
predictive genetic testing process. The degree of psychological distress is related to the 
meaning assigned to being at-risk and one's ability to cope with the news of their genetic 
test result. Key factors identified that precipitated psychological distress included 
practical everyday challenges such as employment, pressure to have testing, feelings of 
guilt linked to having a negative test while others were positive, passing the gene on to 
their offspring, and, finally, concern for their health and that of their offspring. For others, 
knowing one's test result was critical in relieving distress. 
Research has also shown that the predictive genetic testing process does have an 
adverse psychological impact on young adolescents and their parents. However, this is 
not the case for young children. Research found that psychological distress in young 
children becomes more evident as they mature into young adolescents and are faced with 
life decisions (e.g. , employment, disclosing risk to partners, reproductive decision-
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making). As noted in research on adults, the clinical manifestations of any distress found 
remains unknown; however, evidence does suggest that long-term psychological support 
is needed to address the ongoing challenges these children face as they move into 
adulthood. The parents' primary sources of distress are related to the overall quality of 
life of their children, including the children's physical and mental health. This concern 
has caused many parents to constantly monitor their children for any signs of the disease, 
which is psychologically challenging. 
Evident in the research on genetics and cardiovascular disease is that predictive 
genetic testing is a family affair. Partners or spouses of these at-risk individuals do 
experience psychological distress arising from changes in roles and practical everyday 
challenges of life. 
This study is significant in that it delves into how individuals juxtapose scientific 
knowledge against experiential knowledge and the phase of the genetic testing process. It 
is out of this juxtaposition that ideas about risk are constructed and understood. This is a 
complex and fluid process-one that existing research has failed to capture. This 
research not only fill s this gap but also provides insights as to how laypersons' meanings 
of being at-risk are shaped and reshaped alongside new scientific knowledge and 
experiences of everyday life. It is only through a ful ler understanding of the psychosocial 
process of constructing the meaning of being at-risk can health care resources reflective 
of this populations' needs be addressed. 
CHAPTERS 
METHODOLOGY 
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A modified grounded theory approach as outlined by Glaser and Strauss ( 1967) 
was used to generate a substantive theory that explains how individuals living in families 
at risk for Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Cardiomyopathy (ARVC) construct their 
meaning of risk as they move through the predictive genetic testing process. This chapter 
provides an overview of grounded theory, its philosophical underpinnings, and how I 
situate myself within the research process. It outlines the process of data collection, data 
analysis, and specific research strategies used. The explanations of my method draw on 
detailed examples from my research, thus serving the purpose of foreshadowing the 
results. This chapter concludes with a discussion of strategies to ensure rigour of the 
research as well as ethical considerations 
Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory was first introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Grounded theory is 
a methodological approach that allows the researcher to discover and gain an 
understanding of a psychosocial process as it unfolds. This methodology proposes that 
the emerging theory is grounded in the data, and that emerging concepts are linked to the 
data and embedded in the context of the participants' lives (Morse, 2001). According to 
Glaser and Strauss, grounded theory is inductive in that the theoretical explanations 
evolve as data are collected and analyzed simultaneously. Throughout the research 
process, and as the theoretical constructs emerge, an inter-weaving between data 
collection, analysis, and review of the literature coincides in effort to gain a better 
understanding of individuals' experiences (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
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The four key features of grounded theory outlined by Morse (2001) are the use of 
gerunds-words ending in "ing" that signify an action change or concept-to code data; 
an emphasis on a process and trajectory described in a phase or stage; the presence of a 
core category that describes and explains the relationships, and variations, among 
categories, phases, or stages; and the generation of a theory, often in an area where little 
is known. 
Grounded theory generates either substantive or formal theory that is grounded in 
the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Substantive theory is focused in one particular area. 
For example, in my research, the theory is focused on ARVC. The generation of a 
substantive theory is achieved by the comparison of groups within the same focus area, 
or, in the case of my research, individuals at risk for a genetically linked condition. A 
substantive theory provides the foundation as to potential categories and constructs that 
need further exploration to develop a more abstract or formal theory. 
Formal theory is broader comparative analysis of several diverse substantive 
groups (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). For example, if I wanted to develop a formal theory on 
risk construction, I would look at other si tuations in which individuals may be at-risk. 
This might include other chronic diseases or life situations (e.g., risk of failing an exam). 
The philosophical underpinnings of grounded theory stem from symbolic interactionism 
(SI) and pragmatism. 
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Symbolic Interactionism (SI) 
The birth of grounded theory emerged from the tenets of SI as initially laid out by 
George Herbert Mead ( 1934 ), a social psychologist, and developed further by his student, 
Herbert Blumer (1969). SI is a micro-sociological theory that explores individuals ' 
relationships to interactions with the natural world (MacDonald, 2001 ), the meaning 
individuals attribute to events, and the symbols they use to convey that meaning (Annels, 
1996; Baker, Wuest, & Stern, 1992). It is through interpretations and meanings given to 
social interactions that individuals come to understand the self and others (Blumer, 1969). 
Blumer ( 1969) identifies the three critical aspects of SI: 
. . . human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings the thjngs have 
for them ... the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises from the social 
interaction that one has with one's fellow... meanings are handled in, and 
modified through an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the 
things he encounters. (p. 2) 
Essential to SI is the process of active interpretation, whereby one interacts wi th 
others and "the self' through human conduct (Blumer, 1969). A sense of "the self ' is 
acquired through reflection and the ability to take on the role of "the other", which is the 
ability to envision oneself from the perspective of others (Mead, 1934). In order to 
capture the meaning of participants' experiences on a behavioural and symbolic level, the 
researcher must be actively engaged in the participant's world and their interactions 
(Baker, Wuest, Stern, 1992; Chenitz & Swanson, 1986). The researcher is then posed 
with the task of acquiring and understanding the meanings of participants' interactions 
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and coinciding behaviours through the lens of the participants (Blumer, 1969; Chenitz & 
Swanson, 1986). 
Pragmatism 
SI draws on the philosophy of pragmatism and the works of Pierce (1878) and 
Dewey ( 1922). Pragmatism emphasizes the idea of transformation though interaction, 
wherein one's thoughts, ideas, and coinciding choices are continuously adapting in 
response to one's social interactions and interpretations (Jeon, 2004; MacDonald, 200 I ). 
Pragmatism emphasizes the individual's abili ty to cope with changing environments by 
being flexible and innovative (Johnson, 1991). Pragmatism proposes that there is no 
absolute truth but truths that evolve in response to human interaction (Jeon, 2004). 
Throughout the predictive genetic testing process, at-risk individuals and their 
families experience many social interactions that shape and reshape their ideas about what 
it means to be at-risk. These interactions are diverse; hence, individuals ' responses are 
varied, pragmatic, and reflect multiple truths and realities. The assigned meaning of the 
interaction is assimilated into one's existing reality through an interpretation process, in 
order to cope with the meaning of the interaction, its consequences, and to formulate a 
response. Drawing on the ontological and epistemological stance of SI and pragmatism, I 
situate myself within a postpositivist perspective. 
Situation of the Researcher and the Centrality of Postpositivism 
Throughout this research study I have drawn upon the tenets of symbolic 
interactionism and pragmatism as my interpretative framework to discover how 
individuals li ving in families at risk for ARYC construct their meaning of risk. This 
interpretive framework enables me to conceptualize how interpretations of risk are 
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understood in relation to one's social interactions, and how the meaning one attributes to 
an interaction influences one's behaviour and decisions related to the predictive genetic 
testing process. Thus, in believing that human behaviours are influenced by one's 
interpretations or meanings, I needed to get the perspectives of those living in families at 
risk for a genetically linked condition in order to understand and explain how individuals 
experience the predictive genetic testing process. This was achieved using a qualitative 
research approach and a postpositivist framework (Clarke, 1998; Popper, 1968). 
As a researcher I acknowledge that my personal ontological and epistemological 
stance itself is also being continuously shaped. From an ontological perspective and in 
keeping with a realist postpositivist paradigm, I believe that objective truths exist; but I 
also acknowledge that these truths can change in response to interactions with the world, 
one's social context, and science. That is, reality exists but it is "imperfectly and 
probabilistically apprehendable" (Lincoln & Guba, p. 168), or an estimation of what is 
true rather than the exact truth. I use truths in the plural to signify that I believe there are 
multiple truths or realities that individuals draw upon in order to assign meaning to 
interactions and make decisions surrounding genetic testing. Depending on the situation 
at hand, individuals juxtapose existing realities with available truths in order to 
understand their risk and respond in a pragmatic manner. 
As a postpositivist, from an epistemological stance I hold that ideas about risk are 
constructed in relation to objective and subjective knowledge. Therefore, while I 
acknowledge that the stories of participants are an existing truth as they see it, my nursing 
background allows me to also acknowledge that health care providers at times 
understand, explain, and communicate from within an empirical or objective paradigm. 
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Thus, throughout this study I was cognizant that my knowledge and approach may not be 
neutral nor value-free. That is, my perceptions of what is means to be at risk are not 
completely detached from the inquiry. This awareness allowed me to appreciate, discover, 
understand, and be sensitive to how existing ideas about risk, including those of health 
care providers, influence and shape how individuals assign meaning to being at risk for a 
genetically linked condition. Furthermore, this awareness guided me to employ a variety 
of strategies (e.g., memoing, diagramming) to ensure my objectivity as much as possible 
in order to let the stories of the participants be heard without my input. 
I view genetic testing as a reflective social process. It is reflective in that it 
challenges some participants to continuously think about what they have experienced or 
learned in order to interpret and create meaning to being at-risk as they move through the 
genetic testing process. It is a social process in that it starts with an awareness of the 
possibility of a genetic condition at an early age, which continues to evolve and be 
influenced by one's social interactions. Unique to the genetic testing process is its cyclic 
nature; due to its genetic component, ideas about risk are widespread across generations. 
That is, the meaning assigned to being at risk for a genetically linked condition and 
subsequent decisions will continue to influence others living in these at-risk families for 
many years to come. Moreover, the experiences of these "future" at-risk individuals, and 
how they understand risk, will differ from that of their ancestors in light of new 
interactions, different contextual situations, and scientific advancements. 
Finally, I believe that humans are not passive but are active participants in shaping 
the social processes that they encounter. They are able to make choices as to the 
meanings of their perceptions and coinciding behaviours. Individuals interpret the 
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meaning of being at-risk; they then make decisions about testing in complex ways-ways 
that are neither rational nor irrational but pragmatic and shaped by the interactions that 
are part of their everyday life . The philosophical tenets of grounded theory provide an 
appropriate framework to discover and generate substantive theory that describes, 
predicts, and explains how individuals construct their sense of risk. 
Given that the primary focus of grounded theory is to discover basic psychosocial 
processes that exist within human interactions over time within the context of the 
situation (Morse, 200 1), it is a suitable methodological lens to understand how individuals 
construct a meaning of being at risk for ARVC, as this phenomena takes place over an 
extended period of time. Secondly, given that grounded theory holds strong ties to SI, it 
is an appropriate lens to explore how this phenomenon is experienced individuaJJy and 
collecti vely within family interactions. Finally, grounded theory is an appropriate method 
to guide research in areas in which there has been little research done, such as the case 
with ARVC, because theory generation, as opposed to testing, is the focus in grounded 
theory (Chenitz & Swanson, 1986; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
This research study was made to discover the psychosocial processes that 
individuals living in families for ARVC experience as they move through the predictive 
genetic testing process. The first step in this method is data coJJection. 
Data Collection 
The key steps in data collection in grounded theory are sample selection, 
recruitment, and the interview process. Data coiJection in grounded theory is based on 
theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling is the purposeful selection of research 
participants based on their experience with the psychosocial process under examination, 
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the needs of the emerging concepts, and the exploration of the similarities and differences 
of the concepts under examination (Glaser, 1978). In theoretical sampling the researcher 
simultaneously collects, codes, and analyzes data. What data are collected and where 
depends on the needs of the emerging theory. Thus, it is only as the researcher starts to 
determine codes and tries to saturate them by looking for a comparison group, while 
comparing existing and emerging data within and between interviews, that a framework 
for generating substantive theory is generated and the meaning of codes and their 
properties start to take shape (Glaser, 1978, p.37). 
In grounded theory sample selection and size is not predetermined but continues 
until no new theoretical categories emerge (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978). Morse 
(1994) suggests that an adequate sample size consists of 30-50 data sources. In this study 
I had 29 participants and 34 data sources (nine individual interviews; 3 focus groups; 5 
follow-up interviews). 
The Sample 
Inclusion criteria for participants in this study included individuals who (a) were 
over the age of 18, (b) able to fluently communicate in English, (c) capable of 
understanding the purpose of the study, and who (d) had been tested positive or negative 
for ARVC or had an inconclusive genetic test or had refused testing for ARVC, despite an 
identified risk. The inclusion criteria enabled me to collect a range of stories that 
represent the phenomenon of inquiry, ensuring richness of the data. 
Inclusion criteria were eventually broadened to include spouses, other significant 
family members, and older youths. A key reason for this broadening of the inclusion 
criteria was to meet the theoretical needs of the evolving theory. It had been apparent 
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from my initial literature review on the psychosocial impact of predictive genetic testing 
that individuals' experiences of being at-risk for a genetically linked condition were 
influenced by their support network. The significance of a support network in individuals 
living with cardiovascular disease was also a common theme in the cardiovascular 
literature. In addition to this, my early data analysis led to the discovery that the 
experience of genetic testing was so strongly influenced by interactions with fami ly 
members, such as spouses and children, that interviewing participants as if they thought 
about this process independently of their key fami ly members was inappropriate. Indeed, 
participants spoke of the support of their spouse as being essential to their ability to cope 
and make decisions throughout the genetic testing process. Moreover, as many of the 
decisions faced throughout the genetic testing process affected not only the individual 
being tested but also the whole family unit, spouses were frequently an active part of the 
decision -making experience. Thus, in order to fully analyze how individuals living in at-
risk fami lies construct their meaning of risk, spouses or other key support people were 
invited to participate in focus groups. 
The inclusion of the two older youths was initiated by four parents who had been 
interviewed. The two older youths presented themselves as part of one family focus 
group, with their parents requesting me to have their children tell their stories as part of 
the family unit. In this case, children and their parents signed the consent form and the 
Health Research Ethics Board was informed of the departure from the approved protocol 
(see Appendix C). These participants' stories provide a glimpse into the experiences of 
youths and, as will be discussed later, point to the need for further research into how 
young adolescents experience this phenomenon. 
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This study took place in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL). The 
sample was comprised of 29 participants, as shown in table 5.1 7 . Twenty-four of these 
participants lived in rural NL, and five participants lived in urban NL. Of these 24, 17 
individuals lived in areas that were serviced by small health centers; seven of the 24 
individuals lived near a larger center. Nine partic ipants had completed post-secondary 
education. Seventeen had either completed high school or had some high school 
education, and three were currently in high school. Nine individual interviews and three 
focus groups were completed. There were 15 ARVC positive participants and five 
ARVC negative participants. One participant was awaiting genetic testing at the time of 
the interview. Despite efforts, I was unable to recruit any participants who had refused 
genetic testing. The remaining eight participants were spouses of ARVC-positive 
individuals; of those, five were spouses of the individuals comprising the ARVC-positive 
sample in this study, two were surviving spouses of those who had died from ARVC, and 
one was the spouse of the individual who had a heart transplant. The mean age of 
ARVC-positive participants was 4 1, and the mean age for ARVC-negative participants 
was 51. The mean age of the spouses was 45. Two young adolescents, ages 15 and 16, 
presented at the focus group to be interviewed who were both ARVC positive. Fourteen 
ARVC positive participants had an lCD, and one ARVC positive male had received a 
heart transplant. Of the participants, 20 were married, one was divorced, five were single, 
and three were widowed. Fourteen participants were employed; fourteen were 
unemployed with eight retired and three in high school. 
7 Table 5.1 Participant Sociodemographics 
Table 5.1 Participant Sociodemographics 
Characteristic 
Age 
15-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61-70 
71-80 
Marital Status 
Single 
Married 
Widow 
Divorced 
Spouse 
Employment Status 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Students 
ARVC Status 
ARVC positive (males) 
ARVC negative (males) 
ARVC positive (females) 
ARVC negative (females) 
Pending Testing (males) 
Pending Testing (females) 
Inconclusive Test 
Treatments 
lCD 
Heart Transplant 
Location !I 
Smaller Rural Center (health center) 
Larger Rural Center 
Urban Center 
Education 
In High School 
Completed Some High School 
Post -Secondary School 
Number of Participants 
3 
0 
8 
8 
7 
2 
1 
5 
20 
3 
1 
8 
14 
4 
8 
3 
8 
1 
7 
4 
1 
0 
0 
14 
1 
17 
7 
5 
3 
17 
9 
8 Description of Populations: Small rural center (less than 400); Larger rural center (between 9,000-
15,000); Urban Center (200, 000) . 
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Recruitment of Participants 
Participants were recruited through two methods: ( l ) a clinical geneticist and (2) 
using snow ball sampling, whereby individuals heard about the study from participants 
and self-referred to participate. Individuals who had participated in the predictive genetic 
testing experience were recruited by a clinical geneticist who had been involved in 
clinical research with this population. A standardized script was provided for the clinical 
geneticist to use when recruiting participants (see Appendix 0 9). The clinical geneticist 
informed the individuals of the study and of its purpose; those who were interested gave 
permission to have their names and contact information released to me. I then contacted 
each potential participant and explained the study and its purpose. A study information 
package was then forwarded to all potential participants. This included a cover letter, a 
summary of the study, and a consent form (see Appendices E, F, & G 10) . One month 
after the information package was mailed, I contacted the individuals to confirm 
participation in the study and to arrange the first interview. 
Throughout the course of this study, individual interviews revealed the central ity 
of famil y, rather than individuals, in the genetic testing process. That is, I found that the 
genetic testing process is something that occurs within families rather than being 
something that happens to individuals. Therefore, I revised the methodology to 
accommodate this new way of understanding the process from the participants' 
perspectives. I added focus groups as a way of ensuring that the narratives reflected the 
9 Appendi x D : Recruitment Script 
10 Appendi x E: Research Study Cover Le tter 
Appendix F: Summary of Research Study 
Appendix G: Consent Form 
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voices of the participants of genetic testing in an authentic way. Furthermore, the use of 
focu s groups fit well conceptually within the framework of symbolic interactionism; 
individuals at risk for ARVC assign meaning to being at-risk in relation to their 
interactions with family members. As many participants spoke of the meanings attributed 
to interactions with other family members, I wanted to explore how these relationships 
shaped the predictive genetic testing process. Thus, as noted by Glaser and Straus ( 1967), 
I needed to "employ the best method of data collection to obtai n the desired information" 
(p.66). 
Upon consultation with the clinical geneticist, three families were approached to 
participate in focus groups, as shown in table 5.2. 11 These particular families were 
selected because they represented a broad range of fami lies and experiences with genetic 
testing in order to provide a rich and varied account of the predictive genetic testing 
process experience. The same protocol was followed for the recruitment of focus group 
participants as was followed for the individual interviews. The clinical geneticist 
identified a key contact within each of the three families , and the name of each was given 
to me. I advised the participant that they could invite other family members to participate 
in the focus group, using the snowball method of recruitment. An informational package 
was sent to the key contact, with additional packages for other family members who 
might express interest in telling their story as part of the family group. If they were not 
11 Table 5.2 Focus Groups Characteristics 
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comfortable participating in a focus group the option to have an individual interview was 
g1ven. 
As with the individual interviews, data analysis and collection of focu s groups 
was simultaneous. That is, members of the focus group were chosen based on the 
theoretical needs of the study. For example, individual interviews suggested that the 
genetic testing experience is contextual in nature and that individuals living in these 
families may have significantly different experiences. As well, one individual interview 
spoke of the support of his wife as being critical in making the decision to have genetic 
testing. Another participant talked about how family members' experiences were similar 
and different depending on the availability of a reliable predicti ve genetic test for ARVC. 
I recruited individuals who had participated in the gene testing process at all 
phases of genetic discovery (that is, prior to and after the discovery of the ARVC gene in 
2007). Overall, there were eight participants who had experienced or engaged in clinical 
investigations in the early 1980s, seven who had experienced or engaged in clinical and 
genetic testing in the early 1990s, ten who had participated in genetic testing post-
haplotype analysis around 2005, and four who had undergone genetic testing post-
discovery of the ARVC gene. 
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Table 5.2 Focus Groups Characteristics 
Focus Group 1 Focus Group 2 Focus Group 3 
N=4 N=l 2 N=S 
ARVC positive men 2 2 0 
ARYC positi ve women 1 2 
ARYC negative men 0 
ARYC negati ve women 1 1 
Youths (15-20) 3 
Spouses 1 4 3 
I met with the clinical geneticist multiple times over the course of data collection 
and analysis; recruitment of participants took place over a five-month period. Using the 
combination of snowball sampling and purposeful selection via the clinical geneticist, I 
was able to expand the participant pool to include a comparative analysis to existing data, 
in order for me to examine the diverse properties of conceptual codes and to saturate 
categories. In this way, the first participants were chosen because they met the inclusion 
criteria; as data collection and analysis continued, participants were selected based on the 
theoretical needs of the data. 
Only one person who had participated in an individual interview participated in 
the focus group and a subsequent third interview, as well. A single participant made the 
decision, for personal reasons, to forgo the group interview in lieu of a private interview. 
Four of the participants in the individual interviews were interviewed a second time to 
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clarify points in the first interview and to provide them with the opportunity to confirm 
that the categories captured thus far reflected their experience. 
Interview Process 
Prior to beginning the interviews, I explained the purpose of the study, provided 
an opportunity for participants to ask questions, and obtained written informed consent. 
AJJ participants were informed that they were not obligated to participate in the interview 
and could withdraw at any time. No participants withdrew from the study. I coJJected 
demographic information prior to the start of the study. In the case of focus groups, I 
invited participants to introduce themselves in relation to the other members of the group. 
This facilitated my understanding of the context of individual and family experiences. 
The audio component of interviews was digitaJJy taped. A professional 
transcriptionist who had signed an oath of confidentiality transcribed the audio files. The 
written transcriptions were coded and any identifying information was removed to 
provide anonymity and thus ensure confidentiality. The audio files were stored on a 
password-protected computer file. Interview transcripts, consent forms, and recorded 
interviews were stored in separate locked cabinets in my private, locked office. 12 
In addition to audio taping, I took notes during the interviews. These notes helped 
ensure that I would revisit any questions I might have during an interview, reminded me 
to clarify any misconceptions in the interview, and facilitated the development of 
subsequent questions for upcoming interviews. Written notes provided an audit trail to 
record my views, thoughts, and decisions as to recruitment and methodology. This tool 
12 In keeping with M emorial Unive rsity policy, thi s informatio n wi ll be retained for five years fo llowing the 
completion of the project, at which point it will be destroyed. 
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enabled me to be vigilant about observing my emerging theory, identify patterns in the 
data, and allow transparency in the research process. Inserted within the written text of 
the audit trail were numerous diagrams that represented my thought process and decisions 
such as participant selection. 
Immediately following each interview, an interpretative summary, or memo, was 
completed. In addition to this, I sketched detailed family trees, or genograms, following 
the interviews. These family trees allowed me to gain a fuller understanding of the social 
and historical context of the data collected. This was important as participants frequently 
drew upon stories of relatives in order to understand their own risk. A fami ly tree was 
found to be beneficial for quick reference and understanding of biological relationships, 
particularly in the focus groups (for example, in one focus group a grandmother, her 
children, their spouses, and grandchildren participated). Finally, on several occasions, in 
consultation with the clinical geneticist, the family trees were useful for recruitment 
choices as I sought to ensure a broad range of perspectives in order to reach saturation of 
data. 
I did all of the individual interviews. I conducted focus groups with the assistance 
of a researcher in the area who helped with observation and contextual note-taking. 
Interviews were semi-structured, consisting of open-ended questions and probes (see 
Appendix H 1\ Given the nature of grounded theory, the research questions were 
redefined as data was generated, and analyzed. Additional questions were included in 
further follow-up interviews to clarify concepts, expand on emerging themes, and ensure 
13 Appendix H: Sample Interview Schedule/Questions 
141 
data saturation (Speziale & Carpenter, 2007). For example, building on the idea that the 
implantable cardiac defibrillator (ICD) was for many "a life saving device," I asked 
subsequent participants about their perceptions of the lCD. In another four individual 
interviews I asked the participants their thoughts about the idea of "constructing one's 
sense of risk" as being a core category. Their consensus validated that I had indeed 
captured the experience. In fact, one participant looked at me with a sense of surprise and 
relief and said, "I never thought of it like that, but you have got it. Yes! This is it, after 
all those years ... Now it makes sense ... That is what I was doing!" Throughout data 
collection and analysis of the interviews, I took time to simultaneously reflect on the 
transcriptions, review the literature, and reflect on emerging constructs prior to 
conducting further interviews. I also listened to the interviews on multiple occasions to 
ensure I had captured the context of the participants' narratives. 
Individual interviews were conducted in participants' homes or in another private 
space convenient to the participant. Two of the focus groups took place in participants' 
homes; the third was held in a rented space at a local hotel. All of the focus groups were 
done in rural NL. Individual interviews lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes; focus 
group interviews ranged from 60 to 90 minutes in duration. Data analysis commenced 
immediately post-interview, either by reviewing the taped interviews, the transcript, my 
notes, and/or discussing the interview with one of the members of my supervisory 
committee. All interviews were reviewed several times. 
Of the second interviews, two were carried out in person in a private office and 
the other two were done over the phone at the participants' request. Only one person in 
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the focus group had a second interview over the phone. Second interviews lasted from 20 
to 30 minutes. All interview data were included in data analysis. 
Data Analysis 
A professional transcriptionist transcribed the audio-filed interviews, and I 
checked the transcription for accuracy and content. Two members of my supervisory 
committee facilitated data analysis. One member confirmed the interpretative summaries 
or memos prior to them being sent out to the participants (to be discussed below). The 
other member reviewed and confirmed emerging codes, properties, conceptual categories, 
and theoretical constructs that depict the basic psychosocial process of constructing one's 
sense of risk throughout the predictive genetic testing process. 
Data analysis methods used in this research included the constant comparative 
method, substantive and theoretical coding, theoretical memoing, and diagramming, as 
outlined by Glaser ( 1978). 
Constant Comparative 
The constant comparative method was used in order to jointly code and analyze 
data. The constant comparative method adds to the credibility or trustworthiness of the 
data; data are repeatedly being compared throughout the entire research process in an 
effort to construct theory grounded in the data (leon, 2004) . Throughout data analysis, 
time was taken to reflect on and compare coded categories. Isolated incidents within and 
between interviews were compared to each other in order to code for and develop 
concepts, conceptual categories, and their properties. This process was repeated for all 
subsequent interviews. Conceptual categories and their properties were also compared 
within and between interviews. Throughout this time, the focus was on the diverse 
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conditions or the factors that make up a category, how these factors present themselves, 
how they are maximized or minimized, and their consequences on a category. As the 
theory started to emerge through constant comparison methods, category reduction was 
done in order to create parsimony of the categories and generalizability of the emerging 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). That is, links between categories that explain how 
individuals construct ideas about risk throughout the genetic testing process are clearly 
presented on a broad theoretical level (Cutcliffe & Hader, 2009). 
In the case of the focus groups, I initially compared focus group interviews to 
individual data within the same focus group. I then compared this data to other individual 
and focus group interviews. I also compared subgroups within and between the focus 
groups. For example, l compared the experiences of spouses with each other and to other 
participants' experiences. I also compared the experience of different family units. Thus, 
varied experiences were compared to ensure the richness of the evolving theory. 
Throughout this process, conceptual categories and their properties were integrated or 
collapsed as the core category was discovered. As gaps in the evolving theory became 
evident, I searched for participants who would help me gain a fuller understanding of 
what was happening. 
Throughout this process I started to "think about the full range of types of 
continua of the category, its dimensions, the conditions under which it is pronounced or 
minimized, its major consequences, its relationship to other categories and its other 
properties" (Glaser and Straus, 1967, p. I 06). For example, while I was comparing 
incidents surrounding one's initial awareness that they might be at risk for a genetic 
condi tion, I noticed that, for many participants, this initial risk awareness was sparked by 
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story of an unexpected death of a relative. After several interviews, it became apparent 
that, although many participants had similar stories of unexpected deaths in their families, 
for some it was only when they had tangible signs of having heart trouble themselves 
such as a "racing heart" that they started to think that their symptoms may have a genetic 
cause. In fact, for many participants, physical signs of heart problems or witnessing a 
critical event, such as the illness of a close relative, had a significant impact on shaping 
their meaning of risk throughout the entire genetic testing process. Also, even though 
some participants were ARVC negative, the news of another relative's death caused them 
to rethink their own personal perception of risk. In addition to this, it was evident that 
conditions that contribute to one's understanding of risk were also varied. While some 
participants understood their risk for ARVC as being analogous with their lifestyle habits 
and gender, for others this was not the case. Thoughts about risk were also linked to 
treatment modalities. Many participants held varying perspectives surrounding the 
efficacy of the ICD as a treatment for ARVC. For some, the ICD was seen as a 
"lifesaver" and in some way suspended their risk for the disease, but for others the ICD 
was a temporary solution. This led me to believe that the meaning of being at-risk 
emerges at different points in an individual's life, often sparked by a meaningful 
interaction with oneself, others, and objects. It is how one interprets and assigns meaning 
to that interaction that shapes one's behaviour and beliefs about the interaction. 14 
By comparing data it also became clear that there was an obvious core category, 
constructing the meaning of being "at-risk," threaded throughout all narratives that 
14 This fi nding will be di scussed furthe r in Chapters 6 , 7 , and 8. I provide this in formation here as a means 
of illustrating the process of ongoing analysis during data collection. 
145 
linked all of my various categories together in a logical manner and could account for 
variations in experiences. The constant comparison method helped me to code for the 
core category and saturate other categories; that is, as I compared data, new thoughts and 
questions came to light, and I was able to develop questions to gather more data in order 
to address those questions and to help me understand and explain the experience of 
constructing a sense of risk. For example, as I interviewed participants I asked them to 
tell me about growing up in their family, to describe their understanding of ARVC, and to 
talk about their experience with the lCD. This simultaneous data analysis and collection 
continued throughout the coding process until I felt that I had saturated all categories and 
their properties, and that no new information was being heard. 
Coding 
Theoretical coding as outlined by Glaser ( 1978) was used in conjunction with the 
constant comparative method to analyze data, as shown in figure 5.1. In grounded theory, 
theory emerges as relationships between participants' narrati ves or indicators (I) are 
discovered, compared, and clustered together to form concepts that reflect similarities in 
the indicators. Indicators are raw data: words, phrases, or sentences from the participant 
narratives. The hypothetical relationships noted between indicators and concepts are 
merged into properties. Properties describe conditions, dimensions, and consequences 
under which conceptual categories occur (Corbin, 1986). Conditions refer to the specific 
factors that influence the property (e.g., age) . Dimensions are the social context under 
which the phenomenon under investigation unfolds (e.g., pre-genetic testing) (following 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Properties are then combined to form conceptual categories. A 
category is reflective of the variability and similarities of properties. A category is 
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considered "a conceptual element of a theory" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967 p.36). These 
conceptual categories reflect a core category, a main theme that links all categories 
together in a logical manner. Categories are further refined to represent core theoretical 
constructs that describe the psychosocial process under examination, in this case the 
social process of constructing one's sense of risk. Significant throughout this process is 
the fact that as properties and categories emerge it is their interrelation that guides data 
collection and analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Theoretical coding occurs on two levels 
in order to generate a substantive theory: (1) substantive coding and (2) theoretical coding 
(Glaser, 1978). 
Substantive Theory: Constructing the Meaning of Risk 
! 
Theoretical Constructs 
Concept 
I ..,..,.. ____ __....._I 
! . 
Categones 
Prolrties 
I j Concept 
I .,.,. ____ ___.._I 
Figure 5. 1. Ground Theory: Theoretical Coding. Schematic of codi ng used to guide data 
analysis. The letter I indicates the participants' quotes, or "indicators." The arrows 
represent the constant comparison of the data as the indicators are collapsed into 
concepts; concepts are compared and collapsed into properties and so forth . (Adapted 
from Glaser, B. G. [ 1978]. Theoretical sensitivity, Sociology Press Mill Valley: 
California.). 
147 
Substantive coding. Substantive coding is comprised of both open and selective 
coding. Open coding, according to Glaser ( 1978), starts with line by line coding of the 
interview transcript in order to ensure full theoretical coverage of data. These codes or 
conceptual labels, which identify the phenomena indicated by the data, are merged into 
similar concepts and properties and then collapsed into conceptual categories. The 
researcher "codes for as many categories that might fit, coding different incidences into as 
many categories as possible. New categories emerge and new incidences fit existing 
categories" (Glaser, 1978. p. 56). It is through this process that the data are "opened up" 
or "fractured" into analytical pieces that can be coded to fit into properties and categories 
as patterns amongst data are recognized. As open coding continues, core categories start 
to emerge. As one starts coding for core variable(s), categories become saturated and 
their properties confirmed (Glaser, 1978). 
This study included line by line coding of participants' narrati ve accounts. This 
approach to coding forces the researcher to verify and saturate categories, minimizes 
missing an important category, produces a dense rich theory and gives a fee ling that 
nothing is left out" (Glaser, 1978. p. 58). For ease of coding, all transcripts were placed 
in a table with two columns, one for the data and one for the codes and any theoretical 
memos. Gerunds were used to code data throughout this process (e.g., understanding, 
knowing, and trusting). NVivo software was used for data management, providing a 
method to link indicators to concepts, properties, categories, and constructs. Throughout 
the coding process, codes and memos were written in the margins of the transcripts prior 
to being inputted into NVivo. The corresponding indicators were linked to the assigned 
code for ease of retrieval and data analysis; therefore, at any point during the data analysis 
148 
process, the "raw data" to support properties, categories, and constructs was readily 
available in an organized fashion. Theoretical memos were also inputted into NVivo and 
again linked to data. Multiple codes were constantly being assigned to the data as I 
attempted to discover the relationships between data sources. 
As I engaged in open coding, I asked myself several key questions that Glaser 
(1978) suggested as being important to the proper use of open coding. Initially, I asked 
"What is this data the study of?" As I moved through the narratives, it became apparent 
that the data were telling me that I was not simply looking at the psychosocial and 
behavioural outcomes of genetic testing, as initially proposed in my research proposal, 
but rather at how participants construct a personal meaning to being "at-risk." Secondly, 
I asked, "What category does this incident indicate?" This question allowed me to remain 
focused on the generation of codes that are interrelated and grounded in the data. The 
final question asked was, "What is actually happening to the data?" As I conducted more 
interviews, the answer to this question became more apparent: the data were taking me 
through the process of how one' s meaning of risk is shaped and reshaped at various 
stages in the genetic testing process as well as in relation to the state of scientific 
knowledge at that point in time. Also, the significance of social interactions and 
relationships in formulating one 's construction of risk was obvious. 
Open coding continued until it was evident that the participants' narratives were 
telling the story of how ideas about risk are shaped and reshaped throughout the 
predictive genetic testing process. To facilitate an understanding of how individuals 
assign meaning to being at risk for a genetically linked condition the core variable, 
"constructing one's sense of risk," emerged, revealing how risk is understood, and the 
conditions and consequences that influence its meaning in the genetic testing process 
(Glaser, 1978). A core category is one that is identified as being central to the 
psychosocial process, accounting for variation in a pattern of behaviour; it occurs 
frequently, it reflects meaningful relationships amongst properties, it takes time to 
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saturate due to the nature of its variability and relationships, and it can stand alone as a 
separate dimension to the process. A core category, however, is relevant in understanding 
the entire social process (Glaser, 1978). A core variable explains contradictory cases 
such as one's reluctance to engage in genetic testing or varied responses to prescribed 
treatments, such as the lCD (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
In this study, participants' experiences with genetic testing were shaped and 
reshaped in relation to their social interactions and existing beliefs about risk. Their ideas 
about the meaning of being "at-risk" accounted for the variations in their behaviours and 
influenced individual coping strategies; regardless of the life context of each participant, 
all interviews emphasized the process of conceptualizing risk for either themselves, their 
families, or their children. For example, in the one interview, a key factor that influenced 
the decision to have the reinserted ICD was the reconstruction of risk post-cardiac arrest. 
Similar constructions and reconstructions of the meaning of being "at-risk" are evident 
throughout the major categories found in the analysis and reflect all of the data in some 
manner, 
As I continued selective coding for the core variable, I started to saturate 
categories that related to the construction of one' s risk (that is, no new properties or 
categories emerged from the data). This process led me to select additional participants 
whose alternate perspectives would help me to develop the emerging theory. I continued 
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to ask myself questions such as, "How do other individuals adjust to living with a positive 
ARVC result?" "Is this experience the same or different for those participants?" "Under 
what conditions do people successfully cope with having a positive test?" Once I had 
established a sufficiently diverse range of perspectives (that is, once saturation of types of 
perspectives had been gained) I began the task of theoretical coding. 
Theoretical coding. Theoretical coding of data is the process of making 
theoretical links between categories. The selection of a theoretical code constitutes 
continuous reflection on the data and forces the researcher to conceptually analyze the 
social process at hand on a higher theoretical level (Glaser, 1978). It is at this stage that 
one starts to expand and pull conceptual categories into a basic psychosocial process 
(Stern & Porr, 201 I ). 
In this study, the categories generated from the data were linked together as a 
process that evolves over time and in response to one' s interactions. Throughout data 
collection and analysis it was evident from participants' stories that their construction of 
risk was a psychosocial process that sparked at an early age with the awareness that 
something was just "not right" in the family. This awareness was quite often linked to the 
unexpected death of a family member or stories about the demise of a distant relative(s). 
Following the earl y recognition of risk in this vague sense, many participants started to 
face the presence of ARVC in their families as they engaged in social interactions with 
health care providers, were exposed to more deaths and were given the opportunity to 
have predictive genetic testing. It is during this time that participants start to tease out 
and assimilate, for themselves and others, the meaning of being at risk for ARYC. 
Participants' narratives end with a recollection of how they continue to reconstruct the 
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meaning of being "at-risk" in light of predictive test results. For many, it is a process of 
adjustment as they look towards a future of trying to balance their concern for their 
offspring with a positive outlook. 
The psychosocial process that represents how participants construct their personal 
meaning of risk is captured by three key theoretical constructs as they move through the 
three phases of the predictive genetic testing process (pre-testing, during testing, and post-
testing). Theoretical constructs are the highest level of codes (Hutchinson, 1986). 
Although each theoretical construct has its own categories and properties, they overlap as 
individuals move through the phases of the predictive genetic testing process and 
construct their own sense of risk. The three theoretical constructs identified in this study 
were: (1) awakening to a new meaning of being "at-risk," (2) deciphering the meaning of 
being at-risk, and (3) constructing a new meaning of being "at-risk" 15• It is the 
interaction of these three theoretical constructs that represents the core category, 
"constructing a sense of being at-risk." 
Grounded Theory Research Strategies 
In order to develop emerging theory, several strategies common to grounded 
theory were employed, including theoretical memoing, diagramming and theoretical 
sensitivity. 
Theoretical Memoing 
Memoing is critical to grounded theory. It consists of a candid account of the 
researcher's idea about the codes and their relationships (Glaser, 1978). It has three core 
15 These will be further di scussed in chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
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goals: (1 ) to identify any pre-existing ideas and assumptions of the researcher, (b) to 
record methodological decisions throughout the research process, and (c) to reflect on and 
analyze the data in an open and candid manner (Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). It 
is through the writing of memos that the researcher "analytically interprets the data and 
discovers emergent patterns" (Lempert, 2007). Memoing allows the researcher to 
develop codes in a free manner; it also creates a venue for the researcher to describe the 
rationale for the code itself and its placement within the coding process (Glaser, 1978). 
Furthermore, memoing creates a "safe place" for the researcher to tease out the meaning 
of the code, to discuss conceptual depth of emerging patterns and themes, and to capture 
speculations about relationships between indicators, properties, and categories. It can 
provide a forum to guide theoretical sampling or a place to "store" ideas for future 
reference while one del ves into thoughts about the emerging theory and concepts (Morse 
& Field, 1995). 
Memos were used to note my perceptions of the data and to write down ideas that 
needed further exploration . For example, many participants' stories comprised woven 
recollections of factors that influenced their decision to engage in the genetic testing 
process. As I interviewed more participants, I was more cognizant of these factors, and at 
times asked direct questions to determining whether these factors were a common 
denominator in other participants' stories and to discover other potential factors. 
Memoing also included as the following: why I thought the code fit the data, what 
relationships exist between codes, and questions surrounding the variability of the 
emerging concepts and my own personal perceptions. In this study, I inputted memos 
into NVivo and conducted my coding of transcripts in conjunction with the memos. 
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Memos were also linked to codes for ease of retrieval and development. Also, as I started 
to further develop the core category, I reviewed the memos and sorted them to put the 
"opened" or "fractured" data back together in a meaningful way that would capture the 
social process of genetic testing (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). I started sorting using the core 
category and organized the memos to reflect the process of constructing risk throughout 
the various phases of the genetic testing process. 
Memos, or interpretative summaries, were written about every participant to 
reflect their stories and to facilitate development of the emerging theory. Another 
researcher (a member of my supervisory committee) confirmed the interpretative 
summaries; all identifying information was removed and the summaries were mailed to 
all participants. A stamped self-addressed envelope was included for participants to 
return the signed form stating whether the interpretative summary captured their 
expenence. Participants were asked to confirm that I had indeed captured their 
expenence. The summaries provided another opportunity for participants to add to the 
experience or clarify any misconceptions. For some, the interpretative summary was a 
springboard for the second interview. Two participants did call me to request minor 
changes in the summary to better reflect their experience. Four summaries included 
minor editorial changes, such as dates, and one participant added several more comments. 
Two reminders were sent to each participant requesting return of their comments on the 
summary, including one follow-up telephone call. Twenty interpretative summaries were 
returned signed, confirming that I had indeed captured the essence of their experience. 
One interpretative summary was returned without having been reviewed, due to the fact 
that the participant had moved. I followed up on this participant and mailed the summary 
~----·-~--~----------------------------------------------
to the new address; however, it was not returned. This interview was included in data 
analysis as the participant had provided informed consent. 
Diagramming 
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In addition to memos, I drew diagrams throughout the multiple stages of data 
analysis in order to illustrate variations within conditions, relationships amongst 
categories, to reflect on my thoughts , and to identify any areas that required theory 
development (Corbin, 1986; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). As a visual learner, diagrams were 
a place where I "parked" questions about the data itself and its relationships with other 
data; at times the use of diagrams enabled me to identify places where categories should 
be collapsed. Throughout this process I again asked myself several key questions as 
suggested by Corbin (1986), including: "What is the name of this category?" " Under 
what conditions or context does it occur?" "What are its properties?" "How does it 
happen?" "Who experiences this situation?" and "What are the consequences?" For 
example, as it became more apparent that the core category centered on one's 
understanding of risk, I constructed a diagram that represented how the meaning of risk 
developed as participants moved through the genetic testing process, in relation to the 
above questions. I used the diagram to discuss emerging categories, theory, and phases of 
this social process with my supervisory committee. As I reworked the diagram, I could 
easily see gaps in emerging theory that guided sampling and prompted me to explore 
these gaps in the li terature. These diagrams made me more aware of my own 
preconceived ideas about genetic testing. 
I also drew a visual representation of the historical evolution of the theories of 
risk, the history of genetics, and the history of the Canadian health care system. Through 
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data analysis I constantly juxtaposed what the participants' narratives were telling me 
with existing theory and sociocultural shifts that influenced the concept of risk in society 
in general. Thus, these visual representations were another data source that facilitated my 
understanding of the meaning of risk and made me sensitive to emerging theory. 
Theoretical Sensitivity 
Throughout the process of coding and category development, theoretical 
sensitivity is essential (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Kelle, 2007). Theoretical sensitivity 
refers to the researcher's ability to have theoretical insights into the substantive area of 
research, the ability to make sense of these insights (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and the 
ability to think inductively and build theory that reflects the data (Schreiber, 2001). 
Glaser (1978) notes that this level of sensitivity can be obtained by remaining open to 
emerging ideas and by reviewing literature "that deals with both the kinds of variables 
and their associated general ideas that will be used" (p. 3). In order to be theoretically 
sensitive to the data, I did a brief overview of the literature that explored common issues 
with genetic testing across multiple disciplines. This overview was essential given the 
fact that, to date, there is no literature that focuses on the experience of living with 
ARVC. Also, as noted by Morse (2001), one cannot ignore the literature but rather it can 
be "bracketed and used for comparisons with emerging categories providing a meaningful 
springboard into analytical data analysis" (p. 9). Noteworthy is the fact that this initial 
literature review was very brief; however, as I started to see a core category emerge, I 
once again turned to the literature as another data source and compared my findings to the 
existing data (Glaser, 2004). As I became more familiar with the data and started to see 
the emergence of the core category, I turned my attention to li terature surrounding 
theories of risk to further understand the meaning of the data. 
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Another way of facilitating theoretical sensitivi ty is to acknowledge my own 
personal theories about the meaning of predictive genetic testing (Scheiber, 2001 ). This 
was captured in memos, in the margins of transcripts throughout the coding process, and 
in diagrams. I labeled these thoughts as "ME." Also, given the fact that I had previous 
experience with conducting qualitative research at the graduate level, I was able to remain 
open to emerging ideas while being cognizant of my own thoughts and ideas. 
Rigour in Grounded Theory 
Throughout the study, I employed many strategies to ensure rigour of the research 
as outlined by Glaser (1978). Rigour, or credibility, relates to the trustworthiness of 
findings in qualitative research (Sandelowski, 1986). Glaser (1978) identified four 
criteria essential to ensure rigour in grounded theory: fit, relevance, work, and 
modifiability. 
Fit 
Fit refers to the fact that the categories must correspond with the data without 
being forced to fit preconceived categories or match preconceived ideas (Glaser, 1978; 
Stern & Porr, 2011 ). Fit was ensured in this study in several ways. Throughout data 
analysis, I was cognizant of the fact that I needed to continuously examine the data until I 
could see how individuals living in at-risk fami lies conceptualized this process. Initially, 
I had thought that the challenge for my participants might be in terms of understanding 
one' s objective risk; but as I reflected on the narratives, this was actually a small part of 
what the data were saying. It became evident that, for participants, the construction of 
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one's sense of risk and coinciding psychosocial and behavioural responses was 
challenging. As I coded for the core category of constructing risk there was an emergent 
fit between the data and this core category (Glaser, 1978). 
Stern and Porr (20 11) explain that to ensure fit, researchers should be guided by 
their interpretative framework, that is, the underlying set of ideas and principles that 
informs and guides one's perspective and research methodology. Drawing on the tenets 
of symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, and postpostivism, I was able to understand how 
participants' different beliefs and interpretations about risk were symbolically reflective 
of their existing reality and relationships. It became more apparent through data 
collection and analysis that at-risk was an evolving concept that is shaped and reshaped 
throughout the testing process, reflecting the changing realities of life. Correspondingly, 
individuals seem to cope with their risk in a pragmatic fashion. Relationships with others 
and responsibility to others are key to his processual nature of risk perception. 
Although the literature suggests that risk is related to one's social relationships (in 
the sense of relational responsibility as discussed by d' Agincourt-Canning, 2001; 
d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2006a, 2006b; Etchegary, 2006a; Etchegary & Fowler, 2008; 
Etchegary et al., 2009; Hallowell, 1999; Hallowell et al., 2006; Klitzman, Thorne, 
Williamson, & Marder, 2007), I did not raise questions about relational responsibility in 
the early interviews. At the time, it seemed to me that the notion of relationships being 
important to decision-making had been well enough established in the literature to be 
taken as a "given," rather than intentionally explored. It was only through comparison of 
the data, when it became more evident that participants' ideas about risk evolved over 
time and were rooted in more than just a sense of relational responsibility that I started to 
probe further into this area. And, in probing further, I discovered that the way risk 
functions is far more complex than I had imagined based on my readings of existing 
theory. Thus, by ensuring that the "fit" was there in relation to my interpretive 
framework, my theory was able to emerge more fully. 
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A final way that fit can be ensured is when participants recognize in the reported 
research findings their own experiences (Sandelowski, 1986). Theory fits the data, 
according to Glaser (1992), when the categories and properties reflect the realities of the 
participants. van Manen (1997) suggests that findings of qualitative data are credible 
only when they are returned to the participants to confirm the interpretation and to ensure 
that the researcher(s) have an understanding of the importance of each category. In my 
research, interpretive summaries were provided to each participant and participants were 
asked to confirm that the summaries reflect their experiences. As mentioned above, this 
was most evident in the comment of one participant: "Yes! This is it , after all those 
years ... now it makes sense ... that is what I was doing!" 
Work 
The second criterion for rigour in grounded theory is "work." This means that 
"the theory should explain what happened, predict what will happen, and interpret what is 
happening" (Glaser, 1978, p. 4). In order to make theory work, one must capture what is 
going on and the results must be relevant to the substantive area of research (Glaser, 
1978). "Work" was achieved by travelling to many of the homes of participants and 
li stening to thei r stories within the context of their everyday li ves. I strived to obtain the 
facts by asking questions that delved into the breadth of their experience, such as, "Tell 
me what life was like growing up in your fami ly?" I also asked participants to explain 
their interpretations of what it means to have a genetic linked condition or to take me 
through the time they found out they were negative or positive for ARVC. 
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Secondly, throughout the interview process, I invited participants to include 
significant others in the interview. The inclusion of significant others "worked" well , 
enriching the participants' narratives and facilitating an understanding of the experience 
through the lens of another family member. Additionally, focus groups provided an 
opportunity for me to observe social interactions and understand how relationships impact 
one's construction of risk and patterns of behaviour within the predictive genetic testing 
process. As I moved through theoretical sampling and data analysis it became clear that 
kin relationships were a significant factor in determining how one constructs their 
meaning of risk; this enabled me to predict how individuals draw upon family 
re lationships to understand and cope with being at-risk. 
In order to arrive at a theory that worked, I began looking for variation in the 
cases. I included individuals who had a positive or negative test result, those who had 
lived with inconclusive knowledge of their test result until recently, and one who was 
waiting for testing. Data were constantly compared in an effort to identify commonalities 
and differences. 
Finally, my preliminary fi ndings have been presented at several local, national, 
and international conferences. Several members of the audience who have expertise in 
the field of genetics have commented that this study holds much value in understanding 
how the genetic testing process impacts at-risk individuals and their fami lies. I have also 
presented to Genome Atlantic researchers who have supported this research study in light 
of its contribution to the substantive area. As a result of this study I was approached by 
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Dr. Brugada, a leading cardiologist who discovered Long QT Syndrome, and was asked 
to write a chapter in a book regarding the psychosocial implications of genetic testing 
(Manuel , Brunger, & Hodgkinson, 2010). Finally, throughout the research process, I 
have had multiple conversations with my thesis committee supervisors and coJJeagues as 
the theory emerged. I found this dialogue particularly beneficial when I was attempting 
to diagram the model and to ensure that the categories fit. 
Relevancy 
Relevancy, the third criteria for rigour, is achieved by aJJowing the core process 
and problems to surface while avoiding the influence of preconceived ideas and theories 
(Glaser, 1978). Constructing the meaning of risk was a core process that emerged quickly 
during data analysis and was confirmed through foJJow-up interviews and participants' 
commentaries on the interpretative summaries. In order to facilitate the discovery of this 
social process I used an audit trail and memoing as a place to "park" any preconceived 
ideas. Reflecting on these memos I was able to ensure transparency of the research 
process and note any potential bias. 
Modifiability 
The final criterion for rigour in grounded theory is modifiability. This means that 
although the construction of one's sense of risk is central to understanding the predictive 
genetic testing process, the relevance and variation of contributing factors are 
continuously changing (following Glaser, 1978). Throughout the research process I 
sought variations in cases and used a variety of interview approaches to generate a 
multitude of ideas and perspectives about the genetic testing process. I also remained 
open to new and emerging ideas. For example, early in the study I noted that the initial 
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awareness that one might be at-risk seemed to be different for participants; thus, in 
subsequent interviews, I delved into the process of how one becomes aware that one 
might be at-risk. Open ended questions such as, " tell me what it was like to receive your 
genetic test results," were used to elicit participants' perspectives on risk awareness. I 
found that even though the conscious awareness of being at-risk might be articulated 
differently by participants, what was clear was the fact that on a subconscious level many 
participants were aware that something was "just not right" in the family. In fact, for 
many it was only when they became aware of the significance of having a positive 
genetic test that many revisited earlier thoughts about being at-risk. Thus, the process of 
constructing one's risk is general allows for variation and relevancy, which makes it fit 
the criterion of being modifiable. 
Finally, I constantly used diagrams as a method to modify categories and to 
identify variations in the data that warranted further examination. For example, in an 
illustration that outlined the meaning of the lCD, it came to light that one participant 
thought the ICD was a cure for ARVC. This notion of the ICD as curative was not 
something that I had considered in my data collection and analysis to date; therefore, I 
revisited all of the transcripts to see if this was a recurring theme. 
Ethical Considerations 
Prior to the start of the proposed study, ethical approval was obtained from the 
Human Investigation Committee of Memorial University of Newfoundland (now the 
provincial Health Research Ethics Board) (see Appendix 1. 16) Approval was also 
16 Appendix I: Ethical Approval 
obtained from the Research Proposals Approval Committee of Eastern Health (see 
Appendix J .17) 
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Written informed consent was obtained prior to the start of the interviews. At the 
beginning of each interview the potential risks and benefits of participating in the study 
were discussed to ensure that participation was voluntary and informed. Each participant 
was given the opportunity to ask questions. They were also notified that they could 
withdraw from the study at any time (at which point the audio-file would be erased), take 
a break from the interview, or reschedule the interview, regardless of reason. Focus 
group participants were informed of the importance of confidentiality of the information 
discussed within the group and that given that the researcher has no control over what 
other individuals in the group might say outside of the group, confidentiality could not be 
guaranteed. Focus group participants were informed that individual information could 
not be extracted from the focus group transcription , and therefore, once the focus group 
had been conducted, individuals would not have the option to withdraw their data. 
As with any study of this nature there was a possibility that participants might find 
the interview psychologically distressing. In anticipation of any psychological distress I 
was prepared to assist participants to gain access to their genetic counsellor; in fact for 
each interview I carried with me the telephone numbers of the genetic counsellors. 
Secondly, the Director of the Provincial Medical Genetics Program in Newfoundland 
agreed to be available to discuss any concerns that might arise on behalf of the 
17 Appendi x J: Research Approval : Eastern Health 
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participants or myself from the interviews.18 Also, given that I am a nurse and have 
experience dealing with clients in a state of emotional distress, I felt confident in my 
abilities to address any potentially distressing situation. Finall y, I had a toll-free 
telephone line installed in my private office so that participants could call to ask me 
questions at any time. 
There was one participant who took a break from the interview for five minutes 
but decided to continue the interview. Two participants did become tearful when 
discussing their children; however, both participants returned to conduct a second 
interview as well, and one of them also participated in the focus group. To my 
knowledge no participants required access to a genetic counsellor post-interview. 
Participants were informed prior to the interview that there was no direct personal benefit 
from the interview except that they may find it therapeutic to talk about their 
. 19 
expenence. 
Every effort was made to ensure confidentiality for all of the participants. All 
interview audio-files and transcriptions were coded, and all identifying information 
removed from the transcribed interview. The written transcriptions and CDROM backups 
of transcriptions were locked in a cabinet separate from the consent forms and will be 
held for five years, then destroyed. I was the only person who had access to the locked 
cabinet(s) containing research information and to the password access to the computer 
storing the audio-filed interviews and transcriptions. Any future publications or 
18 At no time was that assistance required . 
19 Following the interviews several partic ipants stated that they found the inte rviews bene fi c ial and 
particularly liked be ing able to d iscuss concerns as a fam ily. 
presentations of this research will ensure that the anonymity and confidentiality of 
participants is maintained. 
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One ethical concern that arose during data collection was the presence of two 
individuals under the age of 18 who attended one focus group interview. Prior to their 
participation, I consulted with my supervisory committee member, who was present at the 
focus groups. The purpose of the study was explained to these participants, and then 
written consent was obtained from both the participant and their parent. An amendment 
was sent to the research ethics board informing them of the event and requesting 
permission to include the data in the study (see Appendix C.20) 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of grounded theory, as the research 
methodology used in this study suggests. The philosophical underpinnings of pragmatism 
and symbolic interactionism were discussed. Situation of the researcher and the centrality 
of post-positivism were addressed. This was followed by a description of data collection, 
data analysis, and grounded theory research strategies. The chapter concluded with 
synopsis of the ethical considerations of the study. 
20 Appendi x C : Ethics Approva l: Amendme nt 
,-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CHAPTER6 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: AWAKENING TO A NEW MEANING OF 
BEING AT-RISK 
The substantive theory generated by participants' interviews centered on 
Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk (see Appendix B21 ). This theory emerged 
strongly in the narratives of 29 individuals living in families at risk for Arrhythmogenic 
Right Ventricular Cardiomyopathy (ARVC) who were moving through the three phases 
of the predictive genetic testing process (pre-testing, during testing, and post-testing). In 
order to assign a personal meaning to risk, participants continuously juxtapose ideas 
about risk against their existing beliefs about genetics and heart disease. This embodied 
sense of risk is pragmatic, transient, and fluid in nature. It is pragmatic in that when 
individuals construct ideas about risk they draw on contextual factors to shape or reshape 
risk perception, using a "bricolage"22 approach to make decisions; risk is transient in that 
the meaning one assigns to risk fluctuates in relation to the contextual dimensions in 
one' s life, specificall y one's stage of the predictive genetic testing process, one's 
experiential knowledge, the current state of scientific knowledge, as well as relevant 
conditions (e.g., age, gender, number of deaths in family, etc); and finally , risk is fluid in 
that risk perception is not static but an evolving process that changes with each new 
21 Appendix B: The Theory: Constructing the Meaning of Being at Risk 
22 Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss uses the term "bricolage" to describe the improvisatio nal 
recombination of a fixed series of e lements. These elements, he argues, are a key dimens ion of the "science 
of the concrete," a modality of human thought which he contrasts with formal or abstracted sc ienti fic 
thought. Following Levi-Strauss' sense of bricolage, the at-risk individ uals are continually refashion ing 
"new worlds fro m fragments" without a prior blue-print or overarching plan (Strauss, C.L. ( 1968) .The 
Savage Mind. London : Weindenfe ld & Nicolson.) 
experience, advancement in science, phase of the genetic testing process, and other 
conditions. 
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In the first part of this chapter I present a generic model of a Rubik 's Cube (see 
Figure 6.1 23) to illustrate the situational context in which the theory Constructing the 
Meaning of Being At-Risk unfolds. Following this is a discussion of the research findings. 
The findings of each subsequent chapter begin with the introduction of the theoretical 
construct under discussion. There are three theoretical constructs, and each construct 
corresponds to one phase of the genetic testing process (i.e., pre-testing, during testing, 
and post-testing). Each theoretical construct captures a category(s)-a group of similar 
concepts that describe a central idea. Embedded within each category are descriptive 
properties that depict specific conditions (or dimensions of the category) that influence 
how one assigns meaning to risk. The three contextual dimensions (i.e., the phase of the 
genetic testing process, scientific knowledge, and experiential knowledge) represent the 
broad social context under which the construction of risk unfolds at any particular point in 
time. These conditions and contextual dimensions emerge as participants' narratives are 
constantly compared to each other and, ultimately, become integrated to generate the 
substantive theory that captures the experience of Constructing the Meaning of Being At-
Risk for individuals living in a family at-risk. Participants' narratives or indicators that 
shed light on their experiences are threaded throughout this discussion. 
23 Figure 6.1. Rubik's Cube: Generic Model 
167 
The Rubik's Cube: The Puzzle and Shifting Faces of Risk 
The Rubik's Cube is a three-dimensional, six-faced puzzle created by an architect, 
Erno Rubrik, in 1974. Each face of the Rubik 's Cube, which is in the shape of a square, 
is made up of nine smaller individual blocks or cubes that are the same colour when the 
puzzle is solved. The cube is held together by a single core structure that has three 
intersecting axis, which hold the six faces of the cube in place. The design of the cube 
allows each face of the cube to move independently; thus, as the face of the cube moves 
the colours become intertwined. In order to solve the puzzle all faces must be restored to 
one complete colour (e.g., blue, red, or yellow). There are numerous ways to solve the 
Rubik' s Cube using mathematical algorithms; however for the novice individual, attempts 
to solve the puzzle generally involve trial and error (www.rubiks.com, 2012). 
As participants in this study move through the three phases of the predictive 
genetic testing process experience (pre-testing, during testing, and post-testing), their 
ideas about risk are constantly being shaped and reshaped in relation to experiential and 
scientific knowledge analogous to solving a puzzle. Experiential knowledge refers to the 
cumulative knowledge obtained by assigning meaning to the conditions or factors that 
influence one's perception of risk (e.g., growing up or living in an at-risk fami ly, 
witnessing firsthand numerous losses, listening to accounts of relatives ' deaths passed 
down through many generations, experiencing the effects of ARVC, etc.). Scientific 
knowledge, in the context of this theory, refers primarily to the stage of gene discovery 
within the short hi story of ARYC genetic research and existing biomedical models of 
inheritance and disease causation. As the scientific "reality" of knowledge about, testing 
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for, and clinical care for ARVC changes, that in turn reshapes the individual' s perception 
of their own risk status. 
These three contextual dimensions (phase of genetic testing, experiential 
knowledge, and scientific knowledge) all shape perceptions of the conditions that impact 
one's risk status. Conditions are the key factors that influence how one embodies the 
genetic testing process, how one assigns meaning to being at-risk, and how one copes 
with new meanings of risk. A condition captures the cause of the experience and the 
consequence (Glaser, 1978). Conditions include, but are not limited to, age, gender, 
modifiable lifestyle factors, and the onset of signs and symptoms. For example, the phase 
of testing, experience, and science may intersect to lead a particular individual to hold as 
salient the notion that they are not as at-risk because of their gender, or may lead them to 
perceive that they are more at-risk because of the ir advanced age or because they smoke. 
The reverse is also true; perceptions of the influence of conditions (age, gender, etc.) on 
risk in turn (re)shape the ways in which the contextual factors (phase of testing, 
experience, and science) impact one's risk assessment. The key conditions are, therefore, 
in a constant of flux. The conditions are not the same for everyone, and the meanings 
assigned to these conditions are transient as individuals move through each phase of the 
genetic testing process in relation to existing scientific and experiential knowledge. 
The Rubik's Cube represents how individuals living in a family at risk for ARVC 
construct ideas about risk. Using the Rubik ' s Cube as an analogy one can visualize the 
relationship between the three broad contextual dimensions and specific conditions 
impacting the process of Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk as providing the 
components for the puzzle to be solved. Each axis of the three-dimensional structure of 
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the Rubik's Cube symbolizes one contextual dimension. As the meaning assigned to each 
contextual dimension changes (the axis moves direction), the meaning assigned to the 
conditions change (the face of the cube changes colour), and the overall meaning assigned 
to the experience of being at-risk shifts (physical shape of the cube changes). 
The physical shape of the cube, or one's "risk reality," is made up of the 
conditions that influence risk perception during each phase of genetic testing. Each 
individually coloured block that makes up a face of the cube represents a condition. 
These conditions will di ffer from person to person and will change for each individual as 
they enter different phases of the genetic testing process, and as scientific and experiential 
knowledge changes. Subsequently, as the conditions change (the colours on the face of 
the cube are intertwined), the way one experiences each phase of the genetic testing 
process changes; as the meanings assigned to scientific and experiential knowledge 
changes (the axis moves direction), so does the shape of the cube and the meaning 
assigned to ri sk. Hence, the cube reflects individuals' diverse meanings of being "at risk" 
depending on the contextual dimensions and conditions that infl uence it. The cube's axis 
that is shared by the three contextual dimensions and the conditions within the six faces 
of the cube captures the influence that each has on shaping the other throughout the 
psychosocial process of Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk. These meanings 
ass igned to ri k are transient, fl uid, and pragmatic in nature. 
Figure 6. 1. Rubik 's Cube: Generic model. ® used by perrrtission of Seven Towns 
Limited., www.rubiks.com 
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This Rubik's Cube illustrates the theory Constructing the Meaning of Being At-
Risk and explains why and how concepts of risk vary. For example, the experience of an 
elderl y woman, who has witnessed many of her fami ly members die suddenly and who 
has engaged as a research participant in the process of gene discovery since the early 
1980s, may be significantly different than the experience of a 20-year-old male who has 
only heard stories of relatives who have died suddenly and who engaged in the genetic 
testing process in 1997, when haplotype analysis could provide a strong indication of risk 
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for ARVC. Furthermore, this theory explains how those two experiences would be 
different in comparison to that of a 10-year-old boy in 20 I 0 (given the discovery of the 
ARYC gene in 2007, the availability of the ICD as an effective treatment for ARVC, and 
the lack of exposure to loss). Although each of these individuals pass through the three 
phases of the genetic testing process, their experiences, and the meaning each assigns to 
being "at-risk" would be different because of the differences in available scientific 
knowledge of the time, type of experiential knowledge, and beliefs about the conditions 
that influence risk. 
This theory also explains how conditions influence, and are influenced by, the 
three broad contextual dimensions that shape risk construction; that is, just as the three 
contextual dimensions influence the meaning assigned to conditions, the reverse is also 
true. For example, the science surrounding ARVC frames it as a disease affecting men in 
their 40s; however, as women start to witness or experience signs of the disease they start 
to advocate on their own behalf to be tested for the gene and to receive an lCD. Thus, the 
experiences of women were influential in shaping scientists' perceptions about the 
meaning of risk for women living in families with a history of ARVC and prescribed 
treatment. Hence, it is important that health care providers understand not only the 
conditions that influence risk perception (such as age and gender) but also how the 
conditions shape contextual dimensions that influence risk construction. 
In the following chapters I will discuss, using relevant literature on genetics, risk, 
and heart disease, how participants in this study constructed their sense of risk as they 
moved through the three phases of the predictive genetic testing process (pre-testing, 
during testing, and post-testing). The first theoretical construct that describes the 
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psychosocial process of Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk is Awakening to a 
New Meaning of Being At-Risk (see Figure 6.2). 
Construct 1: Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Risk 
This theoretical construct examines participants' earliest experiences growing up 
and li ving in a family at risk for ARYC prior to receiving genetic testing. This construct 
describes the process by which at-risk individuals become aware of their risk; it describes 
the conditions and contextual dimensions that impact this awareness; and explicates the 
psychosocial and behavioural responses to the new meaning of risk. The chapter also 
highlights how individuals living in at-risk families juxtapose their understandings about 
heart disease and genetics against their experiential knowledge, against existing science, 
and against personal beliefs, to assign a personal meaning to being at-risk. Within this 
construct of Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Risk, there are two categories: (a) 
making sense of numerous losses and (b) struggling to break the cycle of uncertainty. 
Category 1: Making Sense of Numerous Losses 
• Property I : Living in a Famil y Famil iar with Loss . 
• Property 2: The Struggle to Understand the Meaning of Being At-Risk for Oneself 
and Others. 
Category 2: Struggling to Break the Cycle of Uncertainty 
• Property I : Making Sense of and Living Through Earl y Clinical Investigations 
and Prescribed Treatments. 
• Property 2: Acknowledging a Possible Genetic Origin to Risk . 
Figure 6.2. Construct 1: Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Ri sk. Emerging 
properties and categories that describe the first phase of the psychosocial process 
Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk, prior to predictive genetic testing. 
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Category 1: Making Sense of Numerous Losses 
This category explores participants' recollections of growing up in a family 
familiar with loss. It describes their struggles to assign meaning to their experience of 
loss within the context of that experience. That is, depending on the chronological time 
of the experience within their life history (experience), and within the history of scientific 
knowledge (science), perceptions differ. Listening to fami ly members' stories of death 
and illness, living through the illness experience, and witnessing firsthand the loss of 
family members, most tudy participants had started to construct some ideas about their 
risk at an early age. Participants ' reports of their responses to being "at-risk" were 
diverse: some recalled that they had tried to normalize their risk; other reports indicated 
that participants drew upon their experiential knowledge and their knowledge of science 
to create a mental representation of the at-risk relative, creating a framework for 
understanding what being at-risk meant, in a way that enabled them to juxtapose 
competing realities about risk. These two, divergent, approaches wi ll be explicated in the 
following analysis. 
The two properties: (a) li ving in a family familiar with loss and (b) the struggle to 
understand the meaning of being at-risk capture participants' experiences as they attempt 
to make sense of and cope with the numerous losses in the family. Evident within these 
two properties are the conditions and contextual dimensions that influence participants' 
early ideas about risk. 
Property 1: Living in a family familiar with loss. Participants described being 
enmeshed from an early age in a family culture of loss passed on through family stories, 
firsthand experiences of the deaths of close relatives, and personal experiences of illness 
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as they hoped for some answers as to why these losses were occurring. This property, 
living in a family familiar with loss, captures how experiences with loss influence how 
participants awakened to a sense of being at-risk and their psychosocial and behavioural 
responses. Variations of the meaning assigned to the condi tion of loss were evident in 
participants' descriptions of living in a family with a history of loss, witnessing first-hand 
repeated accounts of Joss, the actual number of losses, the events surrounding the loss, 
and age of exposure to Joss. 
Condition One: Loss. As part of an at-risk family, participants knew from an 
early age that heart problems "ran in the fami ly," as these two statements describe: "The 
first time I heard of heart problems was when I was eight years old, when my grandfather 
died," and, "We've lived with it all our lives, knowing that there was something wrong." 
The sense of knowing that something was wrong was precipitated by the numerous 
accounts of illness and death in the fami ly. Watching history repeat itself time and time 
again was at times difficult and, over time, caused several participants to worry about 
their own health at an early age. This is evident in the narrative of one participant who 
described becoming aware of his risk in his teens, "My favorite uncle died in his 30's. 
Then my cousin 's brother died at 26, and that's when it started. From that time on I think 
that the worry was in my mind that it was going to happen to me." 
Often it is the sheer number of deaths in the family that spark one's awareness that 
something is just not right in the fami ly, that they are living with something that places 
famil y members at risk. These feelings of awareness are particularly noteworthy in the 
older participants who, over the years and prior to gene discovery, have witnessed 
firsthand numerous accounts of illness and loss, as this foreboding comment notes, "I 
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have three brothers and three of them have passed away." The recurring pattern of death 
in the fami ly caused many participants to start to seriously think that they were dealing 
with something more than simply heart disease, as thjs participant summarized: "there is 
something [happening]; people are dying around me." 
For the younger participants, the awareness that they were living in an at-risk 
family was something that they, too, grew up with; however, younger panicipants did not 
witness numerous losses. One reason for this is that the ICD had already been introduced 
as a viable treatment option. Their awareness to being at-risk was, instead, acquired 
through stories told second-hand by famjJy members, most often the parents. This is 
evident in the narrative of a young participant currently waiting for genetic testing, who 
briefly described being more aware of his risk status through his mother. He stated that 
he "never really knew about it until recently." 
For some, the awareness that something was going on in the family was similar to 
what Etchegary (2006b) described as "comjng out of the blue" (p. 109), sparked by the 
shocking news of a relative's sudden death, as this participant noted: 
The first indication that there was any sickness was my uncle. One day he 
stopped working. I knew he was having some trouble; he didn ' t like to talk too 
much about it. .. and then during Christmas he died. He was 42. 
Quite often it is the events surrounding death that leave a lasting impression. This 
was the case in the death of one participant 's brother who died at their sister's wedding. 
Reflecting on the incident, the participant recounted, "It came to light when my brother 
died. My sister got married . .. my brother was the father-giver, and he dropped dead on 
the floor at the wedding." It was hard for participants to grasp how someone could die so 
quickly, without any warning, with no window of opportunity to prevent the death. 
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Incidences such as this caused many participants to re-trace their family history of loss, as 
the idea that they were dealing with something more than heart-disease started to come to 
light. What they found useful as a framework for assigning meaning was the 
circumstances surrounding the deaths, such as age and gender. The following narrati ve 
illustrates how individuals used knowledge of the numerous deaths in the fami ly to ass ign 
the label of at-risk to young males: 
My first recollection was hearing that my grandfather had passed away at a young 
age. He was 49 at the time ... . As time went on, my uncle passed away. I was only 
a couple of years old .. .. I got close to my cousin and he died of heart-related 
problems. I can remember Mom describing exactly what happened to him when 
he passed away. Their son passed away at 27. I can remember another uncle, he 
went out fishing, and he never did come back. He had drowned in about a foot of 
water. Then my brother, he was 26 when he died with a heart attack. 
Similar to other studies of hereditary conditions, including HD (Cox & McKellin, 
1999; Etchegary, 2006b; Taylor, 2005), HBOC (d' Argincourt; 2005), and HNPCC 
(McAllister 2002, 2003), participants in this study drew on experiential knowledge, such 
as awareness of family history or personal interaction with an at-risk relative, to formulate 
ideas about risk. As noted in Etchegary's (2006b) study on HD, participants were aware 
at an early age that something was wrong in the famjly; however, they could not pinpoint 
the exact cause. Older family members knew they were at risk for something cardiac in 
nature, something prevalent in young males and something with a fatal outcome. This 
knowledge, as Etchegary noted in relation to HD, is acquired gradually. This knowledge 
was not hidden but became more pronounced as participants interacted with other at-risk 
famjly members and started to assign meanings to these interactions. 
Exposure to the sudden loss of young male relatives, did not instantly translate 
into a heightened sense of risk in all cases. That said, these famil y members still knew 
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they were at risk for something familial. Their exposure sparked a beginning awareness 
that something was just not right in the family, as this narrative notes: "I remember Mom 
saying that she always knew that Dad was not going to live to be a very old age. I think 
she sensed there was something seriously wrong with him." 
For some participants, knowing that family members die young and accepting this 
as normal were two different things. That is, although participants knew that the men in 
their family did not live to be old, they experienced difficulties with trying to rationalize 
why this was the case. Several participants' recalled conversations with other family 
members who had expressed their concerns with health care providers, as heard in this 
narrative of an older ARYC positive participant: 
My brother approached the cardiologist and said he felt there was something 
wrong; so many people dying so young with heart problems ... but he passed 
away in '89. We agreed between us that there seemed to be something wrong .... 
He discussed several things with me, and it was always the men that were 
involved. It seemed like Mom's brothers all passed away young. I knew there 
was something going on, but not until my brother really sat down and talked about 
it. I lived every single day knowing there's something wrong, something not 
right. 
Eventually, as they continued to experience numerous losses within the family, it became 
clear that these deaths--or as one participant calls it, the "unnatural course of events" --was 
not a coincidence. One participant's narrative highlights this, stating that, "When my 
uncle passed away ... I think it really kind of opened everybody's eyes a little bit that 
there was something here." Similar experiences such as this sparked awareness for 
participants that they may be dealing with something genetic at a time when the 
technological means to substantiate the belief did not exist. 
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In response to the emerging awareness that "there was something here," 
participants tried to integrate the numerous family losses as an existing part of their 
reality. This is similar to what Bourdieu (1977) refers to as "habitus," or something 
accepted as a norm because it supports an understanding of everyday life at the time 
(Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). For many participants, trying to normalize something that 
they knew was not normal (the numerous losses within the family) was not an easy task 
as described in this statement: 
You ' re kind of wondering about it [reason for deaths], so you don' t acknowledge 
it. It's like being in a house and you don 't know if this place is haunted, but 
there's weird stuff going on so I won ' t look. 
Similar sentiments were shared by another participant, who described trying to continue 
on with everyday life knowing that his current reality may be subject to change with little 
or no notice. The participant said, "It was just always there. You were always wondering 
is it going to happen to me, or how many more." 
Over time, participants' ideas about risk begin to shift from being a suspicion to a 
belief that they are at risk for a genetic heart condition. These psychosocial and 
behavioural responses to a new meaning of risk are further examined in the following 
property that describes participants' struggles to understand the meaning of being at-risk. 
Property 2: The struggle to understand the meaning of being at-risk for 
oneself and others. This property captures participants' struggles to assign a meaning of 
risk for them and their children and the conditions that influenced this experience. 
Building on experiential knowledge (that is, the sense of knowing that they are dealing 
with a fatal genetic condition), and knowing that science in its current state could not 
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answer their questions, participants spend a considerable amount of time constructing 
ideas about risk. Other studies have also referred to the difficulties experienced by 
participants as they try to decipher and assign meaning to competing ideas about risk in 
order to cope and make decisions about their health (Braithwaite et al. , 2004; Cox, 2003; 
Cox & McKellin, 1999; d ' Argincourt -Canning 2005; Etc he gary, 2006a, 2006b, 2009; 
2010; Frich et al., 2006; Hall , Suakko, Evans, Qureshi, & Humphries, 2007; Hallowell et 
al., 2006; Hunt et al. , 2000, 2001; Marteau et al. , 1995; McAllister 2002, 2003; Ponder et 
al., 1996;Walter et al., 2004; Walter & Emery, 2005; Weiner & Durrington, 2008, 
Weiner, 2009; van Maarle et al. , 2003). 
In contrast to what some other researchers have found (Hunt et al., 2001 ; Emslie 
et al. , 2003; Walter et al. , 2004), participants did not emphasize physical characteristics or 
personality as being significant in how they framed their own risk perception. Similar to 
Marteau et al. (1995) and Ponder et al. (1996), age, gender, physical signs of the disease, 
family history, and modifiable lifestyle factors were the most influential in risk 
assessment. These conditions are evident in all three phases of the genetic testing 
process, and used by participants as a framework to juxtapose with competing realities 
about risk, and to decipher and to assign meanings to risk; however, the relevancy of the 
conditions and the meanings assigned to them change in relation to the contextual 
dimensions. That is, participants drew upon the condition(s) that were most relevant and 
were in alignment with their beliefs about heart disease (and, later, about genetics) at 
different times throughout the genetic testing process. Depending on the contextual 
dimensions, new conditions deemed more relevant or "risky" emerge while other 
conditions assigned a status of being "less risky" are put on "the back burner." 
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As participants struggle to understand the meaning of being at-risk for themselves 
and others, the six conditions (age, gender, physical signs and symptoms of the disease, 
family history, modifiable lifestyle factors, and the concern felt for children in the family) 
were the most important conditions that shape the construction of ri sk and were the 
impetus to participants' creation of the at-risk relative. 
Conditions I and 2: Age and gender. Age and gender24 are two key conditions 
that form the image of what I am calling the "at-risk relative." The at-risk relative refers 
to participants' mental representation of the individual at risk for ARVC (simjlar to the 
construction of the coronary candidate depicted in the cardiovascular literature [Davison 
et al. , 1989, 1991 , and 1992]). The criteria for the at-risk relative that reoccurs 
throughout participants' narratives includes: being over 40, being male, exhibiting 
physical signs of heart disease, having a poor diet, lacking physical activity, living in a 
family with a history of heart disease, and, as science progressed, having a positive 
genetic test. This mental image of the at-risk relative is used as a reference point to 
construct ideas about risk, to make decisions throughout the genetic testing process in 
times of uncertainty (such as while waiting for genetic test results) , and to predict the 
likelihood of a cardiac event. 
Participants in this study frequently referred to age as a condition that influenced 
their risk perception and caused psychological distress. For younger participants, 
24 
"Gender" as a condition is, specifically, the cond ition of "be ing male." Laypersons, as we ll as c li nical 
experts, tend to e mphasise the association of ARVC with being male, such that even when scientific 
knowledge provides evidence that women too are affected, the connotation of ARVC as being a "male" 
di sease is dominant in the di scourse about ARVC and shapes the perception of ri sk. 
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observing their older relatives experiencing distress as their age of "being at-risk" drew 
closer was, in turn, highly stressfu l for the young observers, as illustrated in this 
participant's recollection: 
I remember my father used to be always worried. I can remember seeing him 
sitting on a chair with his head down on his arm. I think it was always there in his 
mind that something was going to happen to him; because at that time his brother 
had died; and then he had another brother that died, and they were too young. 
Once these young observers themselves approached the age of 40, or knew of another 
relative who was nearing 40, they too experienced a heightened sense of risk-anxiety. 
This finding supports the work of Cox and McKeJiin ( 1999), who reported that as at-risk 
individuals approach age of disease onset, there is a shift from the abstract sense of risk to 
an embodiment of risk, or what they refer to as an "intersubjective awareness" of risk. 
Participants also identified gender as a condition that increased one's risk status. 
One participant reported that it was years of observing a large number of young males 
dying in the famil y, including the recent death of a brother at age 33, which prompted the 
family to request the father's autopsy report. He explained how the information from the 
autopsy solidified for him that he was at risk for a fatal cardiac disease prevalent in young 
males: 
The coroner 's report was listing off aJI the things that had happened to [my 
father]. When I read that it was like reading about me. I knew. By the time they 
got around to teUing me [in thel 990s] I had something and I had to go on 
medication, I pretty weU knew I was a shoo-in. So I wasn' t totally surprised. 
Condition 3: Physical signs and symptoms. During this pre-test phase of the 
genetic testing process, it is primarily the onset of physical signs and symptoms that are 
thought to be cardiac in nature that marks the entry into the illness experience and causes 
a tremendous amount of stress. As one participant explained, "I was scared to go 
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somewhere by myself because I used to just drop down, pass out. My heart used to go 
that fast." SimjJarly another participant noted: 
I recall the first time I was aware that I probably had this heart condition was that 
syncope incident in the fall of 1993, when I almost blacked out. For some reason, 
I knew that that would've been symptomatic of this heart condition. 
In a simjJar vein, this same participant describes how the onset of physical symptoms 
sparked his awareness that he might be at risk for a heart disease similar to that to which 
his brother had succumbed: 
Two months after my brother died I was workjng and I started to get electric 
shocks in my arm ... and different things like dizzy spells. I kind of clued in then 
that something was up. So I went to the doctor to see what was wrong. 
It is evident in these narratives that participants knew they were at risk for some kjnd of 
heart disease and in many regards had already started to identify and assign meanings to 
key conditions that placed them at-risk. As they started to exhibit physical signs, they 
immediately attributed this to the suspected heart condition that had claimed the lives of 
their family members. This awakening to the idea that they were at-risk was, for some 
participants, was not a shock, but rather something expected given the strong farllily 
history of loss. Still , for some, this awakening period was a time of much distress as they 
struggled to construct and attribute some meaning to the numerous losses. 
A lot of time and psychological effort went into reconfiguring the mental 
representation of the at-risk relative to encompass the individual who was asymptomatic 
and who did not meet the at-risk relative profile, as many relatives did not have any 
symptoms prior to death. For most, this was not easy as they continued to spend a 
tremendous amount of time monitoring themselves and others for any visible signs of the 
disease. Any signs and symptoms that bore a resemblance to those of the at-risk relative 
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were perceived as "risky," caused a heightened sense of risk, resulted in psychological 
di stress, and marked the onset of the illness experience, which then required immediate 
management. These feelings are nicely summarized in this one parent's narrative, " I am 
so afraid to take a chance that it's just chest congestion and not something else, because 
[my son] said he feel s tightness in his chest." 
Despite witnessing and listening to numerous stories of people who had 
succumbed to heart disease, some participants still struggled with the question of whether 
this was something that they should be overly concerned about. This struggle to assign a 
meaning to being at-risk is captured in this participant' s recollection (in the early 1980s, 
prior to gene haplotype analysis) of awakening to the fact that he may be at-risk and yet 
not overly concerned: 
Nobody reall y paid much attention to it [heart troubles]. There is nothing wrong 
with us. We are all fine. I remember watching as a program on TV over in Italy, 
and there was this family; young fellows all dying, about 40 years old, and it was 
the men it seemed to be affecting. They were all dying off, and I remember them 
saying something about a study to see if it's a heart problem that runs in the 
family. At the time I was saying maybe we got the same thing. Because by then 
it was Mom and my cousin; and where everything was happening in my family, 
maybe someone will do a study on us some day. 
Responses such as this can be attributed to the fact that research investigating genetic 
heart conditions in the early 1980s was in its nascent stage. At that time, science did not 
hold any answers as to what was going on in these families. Some participants took the 
stance that although there is some kind of a heart condition in the family that affects 
young males, there was no point in dwelling on it because there were no answers. Still 
others took a different approach to normalizing their at-risk families, expressing that their 
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families' heart troubles were not dissimilar from many other Newfoundland families. 
This comment summarizes that method of normalizing the experience: 
We had no sickness like heart, no more than anybody else, probably less than 
some. We used to say we thought we were pretty good; pretty well off because 
we didn't have any major problems or anything. There was nothing wrong with 
us. 
Simjlarly, even though other participants described physical symptoms of heart disease 
(episodes of being dizzy, light-headedness, etc.) they were thought to be of little concern. 
" It was just once or twice a year and could happen to anybody," one participant 
rationalized. For these participants, in order to cope, they compared themselves to the 
traditional cardiac population. This strategy of normalizing the experience was a 
pragmatic approach, given the Jack of available scientific technology in the 1980s to 
explain what was happening. 
Condition 4: Family history. For those participants who awakened to a sense of 
being at-risk around the same time as haplotype analysis in 1998, the struggle to 
understand that they were at risk for a genetic hea1t condition was not as difficult. They 
had the support of relatives who had been through some clinical testing for what was, by 
1998, thought to be a genetic heart condition; there was a viable genetic test that could 
provide some answers as to their risk status. For the younger participants who engaged in 
genetic testing in the early 2000s, awareness of their risk emerged as a result of a 
conversation with their parents. As one participant noted, "I didn ' t really find out until a 
couple of years later when they found out Mom had it. I'd say I was 16 when I figured out 
that we could have a problem with this too." Thus, the mental representation of the at-
risk relative for these two groups of individuals expanded to include the genetic test 
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result. What would become an issue later, as these individuals moved through subsequent 
phases of the genetic testing process, was assigning a meaning to the genetic test result. 
This will be addressed in the next chapter, in the discussion of phase two of the predictive 
genetic testing process. 
As participants struggled to make sense of (and assign meaning to) the idea of 
being at-risk, they continuously reflected on family stories of loss and on their own 
observations and experiences to understand what conditions predispose one to cardiac 
disease within the family. They made mental notes as to the number of cases of heart 
disease; they searched for predisposing events; and they coJJected data on the array of 
health outcomes within the family, similar to that done in property one, living in a family 
familiar with loss. 
For some, the outcome of this familial information gathering and analysis was the 
prioritization of physical activity as a condition that precipitates the onset of symptoms, 
as is evident in this participant's account: 
The last time I was out in the garden making rabbit snares, and I felt it coming on. 
I remember I saw everything going away from me, the house moved, and I started 
to go out. 
It is noteworthy that the identification of the conditions labeled "risky" was often a family 
affair, being the result of many family discussions reliving the events of their fami ly 
members' deaths and questioning the cause of numerous deaths in the family, as this 
commentary illustrates: 
My brother discussed several things with me about the deaths in the family. It 
was always men that were involved. It seemed like Mom's brothers had all 
passed away young. She had a sister who was 49 when she passed away 
suddenly; and her other two brothers were on their way back from a funeral, had 
an accident and they were killed. So we wondered if the one who was driving had 
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a heart attack. I knew something was going on; but not until my brother really sat 
down and talked about it did I start to make the connections. 
It is conversations such as this that highlight the importance of family story-sharing for 
constructing ideas about risk and the conditions that influence what is deemed "risky" or 
not. 
What was particularly stressful for participants was the ever-present knowledge 
that they too could have a fate similar to that of their famil y members. One participant 
emphasized this concern , stating, "I knew that I could drop down dead having this 
condition .. . I knew that my father had died with this same condition, so I knew it was a 
possibility." Thus, the identification of any factors that could provide any insights into 
this disease and its management was important, particularly for those individuals who 
lived through the pre-test phase at a time when scientific knowledge could not yet explain 
what was going on. 
Participants who li ved through phase one (prior to the existence of genetic testing 
and prior to the discovery of the gene responsible for ARVC) are engaged in what 
Davison et al. ( 1992, 199 1) describe as the work of a Jay epidemiologist. Lay 
epidemiologists are those who gather information through personal observations or 
reports about the conditions and circumstances that predispose one to be at risk for a heart 
disease using Jay epidemiology. Using Jay epidemiology, similarities are noted that 
generate an explanatory framework for one's risk of heart disease. This framework also 
serves to challenge or support other condi tions thought to impact one's risk for heart 
disease. The explanatory models created by the lay epidemiologist, which are shaped by 
the specific contextual dimensions (phase of the genetic testi ng process, experiential 
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knowledge, and scientific knowledge), are juxtaposed against existing beliefs about the 
conditions that influence risk and the at-risk relative profile, such as modifiable lifestyle 
factors. 
Condition 5: Modifiable lifestyle factors. Based on the conclusion of the "lay 
epidemiologist," decisions are then made to either ignore or dismiss the conditions that 
are understood to shape one's ri sk. For example, they may decide not to adjust their 
lifestyle. Depending on the decision made, one either continues to live as they had 
before, now with the knowledge that they may have a fatal condition, or one alters their 
lifestyle in reaction to the new risk knowledge. For several participants who chose the 
" normality" path, the knowledge of being "at-risk" was very stressful , as is reflected in 
this comment: "the stress that I'd gone through trying to go out and live life knowing that 
I had something that could kill me, where I could drop dead. I think that was more 
stressful." As noted by Etchegary (2009) in her research on HD, participants modified 
their diet and exercise regimes in an attempt to decrease their risk. This was evident in 
the narrative of one participant who gradually began to alter his lifestyle once he began to 
experience subtle signs of heart disease. "I gave up drinking, I gave up coffee, and I just 
tried to be physically fit, without overdoing it, " he recounted. Similarly, another 
participant notes that, being aware of his strong family history of heart disease, he made 
the decision early on to engage in a healthy lifestyle: "Even before I knew that ARVC 
existed, I knew there was heart disease. I said I have got to get myself to a place where I 
don ' t smoke, don't drink, eat well." 
Of those who emphasized the potential for modifying lifestyle as a means of 
managing or altering risk status, a healthy diet and a regular exercise regime were cited as 
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critical to avoid the fate of the at-risk relative. However, physical activity had two very 
different connotations in relation to modifying risk status. For most of the participants in 
this study, regular physical activity was associated with lessening risk. For some, 
however, physical exercise gradually became assigned as something "risky" when 
participants became aware of family members who had died during physical activity. 
Equipped with this new knowledge, the mental representation of the at-risk relative 
shifted to include exercise as something that may put individuals at increased risk. This 
new understanding of risk was hard for many to assimilate into their existing framework 
of risk, given that physical activity tends to be viewed as an activity synonymous with the 
prevention of heart disease. Hence, responses to the proposed link between physical 
activity and heart disease vary from person to person and can fluctuate over time for any 
one person , depending on whether and when a given activity is assigned a meaning of 
being "risky." 
The following narratives capture how the meaning assigned to physical activity is 
shaped and reshaped in relation to one's experiences, knowledge about heart disease, and 
risk perception. This first quotation illustrates the fact that knowledge about being part of 
a family at risk for heart disease does not instantly translate to a heightened sense of risk, 
but rather causes one to look at modifiable lifestyle factors (such as exercise) as a health 
prevention activity. In such cases, exercise is not deemed a "risky" behaviour. 
Growing up you kind of think to yourself there is heart disease in the famil y so 
you take care of yourself. I eat Jots of oily fish, exercise, play basketball, 
volleyball, and try to stay in shape. I walk my dog and things like that. 
Later, as the same person became aware that this type of heart disease manifests itself in 
young males during physical exertion , even causing death, the meaning of physical 
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activity was reassigned as being something "risky" that must be stopped. The participant 
noted that he then "stopped playing basketball." 
Condition 6: Concern for children. As participants awaken to and struggle with 
the meaning of being at-risk for themselves, they also experience an awakening to the fact 
that their children are at-risk as well. Although this awakening to being at-risk (for 
themselves and their children) happens at different times, the parents' experiences in both 
instances are quite similar (except that parents reported that their concern for the 
wellbeing of their children was greater than the concern they had felt for their own 
wellbeing). While all participants had gradually come to terms with the fact that the 
males in their families die at a young age due to heart disease, they were surprised when 
symptoms of heart disease started to be noticed in their children. One parent described 
this feeling as follows: 
I took my son to have a lymph node removed and he had an EKG done prior. The 
girl was checking him in and going over his file prior to surgery. My goodness the 
cardiograph does not look good. He was sent to a pediatrician; and hearing the 
history of the fami ly, the pediatrician did say to me this is ARVC. 
For many parents, this re-awakening to the notion that their children could be at-
risk was distressing. As one parent said, "Every time one of the youngsters said they felt 
weak or sick I wondered, have they got [heart disease]?" Parents' descriptions of this 
process indicate that as they juxtapose ideas about the at-risk relative against this new 
knowledge, they feel an overwhelming sense of anxiety as the concern about their own 
wellbeing is quickly replaced by concern for their children. This concern results in 
diligent monitoring of the children fo r physical signs and symptoms of ARVC, as evident 
in this parent's account: "Every morning I got up, opened the door, and went in [to the 
children's room]. As long as l saw the chest rising or they were breathing, I was fine." 
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The psychosocial and behavioural reactions of parents to the news that the onset 
of ARVC is much earlier than what was known scientifically reflects what has been 
reported in the cardiovascular literature (Andersen et al., 2008; Farnsworth et al. , 2006; 
Hendriks et al., 2005). The concern for the children is threaded throughout the genetic 
testing process and is addressed further in chapter 7 and chapter 8. 
The experience of growing up in an at-risk family and witnessing the numerous 
losses due to ARYC shapes parents' beliefs about and behavioural responses to the risk 
status of their children. 
Category 2: Struggling to Break the Cycle of Uncertainty 
This category captures participants' experiences as they took part in multiple 
diagnostic screening tests and prescribed treatment regimes in hopes of gaining an 
understanding of the causative factor that was putting them at-risk. Participants in this 
study reported that they had agreed to participate in any clinical investigations that could 
provide insights into what was going on, knowing that the numerous deaths in the family 
were not a coincidence (that is, given their experiential knowledge of being at-risk). 
Even though receiving a professional's suggestion that they may have a genetic-
linked disease solidified what participants already knew (the experiential knowledge of 
being at-risk), the genetic testing process was a difficult time for all of the participants in 
this study. Many struggled with trying to give meaning to being at-risk, from a genetic 
stand point, in the absence of a definitive diagnosis, consistent treatment, or visible signs 
of the disease. Hence, participants' ideas about risk fluctuated between biomedical 
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models of disease causation, experiential knowledge, and the evolving mental 
representation of the at-risk relative. The two properties, (a) making sense of and living 
through early clinical investigations and prescribed treatments and (b) acknowledging a 
genetic origin to risk, describe participants' experiences as they struggled to understand 
what being at-risk meant for them and their families. 
Making sense of and living through early clinical investigations and 
prescribed treatments. This property examines participants' experiences and the 
conditions that influence their experiences as they continued to search for answers about 
their risk status and the meaning of risk. The condi tions that describe the variations in 
participants' experiences as they live through early clinical investigations and treatments 
are: (1) experts' knowledge and care, (2) available technology, and (3) the at-risk relative. 
Condition 1: Experts' knowledge and care. Participant narratives reveal that as 
they engaged in diagnostic clinical testing (such as electrocardiograms, echocardiograms, 
and Holter monitor testing), they experienced a shift in risk perception as they looked 
towards traditional biomedical models of disease causation and to the· opinions of experts 
to help them (re)construct their "reality" of their risk status. This is evident in the 
narrative of one participant who became aware of his risk for heart disease in his 
discussion with a specialist in the early 1980s, prior to haplotype analysis: 
I remember asking him, "What do you think I should do?" He said "what, what 
you are asking me is if you were my wife, what would I tell you to do. I honestly 
don't know." I then said, "Well , is there anywhere or anything I can do to find out 
more about this particular heart condition?" 
The significance of using clinical diagnoses to explain increased risk is evident in 
the fact that some participants travelled outside of the province in hopes of finding some 
answers. Several participants recalled trips, made themselves or by others, to a 
neighboring province to undergo further clinical investigations, to get the opinions of 
experts, and to avail of new technology to manage their risk for heart disease. The 
following narratives illustrate this: 
In 1988 he [brother] went to an institute in Ottawa, and he came back and he 
drawed a picture for me that described how they were doing defibrillators. 
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I went to arrhythmia clinic in Ontario in 1994. I went up there thinking they 
mjght do some electrophysiology. I saw cardiologist he did a bunch of things: wall 
motion, signal allergy, EKG, and a stress test, I think. They did a 48-hour Holter, 
an adrenaline surge and an echo. 
The desire to understand what was putting them at-risk was so strong that when a 
US research team approached some of the participants in the early 1990s to participate in 
a study investigating heart disease, they welcomed the opportunity. "I really would do 
anything out there, whatever the researchers wanted," one participant noted. For some, 
that research experience was the first indication that they may be dealing with something 
more than traditional heart disease that runs in NL famjJies. 
Participants described being both surprised and disappointed ori a number of 
levels, about the use and role of the clinical and genetic testing process in helping them to 
understand their risk status. First, although they participated in a myriad of clinical tests, 
results were inconclusive and did not bring participants any closer to understanding their 
risk in most cases. This was emotionally draining, as evident in the narratives of several 
participants: 
I had seven tests done [ ... ] because they could not stimulate an arrhythmia [ . . . ] 
[the cardiologist] told me he didn ' t see any need of putting me on medication or 
doing electrophysiological studies [ ... ]Just go on home and live your life as 
normal. 
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My brother and I was basically a couple of miles away from each other, and this 
was two months after another brother died. We were told at the time they couldn't 
do a whole lot for us; put us on medication and hope for the best. 
Second, the lack of consistency in treatments offered and knowledge amongst experts 
about the management of ARVC contributed to feelings of ambiguity and frustration, 
similar to the reports of McAllister, Payne et al. (2007). The sense of frustration was 
evident in this participant's narrative: 
If you're going to three or four doctors you are getting different things from all of 
them. You really don't know which one to believe; you just kind of got to hope 
for the best, really. I think it's all a luck thing. 
Although participants described being disappointed with the inability of experts to 
provide definitive answers as to the cause of the numerous deaths within the family, they 
did appreciate the fact that gene di scovery does take a long time, that health care 
professionals were providing the best treatment they could given their current state of 
knowledge, and that they were facing the possibility of a rare cardiac condition which 
challenges current biomedical models of heart disease. These sentiments are nicely 
summarized in this participant's statement: 
I think the medical community does have a good handle on it [ARVC], from 
reading about it and having the knowledge and seeing so many people and dealing 
with people who succumb to health conditions. I think they are empathetic and 
understanding. 
In contrast to the above, several participants were not as understanding: they could not 
comprehend why they were not being taken seriously given their strong family history, as 
this woman 's commentary describes: "The first time I went to the hospital [ .. . ]I told 
them I was having a heart attack, the doctor looked at me and laughed and said, 'You' re 
too young for that."' It is understandable that a health care provider (drawing on their 
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own experiential and scientific knowledge about the "coronary candidate") would make 
such a comment, as young women were not considered to be at high risk for heart disease. 
Without a definitive diagnosis of ARVC or any of the diagnostic criteria for heart disease, 
these comments seem reasonable. It is incidences such as this that highlight the fact that 
beliefs about risk that are strongly grounded in biomedical models of disease causation, 
such as the age of onset of heart disease, are very difficult to reshape for both experts and 
laypersons. Thus, when reconstructing ideas about risk, as in cases of new or rare 
conditions, it is important that educators acknowledge the origins of existing competing 
explanatory frameworks. As Gifford ( 1986) points out, knowing that health care 
providers cannot diagnose all conditions nor prescribe effective treatment 100% of the 
time, they must recognize lay experiential knowledge as significant in managing care 
(p.240). The reverse is also true: laypersons need to accept that experts do not have all 
the answers all of the time. 
Despite difficulties in understanding the meaning of clinical investigations, 
participants still conti.nued to attend scheduled tests in hopes of finding soine answers. 
According to participants, however, with each subsequent testing visit, the wait became 
increasingly stressful: "When I'd get the letter for the appointment for the Holter monitor, 
the electrocardiogram, and the echocardiogram, I'd be sick for three days. I would be a 
state. I couldn't sleep." 
In terms of reactions to the results of clinical diagnostic tests some participants 
reported that receiving a negative result was a relief because it implied that everything 
was fine. Other participants reported that receiving a negative result did little to alleviate 
the distress associated with feeling "at-risk." As one participant noted, "Still in the back 
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of my mind I was thinking that if this could happen to my brother then it could happen to 
me." This response was not surprising, given that these participants had watched many 
family members fall ill to the di sease, that definite diagnostic tests were still being 
developed at the time that most participants were receiving testing, and that there 
continued to be a lack of general clinical knowledge about this relatively rare condition 
and related inconsistency in treatment. 
Condition 2: Available Technology. The experiences of participants who had 
become aware of their risk for heart disease post-haplotype analysis were slightly 
different than the experiences of those who had been living with the sense of unknown 
ri sk for years. Reflecting the transient and contextual nature of risk, as cited by 
Shedlosky-Shoemaker et al. (2010) and Sivell et al. (2008), participants' beliefs and 
initial awareness about risk were gradually shaped and reshaped in light of new 
technological advancements and research on ARVC. Thus, the experiences of individuals 
living in a family at-risk 50 years ago were very different from individuals li ving in these 
families during the 20 years of rapid advancement in ARYC genetic research (1980s to 
2000s), and will differ again from the experiences of children growing up in these 
families today. As noted in the literature, once participants in this study were aware of 
advancements in gene discovery and technology, beliefs about risk were no longer 
contingent purely on experiential knowledge but developed analogous to scientific 
knowledge (Farrimond et al. , 2010; Frich et al. , 2006; McAllister, 2002, 2003; Walter & 
Emery, 2005). Participants are continually juxtaposing what might seem to be 
"competing realities" - experiential knowledge and scientific or expert knowledge- and 
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out of that juxtaposition, successfull y (re)shaping for themselves a coherent sense of what 
being at-risk means. 
It is noteworthy that at times of distress and when science could not answer their 
questions, regardless of genetic status or phase in the genetic testing process, and 
regardless of whether scientific advances and /or individual results could now offer 
scientific answers, participants drew on their experiential knowledge. The experiential 
knowledge in turn reshapes the understanding of the scientific knowledge (and the reverse 
is also true). This acti ve use of experiential knowledge in combination with scientific 
knowledge has been found in other studies as being essential to how individuals construct 
their perceptions about their own risk (Cox, 1999; Hunt et al. , 2000; McAllister 2002, 
2003). It is the juxtaposition of the two sources of knowledge that enables participants-
as bricoleurs (Strauss J 968)-to evaluate their own risk factors for heart disease and to 
make decisions about genetic testing. This narrative illustrates one participant's use of 
experiential knowledge to assign physical acti vity as something "risky": 
He [father] went home and shoveled snow, and after when he came inside he just 
dropped in the porch. It was recorded as a massive cardiac attack. His father 
[participants' grandfather] died at 42 in the same way, even died in the porch in 
their house coming inside from doing work. 
The same participant used this knowledge to make choices about his own health: 
So I've always known that my father was 44 [when he died] ; my grandfather was 
42 [when he died] . And as you start to inch up I told myself, ''I'm going to go and 
get physically tested when 1 am 40." 
This group of participants drew on their experiential knowledge to formulate ideas about 
risk and at the same time focused on the hope that the experts and science could answer 
their questions about the causative factor behind this heart disease and offer options as to 
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its management. For participants for whom clinical testing became available during the 
"pre-test" phase, scientific knowledge was momentarily given precedence over 
experiential knowledge. Many participants wanted to participate in cl inical investigations 
as early as possible. This is obvious in the narrative of a spouse who advocated for her 
husband to have clinical testing: "So I called one evening, about ten minutes after that 
genetic counsellor returned my call; three or four days after, they had appointments set 
up. Just as quick as that." 
Although participants knew that in order to find out what was putting them at-risk 
they needed to continue to participate in clinical investigations, having the clinical testing 
done was stressful. This is evident in one panicipant's account of giving consent for a 
cardiac catheterization and the experience of actually going through the procedure: 
So, I balled up the paper and threw it in the garbage and said, "I'm not getting that 
done." I was frightened to death. And I just sat there and said, "Well I have to get 
it done," so I took the paper out, smoothed it out, and signed my name." 
The only time I was real ly stressed was when I went in and the cardiologist was 
going up through the groin [to do the procedure] . He was late that morning with 
his surgeries so I had more time to be there in the bed and just worrying and 
getting so stressed out. I did not think I was going to be able to stay. Yeah that 's 
the most stressful time, having that done. 
Awakening to the fact that they were at-risk, most participants wanted to participate in 
any clinical investigations that would inform them about their risk, even though at times 
doing so was particularly stressful. This momentary shift in knowledge acquisition and 
disease management has also been reported in the li terature (Beery & Williams, 2007; 
Codori et al. , 2001 ; Collins et al., 2005 ; Esplen et al., 200 1; Halbert et al. 2004; Heshka et 
al. , 2008; Johnson et al. , 2002; Sheinfeld Gorin, & Steven, 2003; Watson et al. , 2004;Van 
Roosmaien et al. , 2004). When participants realized that they might not get definitive 
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answers as to the cause of their illness from experts, they referred to their personal 
knowledge and experiences acquired growing up in a family familiar with Joss to try and 
make sense of what was going on. 
Condition 3: At-risk Relative. The narratives of participants recounting their 
experiences of being tested reveal the complex ways in which ri k is (re)constructed 
during the pre-test phase. Equipped with the framework of the at-risk relative, 
individuals being tested are eager to confirm that their mental representation is correct 
and reflecti ve of a person at risk for heart disease. By being tested, they hope to discover 
any qual ities absent from the at-risk relative framework that would place them outside of 
the "at-risk" group. That is, in the process of being tested, they hope to both distance 
themselves from , and reaffirm the validity of, the at-risk relative framework. This 
approach was omewhat unique in comparison with other literature that has looked at the 
construction of risk in other genetic conditions, (Braithwaite et a l. , 2004; Frich et al. , 
2006; Hunt et al. , 2000; van Maarle et al. , 2003 ; Walter et al. , 2004; Walter & Emery, 
2005;Weiner & Durrington, 2008, Weiner, 2009), and the cardiac literature that describes 
the coronary candidate (Davison et al. , I 989; 1991; Emslie et al. , 200 I ; Hunt et al. , 2001 ; 
Walter & Emery, 2005), in that some participants in this study describe their experiential 
knowledge as the initial reference point for risk assessment, rather than the biomedical 
model as being the starting point. 
What was disappointing for many participants was that despite engaging in a 
multitude of clinical testing they were no closer to answering their questions, as this 
narrative highlights, "They worked on ultrasounds and hooked me up to the heart 
machine and stuff like that, but they couldn ' t pick anything up." As participants in this 
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study were quick to realize that science in its current state on many occasions did not 
have the knowledge to provide the answers they wanted, they drew on their own 
experiences and knowledge acquired thorough years of living in at-risk families to cope 
and manage their risk. Once again they found themselves re-using and prioritizing lay 
stories of loss and the mental representation of the at-risk relative to create their own 
subjecti ve interpretations of the meaning of risk and disease management. This is similar 
to the findings of other studies (d' Agincourt, 2005; Condit, 20 10) and is an example of 
what Lippman (1994) depicts as the layperson as expert. 
Property 2: Acknowledging a possible genetic origin to risk. This property 
captures participants' experiences as they come to terms with the fact that they are 
dealing with a genetically linked heart di sease. The two conditions that describe the 
variations in participants ' experiences are (1) their interactions with experts and (2) their 
family history 
Condition 1: Interactions with experts . This moment of reconstructing risk out 
of the juxtaposition of experiential and scientific knowledge typically happened at the 
time when the genetic counsellor or cardiologist first approached the individual or famjJy 
and addressed the possibility of a genetic link to the condition. For many, thj s solidified 
what many of them had started to entertain as a possibility for the numerous losses in 
these families, as these narrative noted: 
"He [relative] did say at the time it could be genetic; and then a couple of years 
later I received the call from [genetics counsellor]. I think that's reall y when I 
realized it could be genetic and there could be something to it." 
----------------------------------------------------
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For one particular famjly it was the comment put forth by the investigating pathologist 
that planted the idea that the recent deaths of two brothers were not a coincidence: "It' s 
got to be genetic. There is something to this." 
Based on that comment, this participant subsequently advocated for an 
investigation into the deaths of other relatives. 
Condition 2: Family History. For several participants, the moment of knowing 
that they may have a genetic condition was a result of discussions with other relatives 
under investigation for heart disease, as one participant recalled: 
I found out about ARVC when my aunt started showing some kind of symptoms. 
She didn ' t know what they were so she spoke to the cardiologist and he identified 
it as ARYC; from right there it sort of traced back. 
For others, the reshaping of risk as being genetic in nature evolved s lowly with the news 
of more relatives faJJi ng iJJ in a pattern that became too obvious to ignore, as this 
narrative described: "While mother was in the hospital, her cousin and her nephew were 
in there, and somebody had the foresight to say there might be something going on with 
genetics there." 
In one family, the awareness of the possibili ty of a genetic condition presented 
itself serendipitously during a friendly neighborhood telephone conversation where two 
women were discussing heart disease and comparing relatives' sto ries of iJiness. By 
coincidence, the discussion lead to the story of a mutual friend who was under 
investigation for a heart condition sirrular to what the spouse of one of the women had 
been experiencing. Given the striking similarity in symptoms between the mutual friend 
and the woman ' s spouse, the woman immediately contacted the research nurse and the 
spouse began to be investigated for a genetic condition. 
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ln comparison, some participants did not require reconfirmation that they were 
dealing with something genetic, as the large number of unexpected deaths was enough to 
suggest a genetic cause, as this narrative suggests: "Ten days after we buried the first 
brother on Friday, the second brother died." It is encounters such as these that highlight 
how participants juxtapose contextual dimensions (experiential knowledge, scientific 
knowledge, and phase of the genetic testing process) with conditions, as they assign 
meaning to their risk. 
With the individual 's introduction to the possibility of a genetic linked condition, 
the at-risk relative framework begins to reshape to include a genetic component. 
Participant narratives indicate that at this time of reconstruction of the concept of risk, 
individuals begin to try to cope with the awareness of this new genetic reality, taking time 
to reflect and re-shape their experiential knowledge, through a genetic lens, to see 
whether and how the new conception of risk resonates as meaningful. 
Chapter Summary 
In relation to the first phase of the genetic process, the construct A wakening to a 
New Meaning o.l Being At-Risk captures how one's social and historical context shapes 
risk perception. The first category, making sense of numerous losses, examines how the 
experiences of livi ng in a family familiar with loss and efforts to understand the meaning 
of being at-risk for oneself and others influence early perceptions of risk. Participants' 
reactions to the news that they may be at-risk were varied; some participants had chosen 
to ignore this information, while others sought out the advice of health care providers. 
Others tried to normalize risk as part of their everyday lives. This approach was 
somewhat effective as it allowed them to carry on with daily acti vities as if normal; 
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however, in the back of their minds, many could not help but wonder what this news 
meant for them and their family members. Many participants used the mental 
representation of the at-risk relative as a reference point to construct ideas about risk. 
Others spent a considerable amount of time reflecting on their family history and 
gathering information that solidified the criteria of the at-risk relative such as gender, age, 
signs and symptoms of ARVC, and lifestyle factors. Underlying participants' efforts to 
make sense out of these numerous losses was concern for the children. 
The second category, struggling to break the cycle of uncertainty, describes how 
participants try to make sense of and live through clinical investigations and prescribed 
treatments as they start to acknowledge a genetic origin to ri sk. Part of breaking the cycle 
of uncertainty is making sense of and living through existing clinical investigations and 
prescribed treatments as dictated by the experts, available technology, and the risk 
relative framework. In response, participants juxtaposed the knowledge of experts and 
science against their own experiential knowledge as they revisited lay stories of loss, 
challenged the criteria of the at-risk relative, engaged in available technology, and 
critiqued the care provided. For many, acknowledging a possible genetic origin to their 
risk was the only pragmatic response to break the cycle of uncertainty. That is, as 
participants revisited their family histories, connections between familial losses were so 
obvious that many felt they had to have a genetic basis. Hence, participants advocated for 
investigations into their family as to why so many were dying suddenly at such a young 
age. 
As participants juxtapose the three contextual dimensions (scientific knowledge, 
experiential knowledge, and phase of the genetic process), the conditions that influence 
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and explain the varied experiences of participants throughout this process are loss, age 
and gender, physical signs and symptoms, family history, modifiable lifestyle factors, 
concern for children, experts' knowledge and care, available technology, and interactions 
with experts and the at-risk relative (see Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3. Rubik ' s Cube Model: Summary of the Conditions that Influence the 
Psychosocial Process of Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Risk. Rubik' s Cube ® 
used by permission of Seven Towns Limited, www. rubiks.com. 
,.------------------------------------------------~----
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CHAPTER 7 
DECIPHERING THE MEANING OF BEING AT -RISK 
This chapter examines participants' experiences as they move into the second 
phase of the genetic testing process and continue the psychosocial process of 
Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk. The theoretical construct Deciphering the 
Meaning ofBeing At-Risk describes participants' experiences during predictive genetic 
testing as they are offered a predictive genetic test, make the decision to have genetic 
testing, wait to receive their result, and receive the test result (see Figure 7.1). This 
construct highlights how specific conditions and the three contextual dimensions (phase 
of the genetic testing process, scientific knowledge, and experiential knowledge) 
influence and are influenced by each other. 
It is important to emphasize that the particular situatedness of any individual 's 
story within the time frame of gene discovery shapes participants' experiences during the 
"testing" phase of the genetic testing process. That is, the experience of those who 
participated in clinical testing (e.g., electrocardiograms, echocardiograms) may be 
significantly different from those who were offered genetic testing in 1998 and those 
being offered genetic testing since the discovery of the causative gene for ARVC in 2007. 
The identification of the causati ve mutation for ARVC in 1998 provided some 
participants with a risk status of either "high" or "low" based on whether they had 
inherited the disease-associated haplotype. A "high" ri sk status meant they were 95% at-
risk of having the gene; a " low" risk meant they were onl y 5% at-risk of having the 
ARVC gene. For others haplotype testing was inconclusive. In subsequent years, some 
were assigned a 50% risk of either being positive or negative. It was not until nearly a 
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decade later, in 2007, that the gene responsible for ARVC was identified and a somewhat 
definitive test available. Thus, for individuals who were being tested during that decade 
(the 1990s), the deci sion to have genetic testing was made in intervals corresponding to 
each scientific step towards gene discovery. Furthermore, the experiences of a person 
who had been living in an at-risk family for 50 years and witnessing numerous losses will 
be different from an individual who was born later and had not experienced the loss of 
immediate family members to ARVC. Hence, for any two individuals moving through 
the same three phases of the genetic testing process, experiences and decisions about 
engaging in genetic testing will be shaped by different contextual factors depending on 
the state of the science at the time. 
The two categories, (a) taking the first steps of the genetic testing process and (b) 
building one's risk portfolio, describe the variations in participants' experiences as they 
decipher the meaning of being at-risk. 
Category 1: Taking the First Steps of the Genetic Testing Process 
• Property I: Being Offered a Predictive Genetic Test. 
• Property 2: Making the Decision to Participate in Predictive Genetic Testing . 
Category 2: Building One's Risk Portfolio 
• Property l: Waiting for Predictive Genetic Test Results . 
• Property 2: Receiving Genetic Test Results . 
Figure 7. 1. Construct 2: Deciphering the Meaning of Being At-Risk. Emerging 
properties and categories that describe the second phase of the psychosocial process 
Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk, during predictive genetic testing. 
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Category 1: Taking the First Steps of the Genetic Testing Process 
This category examines participants' accounts of being offered a genetic test and 
making the decision to have genetic testing. It captures the conditions and contextual 
dimensions that shape how participants assign meanings to risk as they make the decision 
to have genetic testing. Threaded throughout this di scussion are the psychosocial and 
behavioural responses of participants. The two properties, (a) being offered a predictive 
genetic test and (b) making the decision to participate in predictive genetic testing, 
describe participants' experiences as they face a new reality-the availability of a 
predictive genetic test for ARVC. 
Being offered a predictive genetic test. All participants were offered a 
predictive genetic test for ARVC or were present when a family member was offered 
testing (as in the case of the spouses of at-risk individuals whom I interviewed). Some 
were offered haplotype testing in 1998; others were offered a more definitive test, as 
researchers moved closer to identifying the causative mutation for ARVC. It is with each 
offer of a genetic test that the influence of the contextual dimensions and specific 
conditions that shape risk perception are elucidated. The two conditions that capture the 
variations in being offered a predictive genetic test are (1) the availability of the 
predictive genetic test and (2) interactions with health care providers. 
Condition 1: Availability of the predictive genetic test. Even though many 
participants had become aware on a cognitive and emotional level that they were living in 
a family at risk for a genetic condi tion (as described in chapter 6), it was not until they 
were approached by a genetic counsellor or cardiologist to have the predictive genetic test 
that the notion of being "at-risk" came to be translated into an objective reality. That is, 
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despite having had experiential knowledge of being at-risk (such as growing up in an at-
risk family, experiencing the loss of close relatives, and participating in clinical 
diagnostic tests , all of which suggest ri sk for a genetic heart condition), they did not yet 
embody the notion of being "at-risk." It was the interaction with the genetic counsellor 
that prompted participants to reconceptualize their experiential and scientific knowledge 
as noted in these comments: 
Probably a couple of years later [following the visit with the pediatrician], I 
recei ved a call from [Genetic Counsellor] . I think that's reall y when I realized it 
could be genetic and there could be something to it. 
I never associated it with a genetic disorder until I met [Genetic Counsellor]. 
As found in Cox and McKellin 's (1999) study, which explored how risk is socially 
constructed in families at risk for HD, being offered a genetic test often was the catalyst 
that caused participants to reassess existing ideas about risk, as they made the shift from 
experiencing an abstract sense of risk to embodying an intersubjective awareness of being 
at-ri sk for a genetic linked heart condition that could be identified by a predictive genetic 
test. This re-examination and reframing of risk in light of the availability of a predictive 
genetic test was serendipitous in that it provided to them an opportunity to rationalize the 
numerous losses in the famil y and to finally "know" (in a sense that is as embodied as it is 
rational) one's objective risk. This is reflected in the statement, "I think as soon as I 
found out it was something that someone could tell me about, I said, ' I need to know; I 
can' t sit here and think, "Do I or don ' t I?'" 
Responses to the availability of a predictive genetic test were both optimistic and 
pessimistic. Many of the adult participants in thi s study who were presented with the 
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option to have genetic testing were eager to avail of this opportunity.25 As one participant 
explained in discussing his eagerness to have genetic testing, "Whoever is doing [genetic 
testing], please find a cure, or find something that can be done to help." Saliently 
embedded within participants' narratives is an overwhelming sense of relief that their 
experiential knowledge was accurate: something was going on in their famjly that was 
putting them at-risk-- something that affected young males suddenly, and something that 
was fatal. 
One of the first things that [Genetic Counsellor] told me is that with the men the 
first and last symptom is the same: sudden death. Knowing that there is not much 
of a warning genetic testing is an opportunity [to try and prevent these deaths from 
happening]. 
Participants expressed being thrilled when they found that the technology finally 
existed that would rid them of the ambiguity that they had lived with fo r so many years of 
not knowing the reason for the numerous illnesses and deaths within the fami ly. 
Participant spoke of a feeling of relief, of fee lings that something was finally being done, 
of feelings of hope that there would be a viable treatment, and of an overwhelming desire 
to know their risk status. Genetic testing was seen as the next pragmatic step in 
deciphering their risk status. These sentiments are reflected in the fo llowing comments: 
It is a huge relief when you get contacted by the genetic counsel lor. ... You know 
someone is out there. Before that, it was this obscure disease, this condition that 
sits in the dark. You don ' t know anything about it. 
I don ' t know if there is any cure for this disease [ARVC] but as technology 
improves and our knowledge of ARYC increases, it 's my hope that something 
25 As di scussed in Chapter 5. Methods, I was unable to recruit participants who had dec lined gene tic testing ; 
their perspectives are therefore noticeably absent from this discussion. 
-------------------------------------------- -----
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will be found to help my grandchildren or perhaps my sons. They [participant's 
sons] are still only in their twenties and thirties. 
I wanted to know. 
I must say it was good to know that somebody was starting something, and [to] 
realize that probably down the road some answers about this disease [ARVC] 
could materialize. 
When the test [became] avai lable there was hope that at least we can delay this 
[onset of ARVC] with treatments . 
In contrast to the positive responses to being offered genetic testing, there were a 
few participants who did not see the opportunity in the same light. For them, being 
offered a genetic test elicited a somewhat ambivalent approach, as they tried to 
understand and assign meaning to the opportunity to have genetic testing: 
I'd go on the website and look it [ARVC] up. I was reluctant to talk to my wife 
about it. I read about it quietly, but I didn ' t discuss it a lot. There is reluctance; 
you don ' t even want to think about this condition because it is like this thing out 
there that you can't controL 
If I don 't talk about it [ARVC] then there is no confirmation right? 
For one participant, growing up knowing that there was something wrong in the family 
that caused relatives to die suddenly at a young age, the news of a genetic test was at first 
welcomed; however, this was short-lived. Despite having genetic testing on several 
occasions, his genetic test continued to be inconclusive until 2007. For this person 
predictive genetic testing was described as the beginning of a long and stressful process. 
"I didn ' t find out or come to terms with it as a family curse .. .. until [Genetic Counsellor] 
appeared in '96, and it' s been awful since." For others, the news of a genetic test caused 
them some unease, as they momentarily questioned their own theories about risk and 
gravitated towards biomedical models of inheritance to explain their risk. "They [family 
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members] started to talk about testing and how [ARVC] was genetic, that it was passed 
on, it could be 50150." This sparked participants to juxtapose their objective knowledge 
and experiential knowledge about risk. 
The juxtaposition of objective and experiential ways of knowing risk inevitably 
led experiential knowledge to overshadow numerical measures of risk, especially for 
participants who felt that they were being offered a test that in their eyes was not 100% 
accurate. As found by d ' Agincourt-Canning (2005) and Cox and McKellin ( 1999), 
experiential knowledge took precedence over objective estimates of risk. Thus, even at 
the pre liminary stages of entering the genetic testing process, experiential knowledge and 
the conditions (gender, age, availability of a genetic test, and treatment) that account for 
the variations in risk are used to construct ideas about being at risk for ARVC, including 
ideas about its expressivity, its penetrance, and its avai lable treatment options: 
Before my sister died, she found out that her son had ARVC. He was diagnosed 
at [the] age of 2 1, and he had to have a transplant. He passed away in 2005. My 
sister, who also died from ARVC, had seven kids. Five of the kids were positive 
for ARVC. 
I thought to myself that [the] defibrillator is only going to work for so long. My 
understanding of the disease was the heart itself is going to deteriorate. It 
[function of the heart] is going to get worse and worse. I knew there were 
treatments, but I was thinking [that], as of right now, a heart transplant is the 
ultimate treatment. 
I came from a generation of all girls. My great-great grandmother had all girl s. It 
[ARVC] was never thought of as a problem because most females don ' t have any 
problems with this disease. There were no boys in the family until I had my son. 
Next thing you know he's thirty-something years old and he drops down dead 
because no one ever knew that it [ARVC] could be passed on through the women. 
It was only then we started to realize that ARVC [could] be passed down through 
the women in the fami ly to the men. 
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The above excerpts reflect the fact that individuals living in at-risk families 
continuously juxtapose competing realities about risk (scientific knowledge and 
experiential knowledge) in order to construct meanings of risk. This is a fluid process, in 
that the meanings assigned to being at-risk fluctuate in response to one's everyday life 
and the specific conditions that are relevant at the time of being offered a genetic test. 
Objective risk is not sufficient to assign meaning to being at-risk, as it is not possible to 
quantify that which is "felt" and therefore unquantifiable. Objective risk alone is not 
enough to understand one's risk; there are many competing contextual dimensions and 
conditions that influence risk perception, and objective risk is only a small piece of 
deciphering the meaning of risk. That is, as noted by Sivell et al. (2008), one's perception 
of risk is transient in nature and may be more contingent on one's subjective 
interpretations of risk and heuristics than objective estimates. It is experiences such as 
those highlighted in the previous narratives that elucidate the psychosocial distress 
endured while juxtaposing one's experiential knowledge with evolving scientific 
knowledge. 
Condition 2: Interactions with health care providers. Offers of genetic testing 
occur during a face-to-face meeting with a genetic counsellor. It is during this 
preparatory phase that the genetic counsellor provides clients with information about the 
genetic test, information on available services, and an opportunity to ask questions. As 
one participant described it, "It was a lot of information, but [Genetic Counsellor] kept 
saying, 'do you have any questions?' If it was not clear [Genetic Counsellor] was 
avai lable to answer any questions." Participants spoke of the emotional support provided 
at these encounters, as well. "I felt like the genetic counsellor cared and wasn't just doing 
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this as part of a job or whatever; you could see the sincerity." Similar accounts of 
therapeutic relationships between at-risk individuals and genetic counsellors have been 
noted in the literature as being beneficial in decreasing the anxiety related to perceived 
risk (Meiser & Halliday, 2002). 
The information provided in this preparatory period reflected the portrayal of the 
coronary candidate described in the literature by Davison et al., 1989, 1991, 1992, and 
participants ' representations of the "at-risk relative" described in chapter 6. This 
information was easily assimilated into pre-existing cultural beliefs or frameworks about 
risk and cardiovascular disease and thus did not cause a significant amount of 
psychological distress (as has been discussed by Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982b; 
Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). It was only when there was not a "good fit" between what the 
experts were telling them and what participants understood about genetics and heart 
disease, what they had observed going on in the family over the years, and what they had 
envisioned as the at-risk relative, that they experienced some anxiety. 
Although participants general ly reported understanding the information provided 
to them during this preparatory phase, that was not always the case. One participant, 
despite having had multiple conversations with the attending cardiologist, still apparently 
did not have a clear understanding of the disease: 
When [cardiologist] told me I had hypertrophic cardiomyopathy he said its sudden 
cardiac death syndrome- you cou ld drop down and you could die. That was 
really upsetting. I was kind of hoping ARVC wasn ' t as bad as hypertrophic 
cardiomyopathy. 
Experiences such as this remind us that laypersons may not have an understanding of the 
basic anatomy and physiology of genetics, might struggle with core concepts of genetics, 
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and may have misconceptions about the scientific facts when assigning meaning to their 
risk (see also Richards, 1996; Lanie et al., 2004 ). 
Similarly, other participants, despite being aware of the signs and symptoms of 
ARVC, still found it hard to grasp how one could have such a fatal disease without any 
physical signs. Therefore, asymptomatic participants spoke often of being disinterested 
in learning more about the disease because they did not believe that they were at-risk. 
This was particularly evident in younger participants who had not experienced as many 
losses: 
I thought that I didn ' t have it [ARVC] . I'm very active and never had any heart 
palpitations or any adverse effects at all. So it made me think there's nothing 
wrong with me. 
I have no signs and symptoms that would make me think that I had anything 
wrong. 
Incidences such as thi s can lead to individuals becoming disengaged in the genetic testing 
process or being reluctant to participate in recommended screening as noted in 
McAllister's (2002, 2003) Theory of Engagement. The Theory of Engagement describes 
the outcomes of one's cognitive or emotional beliefs that they are at risk for a disease. 
These participants were partially engaged; they were cognitively aware of their risk but 
did not have any significant anxiety related to thi s knowledge. Their understanding of 
their risk and subsequent decisions about genetic testing was based on the fact that they 
did not have any signs of the di sease; hence, several had ente1tained the idea of 
disengaging in predictive genetic testing. 
Property 2: Making the Decision to Participate in Predictive Genetic Testing. 
Although the purpose of this research was not to discover the decision-making process 
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that occurs throughout the genetic testing process, as I started my interviews I discovered 
that a significant part of understanding one's risk was "teased out" as participants made 
the decision to have genetic testing. Thus, the focus of this property is to discuss how the 
decision to have genetic testing unfolds. 
All of the 29 participants in this study, at some point, were involved in making the 
decision to have predictive genetic testing. Among the participants, six at-risk individuals 
and two spouses lived through early clinical investigations for ARYC in 1980s, up to and 
including haplotype testing in 1998, and through to the discovery of the causative 
mutation for ARVC in 2007; two at-risk individuals and their spouses entered testing 
between 1994 and 1997; and eleven at -risk indi victuals and two spouses entered the 
genetic testing process with haplotype testing after 1998. Only three participants had 
engaged in testing after 2007, and one participant was awaiting testing at the time of the 
interview (see Figure 1.3). 
The property making the decision to participate in predictive genetic testing 
describes participants' experiences of making the decision to have genetic testing for 
themselves and for their children. I found that there were two distinct approaches to this, 
as the decision to be tested either (a) develops gradually over time or (b) happens so 
quickly that it is felt as a non-decision (see Figure 7.2). 
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Figure 7.2. Making the Decision to Have Predictive Genetic Testing For ARVC. 
As 1 have argued previously in this work, the decision to have genetic testing is 
pragmatic, transient, fluid , and contingent upon the meaning that one ass igns to being at-
risk at any given time. It is pragmatic in that participants juxtapose the two contextual 
dimensions (scientific knowledge and experiential knowledge) against the conditions or 
specific factors that influence risk perception in order to make the decision to engage in 
genetic testing. It is transient in that as one's risk perception fluctuates so do the 
contextual dimensions and conditions that influence it. It is fluid in that the decision 
evolves with each new experience, with gene discovery, and it is contingent upon each 
reassignment of the meaning of being at risk for ARVC. 
Participants' experiences when making the decision to have genetic testing are 
variable, and yet there are some underlying commonalities. They are variable in that 
participants' decisions either develop gradually over time (as the individual reflects on the 
pros and cons of having testing), or the decisions are made quickly with little to no 
conscious effort (that is, the correct decision is so immediately obvious to the decision 
maker that it is felt as a non-decision). However, no matter how quickly the decision-
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making process unfolds, all participants juxtapose the two contextual dimensions 
(scientific and experiential knowledge) with the specific conditions that influence their 
risk perception. 
While participants typically follow one process of decision-making (developing 
the decision slowly or deciding so quickly that it is a non-decision), for some decision 
makers the two types merge momentarily or change completely. For instance, for some 
who have been engaged in their decision-making process over time, their decision can 
shift to become a non-decision in light of new contextual information or conditions 
influencing their ri sk perception (for example, onset of signs of the disease). Importantly, 
this is not the same as an individual simply completing the decision-making process and 
arriving at a decision: rather, the decision-making process transforms - the pros and cons 
that were being weighed have now changed and the decision-making process shifts from 
being gradual to being sudden. Similarly, the person who had quickly decided one course 
of action or inaction may re-enter the decision-making process due to a shift in the 
con.textual dimensions and conditions that influence risk perception (for example, ·new 
knowledge about the average age of onset of symptoms). The decision-making process, 
then, is dynamjc, because the contextual dimensions or conditions that shape the meaning 
of being at-ri sk are constantly in flux and continually reshaping the perception of risk. 
In figure 7.2, the bidirectional arrows represent the potential sharing of the 
contextual dimensions and conditions that influence risk perception. That is, when 
making the decision about whether to engage in genetic testing, participants draw on 
similar contextual dimensions and conditions. It is, however, the meaning that each 
individual assigns to these contextual dimensions and conditions that influences one ' s 
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risk perception and the speed at which one makes the decision. For example, for those 
participants whose decision developed over time-in the absence of a definitive 
predictive genetic test-considerable time had been spent trying to understand the 
meaning of the numerous losses within the family in order to assign a personal meaning 
to being at-risk. Although those individuals who took the non-decision approach in 
making the deci sion to have genetic testing do reflect on the meaning of the numerous 
losses within the family, they also do not engage in as in-depth analysis of this meaning, 
because they know that there is genetic test that will do this for them. This information is 
processed quickly and used as evidence to rationalize the merits of the predictive test in 
deciphering the ir risk. The state of scientific knowledge (availability of a predictive 
genetic test) alters how experiential knowledge (numerous losses) is understood and how 
the decision to have genetic testing is made for these two groups of participants (those 
who took a "developing decision" approach and those who took a "non-decision" 
approach), regardless of when they became aware of their genetic risk ( 1980s, 1998, 
2007). 
The dashed lines of the bidirectional arrows in figure 7.2 represent the fluid 
nature of risk perception and the varied contextual dimensions and conditions that 
influence it. The fi gure reflects the transient, fluid, and pragmatic nature of decision-
making around genetic testing. The two approaches to making the decision to have 
genetic testing (developing and non-decision) are further described in this property 
making the decision to participate in predictive genetic testing. The seven conditions that 
were of most significance for all 29 participants as they made the decision to engage in 
genetic testing are as follows: ( I) available predictive genetic test, (2) numerous losses or 
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deaths within the famjly, (3) physical signs and symptoms of disease, (4) gender, (5) test 
relevancy, (6) one's sense of relational responsibility or moral obligation to other family 
members to have testing, and (7) family support. 
Condition 1: Availability of a predictive genetic test (comparing 1980s, 1998, 
and 2007). For those eight at-risk individuals and two spouses who became aware of the 
famjJy ' s risk for heart disease prior to haplotype testing in the late 1990s, the decision to 
have genetic testing in 1998 and for some again in 2007 was something that evolved with 
gene discovery and with each offering of a more definitive genetic test. For these 
participants the dec ision to have genetic testing developed over time, similar to the 
process of decision-making described in Cox 's (2003) work on HD. 
Of the six at-risk individuals and two spouses who took part in early clinical 
testing (e.g., echocardiograms, cardiac stress tests, blood analysis) in the 1980s, when 
there was no predictive genetic test for ARYC, many knew they were at risk for 
somethlng that "ran in the family. " However, this awareness did not immediately 
translate into a he ightened sense of risk, partly due to the lack of scientific evidence to 
support the experiential knowledge. Some participants took the approach that they were 
not at risk for a specific genetic condition but rather were simply living with something 
that they constructed as being normal for the typical Newfoundlander (that is, normal 
within a province that is well known to have a high incidence of cardiac di sease). The 
sense of normalizing one's risk, initially sparked in the pre-testing phase and summarized 
through the construct Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Risk, continues to 
resonate in participants ' narratives about their decision to have testing: 
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Well , we [family members] thought we might have something wrong. We were 
just thinking it was an arrhythmia; nobody really paid much attention to it back 
then. The fact that it might be genetic was something way out there. We thought 
there is nothing wrong with us. 
According to many participants, their attitude in the early 1980s had been not to worry 
about something that was not tangible, not treatable, and that did not have a definitive 
diagnostic test. Thus, as noted by Esplen et al. (2001 ) in their research on HNPCC, the 
decision to engage in blood analysis prior to having any predicti ve genetic test was 
simply altruistic in nature for several participants in the earl y 1980s: 
We were just happy to help out; any lUnd of information that they [researchers] 
could get from our blood, go for it. .. They [researchers] j ust wanted to do some 
testing, and it wouldn ' t affect anything in our lives; but we didn 't reall y think 
about stuff like that back then. 
This sense of a ltruism continued for participants as they made the decision about whether 
to have testing later in 1998 and again in 2007, as one partic ipant explained, "Well , even 
if I die of this [ARVC] , hopefull y somewhere someone will stop it [ARVC] before the 
next generation is over." 
Coinciding with each offering of a more definitive genetic test fo r ARYC (in 1998 
and again in 2007), was a heightened sense of anxiety, as is summarized in this 
participant's description of weighing the pros and cons of knowing his risk status: 
I started to think about it .. . the problems of knowing and of not knowing such as 
if you don' t have li fe insurance and medical insurance. Do you want to know? 
Here we [at-risk family members] had the chance to be tested . . . but then we 
wondered what happens if there is something wrong. What do we do? What are 
they [health care providers] going to do? They are just learning now, just starting 
to find out about this condition. 
Although some participants agree that the decision to have genetic testing can be 
stressful , in contrast to other studie (e.g., d' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b; Klitzman, 
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Thorne, Williamson, & Marder, 2007; Landsbergen et al., 2005; Meiser, 2005 ; Smart, 
201 0), this anxiety was not a deterrent to making the decision to have testing. This may 
be explained by the fact that for participants who engaged in the process of decision-
making over time, the period of contemplation prepares them emotionally and 
intellectually to make the decision to have testing and to deal with the potential outcome 
of the test. 
The ex periences of those participants who entered the genetic testing process in 
the earl y 2000s are similar to those who ente red it in the early 1980s, with two 
exceptions. First, participants making the decision in 1998 and again in 2007 were 
presented with the option of a somewhat definiti ve genetic test immediately; thus, they 
did not have to endure the same level of ambiguity regarding their risk status as those 
who became aware of their potential ri sk in the 1980s when there was no genetic test for 
ARVC. Second, those making the decision in 1998 and in 2007 did not experience a 
prolonged period of contemplation when making the decision to have testing. 
For these participants, accounts of making the decision to have genetic testing 
were vague: " I don' t even remember going in and getting tested for the first time." This 
vagueness suggests the decision to have genetic testing did not cause a large amount of 
psychological distress but was rather, as Cox (2003) noted, something they knew they 
wanted, something self-evident, something requiring little conscious effort, and 
something believed to be the next logical step to deciphering their ri sk for ARVC. These 
sentiments are evident in the following statements: 
I wanted to know. I don ' t remember any anxiety or stress of problems making 
the deci sion to get it done [genetic testing] . It wasn' t a big decision. 
----------- - ~ ~-- -
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It's just something you just got to do. You can go get tested and do something 
that may save your life, or you can just hope and pray that nothing happens to you. 
I vaguely [recall making decision to have testing]. I had no hesitation about being 
tested because I felt, as long as there was a cure somewhere on the horizon, I 
would do anything. 
For those who made the decision immediately, their convictions about knowing their risk 
were so strong that they believed that having the genetic test was the only thing that could 
relieve them of their distress. 26 
Despite the fact that participants entered the genetic testing process at various 
phases of gene discovery, there was a similarity to the contextual dimensions and 
conditions when deciding whether to undergo genetic testing. The meaning that 
individuals assign to these contextual dimensions and conditions is what makes the 
decision-making process dynamic, fluid, and unique for each person. The meaning 
assigned to being at-risk can shift from the development of a decision to a non-decision or 
from a non-decision to one that requires more thought in order to decide in light of new 
contextual information or conditions that influence risk perception. Depending upon the 
context wherein the decision to engage in genetic testing occurs (e.g., year and state of the 
science), the influence of the contextual dimensions and the conditions on risk perception 
varies. 
Condition 2: Numerous losses. As found by other researchers, growing up in a 
family culture enmeshed with stories of loss and witnessing first-hand the loss of a family 
26 The argument can be made that it is the time lapse between the making of the dec ision and the interview 
with me that contributed to participants' vague accounts of making the actual decision and giving consent. I 
do not believe this is the case, given participants' vivid accounts of the circumstances pre- and post-
decision. 
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member were key factors that motivated participants to have genetic testing (Armstrong 
et al., 2000; Cox & Mckellin, 1999; d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2006a, 2006b; Lerman et al., 
1994; McAllister, 2002; Norris et al., 2009). The impact that a loss had on one's 
perception of risk and willingness to undergo testing was determined by the individual's 
psychological closeness to the loss. This is evident in these accounts of losing a relative: 
My third brother was 43 when he passed away suddenly ... In the back of my mind 
I was thinking if this could happen to him [brother] it could happen to me. 
I didn ' t want to see my life turn out the same as my mother's --burying two of her 
children before herself. I didn 't want that. 
Observing and listening to numerous accounts of illness and loss, many participants knew 
there was something "going on" in the family. These participants viewed a predictive 
genetic test as an opportunity to confirm or dispute their suspicions. Supporting the work 
of Lock and Nguyen (2010), participants' desire to know their risk status, coupled with 
the availability of a genetic test, supplemented their experiential knowledge rather than 
replacing it. As reported in the literature, in order to assign meaning to risk and to make 
the decision to have genetic testing, participants juxtaposed their experiential knowledge 
against the science of genetics, and it is out of this juxtaposition that risk was constructed 
(Boenik & Vander Burg, 2010; Cox, 2003; Sanders et al. , 2007; Smith et al. , 2002; 
Taylor, 2005). 
Condition 3: Physical signs and symptoms. As found in other studies 
(Armstrong et al. , 2000; Klitzman, Thorne, Williamson, & Marder, 2007), the onset of 
physical signs of ARVC was a key factor in heightening one's sense of risk, and thus 
prompting participants to engage in genetic testing. This is similar to what Cox (2003) 
describes as "taking the decision" (p.269). That is, the onset of physical signs of heart 
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disease raises one's conscious awareness that genetic testing is something that must be 
done in order to decipher one's risk. This decision was difficult for those who fe lt that 
the inclusion criteria of the coronary candidate or the at-risk relative did not apply to 
them- that is, they were young, physically active, and, most importantly, had no signs of 
cardiac disease. This soon changed as perceptions about risk were reshaped in light of 
overt physical signs and symptoms of heart disease that could not be denied as noted in 
the comments of two participants: "I think there were a couple of times I went and got 
checked out. I thought I was having shortness of breath," and "I had some pain in my 
chest. .. I went to see what was wrong." This supports Nelkin (1992) and her observation 
of it being the onset of physical signs and symptoms that represents the onset of the 
illness experience that causes participants to engage in the genetic testing process. The 
onset of physical signs and symptoms is an excellent example of how those participants 
whose decision to have genetic testing was "developing" would suddenly switch 
decision-making approaches to that of "a non-deci sion" (that is, suddenly knowing that 
one would be tested), as the meaning assigned to risk was quickly reshaped to reflect the 
new risk reality. 
For some participants the onset of physical signs and symptoms, despite efforts to 
maintain a healthy lifestyle (diet and exercise), was frustrating. The only means by which 
participants felt that they could have some control over and be able to deal with their 
feelings of anxiety was to have testing. The benefits of taking a proactive approach to 
knowing one's risk is evident in several participants' comments, such as, "I find it's better 
to know [genetic status] than not to know because [ARVC] is not going to go away," and, 
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"I took a proactive approach. There is something lurking in the dark, and I went looking 
for it." 
The role that anxiety caused by uncertainty plays in making the decision to engage 
in genetic testing is evident throughout the genetic literature (Armstrong et al. , 2000; 
Binedell et al. , 1998; Christiaans et al. , 2009; d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2006b; Decruyenaere 
et al. , 1997, 2003 ; Douma et al. , 2008; Evers-Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 1998; Evers-
](jebooms et al. , 2002; Lerman et al., 1994; Meiser et al. , 2007; Smart, 20 10). As in the 
cardiovascular literature (Aatre & Day, 201 1; Christiaans et al. , 2009) and as argued by 
Lupton ( 1995), the sense of control acquired with making the decision to have genetic 
testing displaces feelings of uncertainty and psychological distress about not knowing 
one ' s genetic status. 
Condition 4: Gender. 27 For the women in the study who lived through gene 
discovery in the earl y 1980s, the onset of physical signs and symptoms of ARVC were 
particularl y critical in constructing ideas about risk. Many women had taken comfort in 
the fact experts h ad advised them that they were at low risk for the disease in comparison 
to their male counterparts and did not require immediate testing. For these women the 
fact that they were at low risk seemed logical, as it supported their existing beliefs about 
risk, which were based on their mental representations of the at-risk relative, their 
experiential knowledge, and the cardiovascular literature of the time that framed heart 
disease as predominantly male (Davison et al. , 1989, 199 1, and 1992). 
27 See previous footnote 25. 
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It seems like it' s more on the male side . . . . It affects males harsher [worse] than 
females. Females seem to be older when they contract it. The males have a 
sudden cardiac death. 
I had the mind-set that women couldn't be affected by this; but I did think I could 
pass down a gene to my boys without having anything wrong with me. 
Incidences such as these illustrate how beliefs about a health condition can shape one's 
decisions about genetic testing. The above quotations capture the impact that the opinions 
of experts have on risk perception. 
Based on the fact that ARVC was presented by the experts and perceived by these 
women as something that did not readily affect women, women had taken a "developing" 
approach to genetic testing. This approach soon changed to that of a non-decision, as 
many women in the 1990s started to have physical symptoms deemed cardiac in nature 
and wanted genetic testing, as explained in this narrative: 
At work one day I turned to my left , and everything went dark. I got light headed, 
and felt like my heart was doing flip flops in my body. I just put my hand on my 
head and said, 'please God, don't let me die.' 
This is an example of how conditions such as gender may shape science. As one ARVC 
participant discussed, it was only through the many voices of women advocating to be 
tested after the onset of physical signs of heart disease that experts were forced to re-
evaluate the criteria for risk of ARVC to include women. 
Condition 5: Test Relevancy. For the participants, the meaning assigned to being 
at-risk is contingent on the relevancy that the contextual dimensions or conditions have 
for any given individual at a particular time. In keeping with research by Cox and 
McKelJin ( 1999), and as described in the previous sections, the onset of physical 
symptoms, the continuous losses within the family, and the introduction of a more 
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conclusive test are relevant conditions that not only heightened one's sense of risk but 
also prompted participants to engage in genetic testing. 
In regards to making the decision to have genetic testing, relevancy implies not 
only seeing the test as something important to undergo but also having a sense that this is 
the right time in one's life to have the test and feel ing confident that one can cope with 
the outcome. As found in Taylor's (2005) research on HD, participants' narratives reflect 
an emotional, intellectual, and circumstantial readiness to know if they had ARVC or not. 
This coll aborative sense of readiness is evident in various segments of several 
participants' narrati ves: 
There are two different issues [with having testing]. One is personal and the other 
is for the public good .. .. I think that [genetic testing] is the only way we are going 
to find out if we can get rid of it [ARVC] .. 00 That is what went through my mind 
when l came in for testing. 
There is no way that you can be prepared. It [genetic testing] is just something 
you got to do. 
I never reall y took time out to come and get tested .. 00 Now I had the time, and l 
said, 'I' ll come and get it done now.' 
This sense of readiness was seen as both exciting and scary at the same time as this 
narrative highlighted: 
I wanted to know, but I was scared to know, because I know what Mom went 
through, especially the last year of her li fe; that was worrisome and scary and still 
IS. 
The concept of risk relevancy provides some insights as to why studies have found 
that children at risk for a genetic condition do not experience high levels of psychological 
distress (Cordi et al. , 1996, 2003; Michie et a l. , 2001 ; Smets et al. , 2008). That is, as 
noted in the literature, it may not be until later in li fe- when children reach adulthood and 
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are faced with critical life decisions such as marriage, reproduction, and employment-
that the outcomes of genetic testing have meaning for or are relevant to their li ves 
(Armstrong et al. , 2000; Binedell et al. , 1998; Decruyenaere et al., 1997; Duncan et al., 
2007; Evers-Kiebooms & Decruyenaere, 1 998; Evers-Kiebooms et al., 2002; Lerman et 
al., 1994). Therefore, it is worth noting that the three young participants in this study did 
not mention having gone through any psychological distress when making the decision to 
have genetic testing. 
Condition 6: Relational responsibility. Included in parents ' decision to have 
genetic testing was consideration for the impact that this decision would have on their 
children. Similar to other studies in genetics (Cox, 2003 ; d' Agincourt-Canning, 2001, 
2006a, 2006b; Hallowell, 1999; Hallowell et al., 2006; Klitzman, Thorne, Williamson, & 
Marder, 2007) concern for the risk status of the children was threaded throughout parents' 
narratives. Added to this was concern for the children ' s future if a parent was ARVC 
positive. These sentiments are threaded throughout the following comments made by the 
parents: 
That' s my biggest fear of all : that my two kids are going to end up with what I 
have. 
I chose to participate in genetic testing for my three boys. That was my reason: to 
help them. 
I owe it to the children to get tested. 
I said, 'Okay, I don't want to know [genetic status].' Then I thought, well , I have 
got two daughters, I have to know for them. Whatever about me, I have to know 
for them. 
This strong sense of relational responsibility felt by participants to the children reinforces 
previous studies demonstrating that individual choices are socially embedded within the 
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nexus of our social relationships and the meanings that we assign to these interactions 
(Blumer, 1969; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Mead, 1934; Sherwin, 1998). In this study it is 
the intersection of the contextual dimensions and conditions in which participants interact 
that shapes risk perception and the decision to have genetic testing. 
This sense of relational responsibility described by participants in the second 
phase of the genetic testing process (that is, in the period when a decision about testing is 
being made) is not in the broader societal sense that Dean ( 1999b) and Wilkinson (2010) 
described in their works. That is, most participants did not conceptualize ideas about risk 
and the paiticipation in genetic testing in terms of a broader societal moral duty; their 
sense of moral duty was in relation to their chi ldren. 
Embedded within parent narratives was the turmoil of having to make the decision 
about whether to have their children tested. 28 It is quite obvious that making the decision 
for the chi ldren was not a non-decision but was something that developed. Parents 
constantly weighed the pros and cons of getting their children tested by drawing on 
multiple types of knowledge to make the decision, including conditions such as gender, 
age, and modifiable factors, as well as experiential knowledge such as the history of loss 
in the family. 
Being a mother, giving birth to my children and knowing that something could 
happen to them ... I mean, I look at my mother; mom buried her two boys within 
ten days of each other. 
28 The average age of the children at the time o f genetic testing for ARVC in this study was 14. Ethical 
issues re lated to gene tic testing were not the focus o f this study; ho wever, there is a body of literature that 
does address the e thical implications of predictive genetic testing of children (e.g., Bailey, Skinner, Davis, 
Witmarsh, & Powell , 2008; Caga-anan, Smith, Sharp, & Lantos, 20 II ; Clarke, 20 I 0 ; Emsenauer, Michels, 
& Reinke, 2005 ; Hogben & Boddington, 2005: Ross & Moon, 2000; Tozzo, Caenazzo, & Rodriquez, 201 2: 
Valente, Ferrais, & Dallapiccola, 2008) 
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Every year as [Son] gets older; I know it's getting closer to the time to get him 
tested because he's more involved now with sports and things . ... I don ' t know if 
[Son] fully realizes it. 
I didn ' t know if it was best for them to get the blood work. Did I want to know? I 
didn ' t want to know it. .. . I couldn't make up my mind. 
They [health care providers] are more watchful over my son than they are over my 
daughter. The [Genetic Counsellor] said, ' [Daughter] is 14-but for whatever 
reason, the females fares a bit better than the males.' I'm not saying it takes 
[Daughter] off the hook. Obvious ly, it doesn' t, but it may be a longer time before 
she has any problems. When my son was getting ready to have genetic testing, 
[Genetic Counsellor] asked me what I wanted to do. [Genetic Counsellor] gave 
me time to think about it, and I kept saying, 'No, I don ' t want to know.' [Genetic 
Counsellor] said to me, 'Okay, put it this way. We have lost some at the age of 
seventeen, so what if the same thing happens to [Son]. He didn ' t have a chance 
because you didn 't get testing done. [Genetic Counsellor] said, 'I'm not telling 
you what to do, but think about it.' So I thought about it, and I said, ' I wouldn't 
be able to live with myself that way, either, so I might as well go on and get it 
done.' 29 
Even when a decision was made to have their children tested, parents questioned 
the children 's ability to cope with news of genetic testing and were concerned with how it 
would impact their lives. Knowing firsthand what the experience was like, parents try to 
protect their children from going through the same thing. The concern for the children is 
evident in these comments: 
I am concerned for him [son] . .. . It would be bad for me to be out of the picture, 
but I don ' t want him growing up [wondering whether he has ARVC]. 
1 want [Son] tested, but I don' t want him tested. I'd like to bury my head, but for 
his sake I just can' t. 
Well , I think about [Son] , if he ever wanted a family, would it stop him . . . . It will 
be the happiest day of my life ifl find out he doesn' t have it [ARVC]. 
29 Again , thi s is an example of the gendering o f sc ie nce and c linical care. See footnote 25 . 
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Similar concerns regarding the wellbeing of children are found in other research looking 
at the psychosocial impact of genetics (e.g., Andersen et al. , 2008; Armstrong et al. , 2000; 
Binedell et al., 1998; Bruno et al. , 2004; Cox 2003; Chivers-Seymour et al., 2010; 
d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2006a, 2006b; Douma et al., 2008; Decruyenaere et al. , 1997, 
2003; Esplen et al. , 2001; Evers-J(jebooms et al. , 2002; Haddow, 2009; Meiser et al. , 
2007; Norris et al., 2009; Smart, 20 I 0; Smith et al., 2002). Concerns for the wellbeing of 
the children are discussed in more detail in chapter 8. 
Even though parents were confident that they had made the right choice to have 
their children tested, this decision was met, at times, with resistance by their young 
children (in the ir teens), as one mother described: 
The middle one didn ' t want to know at all; it took a little while for him to be 
tested . The oldest had a bit of resistance. And the youngest one said I don ' t want 
to know. He was okay with getting the blood work done, but not with knowing ... . 
He was upset at the time. 
[Daughter] did not want any part of it. Her blood pressure went up ... she had a 
panic attack. 
In contrast, other children seemed to accept their fate at a level of unexpected maturity, as 
illustrated in this parent ' s narrative that described his eleven-year-old child 's response to 
genetic testing: "The dice was thrown the day I was born, because either I got [ARVC] or 
I haven't got it. ... lsn 't it better ifl know I got it or not?" In some respects it seems that 
li ving in a family with numerous losses had become a part of the children's everyday 
norm at an early age. Participating in genetic testing was a natural part of this norm. 
Thus, as with the older participants, genetic testing was a non-event. 
For one young adult who had genetic testing in his childhood, living with ARVC 
was not something that he had envisioned fo r himself. In fact he expressed some 
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resentment to the fact that he was not included in the decision to have genetic testing as a 
youth but as an adult had to live with the consequences of the decision: 
I was 16 when I figured out that I could have a problem with it [ARVC] . I didn ' t 
really want to be tested, but there was nothing I could do because I wasn' t of age; 
and Mom wanted to know ifl had it. . .. I don ' t even really remember going in and 
getting tested for the first time . . . . I didn ' t really want to know. You know what I 
mean? I'd rather just go through life and not know at all. .. . I was pretty much 
forced to do it by my mother at that time because I didn ' t really want to know, but 
she did, and I agreed to do it. 
The long-term repercussion of this unilateral decision was also felt by a parent who 
questioned the viability of a good parent/child relationship: 
My son is upset because he wants to go into this cooking course. To do the course 
you need to pass a medical. He is afraid that he is going to flunk the medical.. .. 
So, according to him, this [being ARVC positive] has got his life totally screwed 
up . .. . Our relationship is strained. He believes that he had this [ARVC] dumped 
on him and he can' t do anything about it, so he' s not a happy camper. 
Although one's sense of relational responsibility to have genetic testing evolves out of 
concern fo r the wellbeing for the children, it is sustained by the support of one's family. 
Condition 7: Family Support. A genetic linked condition can have a long-lasting 
effect on a family fo r many generations; thus, the decision to have genetic testing does 
not occur in isolation. Family support is imperative in making the decision to have 
genetic testing done. Participants' accounts of how they construct ideas about risk 
dispute aspects of Beck' s idea of individualization of risk, and they support the work on 
relational decision-making (d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2001 ; Etchegary, 2005) in that, 
although participants do take an active ro le in assigning meaning to ri sk, they are strongly 
influenced by familial relationships. For many participants the decision to have genetic 
testing was considered a family matter, as one participant explained: 
232 
It wasn' t made plain to us that we were dealing with something genetic. We just 
talked it over with the famj Jy . . .. No doctor went up to [Relative] and said, 'Well , 
this is in your family, so you ' d better get tested. ' 
For many fami lies, the collaborative nature of the choice to be tested was apparent in this 
comment: "Eight of us went in. We had blood work." 
The importance of famjly support in making a decision regarding testing is 
evident in this participant's recollection of refusing to have a child tested without the 
spouse present for suppo1t: "I said no, I can't let you test [Son]. Because my husband 
wasn't there, and I just couldn't deal with it at that time." Support of the ir family 
members was also significant in maintaining a positi ve attitude, as one individual 
recalled: 
[Husband] has always seemed to me to be the strong person. If we ever went 
anywhere and there 's bad news that had to come, as long as I had him to lean on, I 
fe lt very good. 
Noteworthy is that the participants in this study did not discuss objective risk (that 
is, their scientificall y based risk status) as being a key factor when making the decision to 
have genetic testing. This supports the findings of Cox (2003) and others who have 
argued that objective risk alone is not sufficient to assign meaning to risk and is not a 
primary factor in making the decision to have genetic testing. Similar to Rapp' s (1999) 
work on the social impact of amniocentesis and studies examining decision-making 
around testing for other genetic conditions such as HNPCC (Bombard et al. , 2008) and 
BRCA l/2 (Shiloh & Ilan, 2005), decisions to engage in genetic testing, fo r this study's 
participants, were contextualized in relation to the experiential knowledge formed out of 
their everyday li ves and the contextual factors that impact that experiential reality. 
Decisions were not made based solely on Mendelian theories of inheritance . As noted by 
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several researchers (e.g., Lupton, 1995; Lupton & Tulloch, 2002; Johnson & Tversky, 
1983; Krimsky & Goulding, 1992), the decision to have genetic testing is not a "rational" 
choice based on statistical analysis or objective measures but something that develops in 
response to heuristics, the subjective meanings assigned to risk that evolve out of 
individual interactions with the contextual dimensions (scientific knowledge and 
experiential knowledge), and conditions of one's everyday life. 
Category 2: Building One's Risk Portfolio. 
This category examines participants' experiences and shifting ideas surrounding 
risk as they continue to decipher what it means to be at risk for ARVC. This category 
includes the time period up to and including waiting to receive test resul ts and the 
immediate responses to having either a positive or negative test result. Included in this 
discussion are the diverse coping mechanisms that participants employed to deal with 
perceived psychosocial stressors. The two properties, (a) waiting for predictive genetic 
test results and (b) receiving genetic test results, capture how the participants assign 
meaning to being at-risk as they wait for and receive their test result, the conditions that 
influence this experience, and pa1ticipants' psychosocial and behavioural responses. 
Property 1: Waiting for predictive genetic test results. This property 
highlights family members' experiences as they wait for their predicti ve genetic test 
results. It describes the various psychological and behavioural coping responses 
employed as participants wait to receive their test result. The two conditions that 
influence these responses are the ( 1) waiting period and (2) coping mechanisms. 
Condition 1: Waiting period. Participants reported that, although they had been 
fully aware that the discovery of the ARVC gene was something that would take a long 
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time, they had not been prepared for the psychological and behavioural stressors they 
would endure while waiting for their genetic test result. Impacting on this experience was 
the fact that the waiting period took longer for some, as the facilities to do the testing did 
not at first exist in the province, as this narrative stated: 
[ARVC participant I] had his test done, but it was two years before he got the 
results of his test; [ARVC participant 2] was a year. They [researchers] were 
switching where the testing was taking place. They used to have to send the blood 
to Germany, but now they were going to start to do genetic testing here, in 
Newfoundland .... So [ARVC participant 1 's] blood got sent to Germany, then 
back to Newfoundland and had to be retested. That's why it took a bit longer. 
For those who engaged in testing more recently, the waiting period was not as long: "A 
month, 1 think, to get the results back." 
There is a dearth of literature that explores the waiting period immediately post-
blood collection and prior to receiving one's test result. Most of the literature 
concentrates on the experience prior to genetic testing or the period after receiving the test 
results (e.g., Bleiker et al. , 2003; Broadstock, Michie & Marteau, 2000; Croyle et al. , 
1997; Decruyenare et al. 1999; Gargiulo et al. , 2009; Hendriks et al. , 2005; Lodder et al. , 
2001 ; Meiser & Dunn, 2000; Murakami et al, 2004; Reichelt et al. , 2004; van Oostrom et 
al. , 2003; van Roosmalen et al. , 2004). There is a general consensus in that literature that 
those who experience psychological distress in the pre-genetic testing phase are more 
likely to experience rugher levels of anxiety as they move though the genetic testing 
process. In keeping with that research, and supporting the research of Esplen et al. (2001) 
on HNPCC, the psychological distress experienced by ARVC participants in the 
pretesting phase continued to manifest itself in the waiting period. Threaded throughout 
participants' narratives, in their descriptions of waiting to receive their test results, were 
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expressions of feelings of a loss of control over one's life, denial, depression, anxiety, and 
uncertainty, as reflected in the following participants' accounts: 
When you don ' t want to deal with something, you put it in the back of your head 
and try to forget about it; but you can't forget about it [ARVC] when you start 
having adverse reactions . . .. I'd wake up at night, my heart pounding .... I was a 
wreck . . .. I wouldn't say anything because I figured they're going to think I was 
nuts . ... I was so afraid that something was going to happen. 
Waiting for my test results was stressful and nagging. It did affect me every day, 
but it is one of those things that I needed to know .... It is there all the time in 
everything I did. We were working on our house for seven years, renovating, and 
in the back of my mind I was thinking, ' Am I ever really going to live in thi s 
place?' 
I got in bed that night and-bang-just like that, I had a panic attack. I was 
thinking about it [test result]. I was in such a state my friend had to get up and 
actually get in the bed with me. I was so upset. I was distraught. When all of this 
[anxiety attack] is happening to you and you don ' t know if it is real [heart-related 
or not], that makes it even worse. If it were real, you'd have to deal with it, get 
medication , or do something. But when you don ' t know if it's real or not . . . it 
was awful. 
This overwhelming sense of worry and anxiety, described above, was not isolated 
to the individual at-risk, but was also experienced by the spouses: "I usually worry about 
ARVC all the time. I even went on antidepressants. I couldn ' t take it, because every time 
the phone rang I'd be shaking." Similar accounts of psychological distress in spouses 
li ving in at-risk families have been noted in genetic research on familial adenomatous 
polyposis (Douma et al. , 2010), and in the cardiovascular literature (Dalteg, Benzein, 
Fridlund, & Maim, 2011; Hendriks, et al. , 2008; Pihl , Fridlund, & Martensson, 2010). 
Feelings of worry and concern were not as apparent in the narratives of those 
whose waiting period lasted Jess than six months. This suggests that individuals living in 
at-risk families for a pro longed period of time have a heightened sense of risk and 
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experience more psychological stressors in comparison to those who experience a shorter 
waiting period. 
Condition 2: Coping Mechanisms. In explaining their experiences during the 
period of waiting to receive their test results, several participants described various 
coping mechanisms to deal with the stress throughout this period and to understand their 
risk. These included: avoidance, gathering information, constantly survelling one's body, 
modifying lifestyle factors, and initiating a risk behaviour. 
A voidance. Some participants described trying to normalize the fami ly history of 
cardiac disease as an effective coping strategy. These strategies of normalization as a 
coping strategy had also been employed in the pre-testing phase, as captured in Construct 
One: Awakening ro a New Meaning of Being At-Risk. Normalization is identified as a 
strategy in the cardiovascular literature (Anderson et al. , 2008). The successful use of 
normalization as a coping strategy is contingent upon one's ability to avoid 
communicating with others about their impending test result and ability to downplay the 
significance of having genetic testing as described in these narratives: 
You try and hide it from your family. You don ' t want to talk about it. 
The accusation [being ARVC positive] is there, but you are deflecting it all the 
time. 
Sometimes I felt that the less I knew about it [ARVC], it probably wou ldn 't 
happen to us o r our family. I could be one of the lucky ones that are not affected 
by it. 
First, when I had the test done, I just put it out of sight, out of mind; but the more I 
li ved with it, the harder it was to li ve with. 
Gathering information. A second coping strategy involved gathering information. 
For some participants, becoming more knowledgeable about ARVC was therapeutic: not 
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only did it help them cope; it also helped them prepare for the test result and helped them 
make their own judgments about what it means to be at risk for ARVC, as evident in this 
comment: 
Waiting for the results was stressful , but there is a relief because you will 
eventually know if you have it [ARVC] or not. I do have a tendency to read 
everything .. .. There are probably some people out there, if you told them about 
this [ARVC], they' d just take what the doctor told them. I'd be in my office; I'd 
get a minute and go on the internet. I'd look it up and read about it. You try to 
find out yourself whatever you can about the disease. 
Surveillance of the body. In addition to the above psychological coping 
mechanisms, participants also employed behavioural coping mechanisms as they waited 
to receive their genetic test result. Similar to Kavanagh and Broom's (1998) study on 
embodiment of risk among women with abnormal pap smears, participants became 
increasingly conscious of their body's physical state as an indicator of one's risk status: 
"When you are aware of your body at all , and if you are worried about something, you are 
very conscious. You are conscious of your breathing and every heartbeat and every 
palpitation." This constant surveillance was both comfmti ng and stressful , as a large 
amount of effort was put into trying to prevent a cardiac episode. 
Mod~fying lifestyle factors. A voiding a cardiac episode meant that participants 
once again revisited the cri teria of the at-risk relative and the typical coronary candidate 
to identify and modify those conditions that put them at risk for a cardiac event. As in the 
Phase one awakening period, li festyle factors such as diet and exercise received the most 
attention: "Okay, got to get yourself to a point where you don't smoke, don ' t drink. You 
eat well." For some of those who self-ascribe a high risk for ARVC, physical activity is 
assumed to heighten risk and is therefore restricted, as this participant noted: 
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I wouldn't exercise. I'd go for a walk here and there but wouldn't push myself. I 
was always afraid that I was going to trigger it [ARVC] and I would end up dead 
like my brother. 
The same principle was applied to the children, as parents removed them from physical 
activities such as sports in fear of evoking a cardiac episode pending their test results. 
For others, adherence to thjs strict self-imposed lifestyle was at times lenient, as those 
who believed they did not have ARVC continued to engage in physical activity as a 
means of improving their heart health. Hence, responses to the proposed link between 
physical activity and heart disease fluctuate depending on one's beliefs about their risk 
for ARVC and the degree of risk assigned to physical activity. 
Initiating an at-risk event. Another, less frequent, coping strategy was to attempt 
to initiate a cardiac event, based on the idea that if it was going to happen anyway, it 
would be better to provoke it to happen earlier to get it over with. :~o This was the 
experience of one participant who had stopped all physical activity pending his test result 
and found that period to be extremely stressful. Thus, at one point he purposively 
engaged in ·vigorous exercise in hopes of evoking a cardiac episode. The incident is 
captured in thi s narrative: 
You get fed up with the whole thing .... Once you get challenged with something 
like this, it is like being bullied. You get pushed so far you ' re going to punch 
back. You feel like you are being pressured. I got to do something, and then you 
30 This is similar to descriptions of responses in other traumatic processes such as living through 
domestic violence, whereby a victim may take charge of the experience by initiating the feared event in 
order to get it over with (e.g., Walker, L. I( 1979],), The Battered Woman. New York: Harper and 
Row). 
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go out and say to hell with this; I'm going out and do my thing .... You go out and 
work chopping wood from sun up to sun down. 
It is behaviours such as this that foreshadow the potential psychological distress that 
participants may experience as they wait for their genetic test and supports the fact that 
psychological counselling is critical throughout all phases of the genetic testing process, 
not just pre-testing and post-receipt of one's test results. 
Property 2: Receiving genetic test results. This property highlights how and 
from whom family members receive the news of their genetic status. It describes 
participants' immediate thoughts upon receipt of their genetic test results. The two 
conditions that describe participants' variations in this experience are as follows: (l) 
genetic test results and (2) mode of receiving test result. 
Condition 1: Genetic test results (positive, negative, and inconclusive) 
All of the participants in this study received their genetic test results either from 
the genetic counsellor or the cardiologist, in a private office. Participants' narratives, 
however, did not focus on this interaction but alluded to the fact that this was a positive 
encounter: 
I found [Cardiologist] was very helpfu l ... . I found it [interaction with cardiologist] 
very comforting. I guess it comes from being a professional. You are dealing 
with very serious issues day in and day out, and you know how to deal with 
people in a positive way. 
Reactions to having received a positive or negative test result varied. 
ARVC negative participants typically described an overwhelming feeling of relief 
("It [negative test result] was a huge relief'). This sense of relief was somewhat bitter 
sweet for one ARYC negative participant who had lived for over a decade with an 
inconclusive test from the 1990s. "I cried for three days; I was ten years not knowing, so 
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it was like freedom to me .... Finally, I knew, one way or the other, whether I was high 
risk or low risk." This participant's narrative contradicts the literature, which reported 
individuals who had an inconclusive test perceived themselves as being low risk 
(Hallowell et al., 2002; Meiser, 2005). For this person, an inconclusive test in 1998 was 
experienced as if his condition were a high-risk status, which caused episodes of panic 
and distress. 
For several participants, despite experiencing an overwhelming sense of happiness 
with receiving a negative test result, there were reservations about "publically" 
celebrating, due to an overpowering sense of guilt that others in the family may not be so 
lucky, as reflected in this comment: "You don't celebrate because there are others that 
you're waiting on, and knowing that other family member's news wasn ' t so great." For 
some, celebrating took place in less overt ways, such as resuming physical activities. 
Similar accounts of "survivor guilt" have been cited in the literature (e.g., Codori & 
Brandt, 1994; Davies et al., 2007; Duncan et al., 2008; Hallowell et al. , 2006; McAllister,; 
Mireskandari et al. , 2009; Murakamj et al. , 2004, Sobel & Cowan, "2003; Tibben et al. , 
1993). 
Immediate reactions to having a positive test result also varied. One participant 
reported that receiving a result of "positive" did not translate into a heightened sense of 
risk, because he had no physical symptoms and, therefore, there were no immediate 
actions required. In a similar manner, an ARVC positive woman described not being 
overly concerned about her newly assigned risk, given that her experiential knowledge of 
the at-risk relative and coronary candidate coincided with what the experts were saying: 
that women were not as affected by ARVC as men. "I don ' t think I was overly concerned 
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about it [positive genetic test] , to tell you the truth. I took a lot of confidence from the 
fact that I was female." In other words, the positive test result had no bearing on her 
lifestyle; no immediate action was required. 
For another participant, the news of having a positive test result was expected, 
given the extensive family history of loss and subtle signs of heart disease: 
I was shocked and I wasn't shocked, given-because in our family we had all 
kinds of stuff. . .. There's a lot of it [ARVC] out in [rural area] , where my father 
was from. I wasn't surprised because I had been having trouble [signs of heart 
disease], just every now and again, for a few years. Two months after 
[participant's brother] died, I was working, and I started getting dizzy spells and 
electric shocks in my arm, even though I wasn't touching anything. I kind of clued 
in then that something was up. So I went to the doctor to see what was wrong. 
When they did all their tests, I had what [brother] had, so they put me in the 
hospital. I was in there for three weeks. After about a week, they woke me up in 
the middle of the night and told me that my [participant 's other brother] came into 
the hospital ; he was just admitted. 
Similar responses have been found in the cardiovascular literature that looked at how 
people understand and cope with the news that they are at risk for coronary heart disease 
(e.g., Farrimond et al., 20 10). Comments such as these bring to light that at-risk 
individuals embody information about the conditions that influence their risk perception 
with more ease if they fit within existing frameworks about risk. It is only when one's 
existing framework is challenged, and one's existing risk perception is reshaped by a test 
result, that at-risk participants experience an elevated sense of being at-risk, causing 
psychological stress and disembodiment-a disconnect between what one believes to be 
the case and what is true according to existing scientific knowledge. This sense of 
disembodiment can cause distress, disengagement in the genetic testing process, or hinder 
adherence to preventative health behaviours in a manner similar to that described in other 
research (Heshka et al. , 2008; McAllister, 2002; Sanders et al. , 2007). 
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Reactions to the news of either a positive or negative test result were particularly 
striking for parents of children who had been tested. As noted in other studies (Meiser et 
al., 2002; van Roosmalen et al. , 2004; Watson et al., 2004) for many ARVC positive 
participants, while they were concerned for their own wellbeing, it was the receipt of 
receiving the news that their child was ARVC positive that proved to be psychologically 
overwhelming, even for those who felt they had been emotionall y and intellectually 
prepared: "I thought I would be able to handle it, but when I got the news [that 
participant's child was ARVC positive], it was devastating for me." It seems, regardless 
of how many times parents have prepared to receive their children's test results, they still 
experience anxiety, as one participant's reaction to their child being found ARVC 
positive illustrates: "I was all geared up for it [genetic test results] . . .. But you were still 
thinking in the back of your mind, 'No, we can't go through this again."' When receiving 
test results, especially in relation to children's risk status, participants appreciate the 
significance of having a support person present, as one parent who received the news 
alone notes: 
I wish I had somebody there with me at the time, because it was hard to get that 
news. It came back that the two of them had ARVC, so that was the worst thing 
that could happen. 
Condition 2: Mode of receiving results . Participants reported being informed 
about their test result in a face-to-face meeting with a genetic professional, but then 
subsequently receiving, by mail , the written notification of the test result. For some 
participants, this objective evidence was welcomed and reconfirmed their risk status. For 
others, the letter brought with it a familiar sense of ambiguity. Whi le the letter confirmed 
that the experts were 95% confident that they were negative for ARVC, what stood out 
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more to some was that they were still 5% at risk for this disease. For those with a positive 
test result, the opposite was true: they were 95% sure they had the ARVC gene, but 
questioned whether the experts were wrong and whether they might be lucky enough to 
be in the 5% who did not have the mutation. The letter, then, was a catalyst that caused 
ideas about risk to be renegotiated again , with participants now appreciating that the 
genetic test results were not 100% defini tive. " I think [the letter] said I might be 95% or 
90% [not at-risk] . . .. So it' s still there. I still got that bit of doubt there." Some had 
simultaneous feelings of joy and doubt as they received their genetic test results: "That 
was just marvelous-to know that I had gone from 50150 down to five percent, but, still , 
it was there." The only viable solution noted by participants, to resolve these doubts, 
would be to receive written notice that they were 100% positi ve or negative, which they 
never did receive. In any case, these letters were a critical link in facilitating the shift 
towards a new understanding of risk, one that they would revisit many times over the 
course of their li ves as they moved towards constructing a new perception of risk. 
Chapter Summary 
Participants' experiences in the second phase of the genetic testing process, 
Deciphering the Meaning of Being At-Risk, are captured in two categories. The first 
category, taking the first steps of the genetic testing process, describes how at-risk 
individuals construct ideas about their risk as they are offered a predictive genetic test (by 
health providers) and are faced with the decision to have predictive genetic testing for 
ARYC, or not. Each offering of a predicti ve genetic test required participants to 
juxtapose the contextual dimensions (scientific knowledge and experiential knowledge) 
against the meaning of the test being offered at the time of testing (that is, haplotype 
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testing in 1990s or a definitive test in 2007), and interactions with health care providers. 
For most, being offered a genetic test was a relief; not only did it provide a rationale for 
what was going on in their families, but it also provided hope of a viable treatment option. 
Interactions with health care providers were considered to be informative, and did provide 
emotional support but, for some, also caused a sense of uneasiness, as they remained 
ambivalent as to their true risk. All participants spent considerable time trying to 
understand and assimilate their objective and subjective knowledge in relation to existing 
beliefs about risk. 
The decision to have genetic testing was considered a non-decision, an evolving 
decision, or some combination of these two. Participants' experiences with genetic 
testing as they made the decision to undergo it were influenced by the existing genetic 
test available, the numerous losses within the family, having physical signs of the disease, 
gender, relevancy of the test, sense of relational responsibility, and family support. As 
participants were offered a genetic test and made the decision to undergo testing, a 
common theme is that ideas and decisions based on one's understanding of risk are 
pragmatic, fluid, and transient. 
Category two, building one's risk portfolio, examines how at-risk individuals 
construct ideas about risk as they wait for and receive their genetic test result. The time 
frame from having a genetic test to receiving the results can be stressful , requiring the use 
of coping mechanisms. Coping mechanism employed by participants were avoidance, 
information gathering, surveillance, modification of lifestyle factors , and initiation of an 
at-risk event. Participants' responses upon receipt of the genetic test results were varied 
and related to the mode of receiving the test result. Although most ARVC negative 
245 
participants were relieved, some did experience survivor guilt. Meanwhile, some ARVC 
positive participants were not overly concerned about their risk status, being that they had 
no visible signs of the condition, were female, and did not fit the profile of the coronary 
candidate. For others, being positive was something expected given their existing 
experiential knowledge. It is only when their experiential knowledge was challenged or 
when a child was found to be positive that they experienced increased psychological 
distress. 
As individuals living in a family at risk for ARVC try to Decipher the Meaning of 
Being At-Risk, they juxtapose their scientific knowledge against their experiential 
knowledge and specific conditions. Figure 7.3 illustrates the interactions between these 
three factors. 
Figure 7.3. Rubik ' s Cube Model: Summary of the Conditions that Influence the 
Psychosocial Process of Deciphering the Meaning of Being At-Risk. Rubik's Cube ® 
used by permission of Seven Towns Limited, www.rubiks.com. 
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CHAPTERS 
EMBODYING A NEW MEANING OF BEING AT -RISK 
This chapter explores participants' experiences as they entered the final phase of 
the genetic testing process. The theoretical construct Embodying a New Meaning of 
Being At-Risk captures the experiences of participants as they began to adjust to the 
reality of living in a family at risk for ARYC and the news of their genetic test (see Figure 
8.1). The process of embodiment of risk unfolded as participants juxtaposed the three 
contextual dimensions (scientific knowledge, experiential knowledge, and phase of the 
genetic testing process), against the conditions that influenced the manner in which the 
risk was experienced, understood, and evolved. 
The three categories, (a) adjusting to living with or with out a genetic condition, 
(b) recognizing the reality of living in a family at risk for a genetic disease, and (c) 
looking towards the future, describe the variations in participants' experiences as they 
embody a new meaning of being at-risk. 
Category 1: Adjusting to Living with or without a Genetic Condition 
• Property I: Accepting and Assigning Meaning to Treatments Regimes 
• Property 2: Questioning the Accuracy of the Predictive Genetic Test 
Category 2: Recognizing the Reality of Living in a Family at Risk for a Genetic Disease 
• Property 1: Facing Everyday Worries and Challenges 
• Property 2: Coping with Barriers to Resources 
Category 3: Looking Towards the Future 
• Property 1: Trying to Maintain a Positive Outlook 
• Property 2: Living with Concern for At-risk Children 
Figure 8.1: Construct 3: Embodying a New Meaning of Being At-Risk. Emerging 
properties and categories that describe the third phase of the psychosocial process 
Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk, post-predictive genetic testing. 
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Category 1: Adjusting to Living with or without a Genetic Condition. 
This category captures the experience of beginning to adjust to the meaning of 
having a positive or negative test. For the younger participants, the time from blood 
collection to receiving the genetic test results was short; however, for the older 
participants, this was not the case. Many li ved for years, until 2007, with an inconclusive 
test or the knowledge that the genetic test for ARVC was not definitive. For the 
participants in this study, adjusting to living with the outcome of the genetic test required 
them to come to terms with prescribed treatment regimes. This was reportedly difficult, 
as many, regardless of the test result, still questioned its reliability. The two properties, 
(a) accepting and assigning meaning to treatment regimes and (b) questioning the 
accuracy of the predictive genetic test, describe this experience. Evident within these two 
properties are the conditions that participants continued to juxtapose against the two 
contextual dimensions (scientific knowledge and experiential knowledge) as they 
embodied and adjusted to a new meaning of risk. 
Property 1: Accepting and Assigning Meaning to Treatment Regimes. 
In light of the presence or absence of physical signs and symptoms of ARVC, the 
meaning assigned to having a positive or negative test significantly influenced the ease 
with which participants accepted prescribed treatment regimes. The confounding factor 
of participants' understanding of available treatments added to this. The two common 
treatments referred to in participants' narratives that caused the most discussion were 
pharmacological management and the lCD. For many, these interventions were 
welcomed; for others, this was not the case. It was only as participants recognized that in 
order to survive, they would need some type of medical intervention that they begin to 
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embody a new meaning of risk. For a number of participants, the process of embodiment 
was easy; yet, for others, it was something that would evolve as they continued to adjust 
to living in a family with a genetically linked condition. The property accepting and 
assigning meaning to treatment regimes captures participants' psychosocial and 
behavioural responses to being offered and li ving with treatments that are indicative of 
disease progression. The key conditions that influenced participants' experiences are as 
follows: ( 1) the genetic test result, (2) the presence or absence of physical symptoms of 
ARVC, and (3) the believed efficacy of available treatments (medications and ICD). 
Conditions 1 and 2: Genetic test result and physical symptoms. Participants 
frequently spoke of their genetic test result and the existence of physical signs and 
symptoms of ARYC as being significant conditions that shaped their perceptions of risk. 
These two factors influenced their decision to engage in prescribed treatment regimes or 
not. Figure 8.2 provides an overview of the relationship between having a positive or 
negative test, being symptomatic or asymptomatic, and the decision to have treatment or 
not. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates how, for some participants, having a positive genetic test 
with no physical symptoms of ARVC caused them to question the need for treatment and, 
in several cases, to initi all y refuse treatment. Those who had received a positive test and 
were symptomatic generally welcomed the news of some treatment. For the majority of 
participants the fact that they were ARVC positive was enough to warrant treatment, 
regardless of whether or not they had experienced any physical symptoms of ARVC. Of 
those who tested negative for ARVC, they either wanted to continue with some method of 
monitoring themselves or their children (because they questioned the accuracy of the test 
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results, something that will be discussed later) , or were happy having no further follow-up 
or treatments. 
ARVC Positive 
ARVC Negative 
Symptoms 
/ ........... 
no treatment treatment 
No Symptoms 
/ ........... 
no treatment treatment 
Symptoms 
/ ........... 
no treatment treatment 
No Symptoms 
/ ........... 
no treatment treatment 
Figure 8.2 Relationships between Predictive Genetic Test Results, Disease Symptoms, 
and Treatments. 
These responses can be explained by the fact that participants realized from an 
objective or clinical point of view that a positive test requires some medical intervention. 
However, thi s news was difficult to accept on an experiential or embodied level; being 
labeled as positive for ARVC did not immediately translate into a heightened sense of 
risk or anxiety, particularly for those who were asymptomatic, and therefore did not lead 
to the response that "being positive" could be relieved by some form of treatment. The 
same principles can be applied to those who are negative. That is, despite having a 
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negative test some participants still wanted to be monitored because it was not easy to 
ignore their experiential knowledge, and put trust in scientific knowledge. This may be 
because many participants had lived through the discovery of the causative gene for 
ARYC when the genetic test was not definitive and prescribed treatments were constantly 
changing. Other research has also shown that the meaning assigned to being at-risk may 
be more dependent upon subjective interpretations of risk and heuristics rather than 
objective estimates, and that subjective interpretations of what it means to be at-risk 
facilitate the ability to understand, cope, and make decisions about health in the context of 
everyday life (Cameron et al., 2009; Cox and McKellin, 1999; Sanders et al. , 2007; 
Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Lupton & Tulloch, 2002; Sheldlosky-Shoemaker et al. , 20 10; 
Sivell et al. , 2008; Weiner, 2009). 
These two conditions (physical symptoms and genetic test results) in turn shape 
beliefs in the efficacy of pharmacological and JCD treatments, as the following discussion 
illustrates. 
Condition 3: Believed efficacy of prescribed treatments: Pharmacological 
management. Participants' understanding and acceptance of the pharmacological 
management of ARYC was not something that took place in silo, but was understood in 
relation to the broader context of the state of avai lable genetic testing at the time, and in 
relation to the individual's experience of having, or not having, physical symptoms of 
ARVC. These conditions intersect and shape each other in an individual' s construction of 
risk and decisions about best treatment options. 
In the early 1990s, the pharmacological management of ARVC consisted of a 
combination of medications such as antiarrhythmics, cholesterol reducing agents, and 
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antihypertensive drugs. It was common practice to be prescribed medications, as the lCD 
was not yet available: "It was 1991 when we were all diagnosed with some kind of heart 
problem and we were put on medications." Medications were, at that time, and continue 
to be, individualized to a person 's physical symptoms, general health status and prior 
health history, and therapeutic response, as described by a spouse: 
This is the second lot of medications that [Husband] has been on now. They 
[doctors] put him on one type of drug first but then increased it to one and a half. 
Then he had another attack [cardiac event] and the doctor put him on another pill. 
So now he is taking two kinds of pills. 
Some participants who engaged in genetic testing in the early 1990s did not 
receive any treatment, despite undergoing clinical testing, as shown in the statement, "at 
the time [early 1990s] they were not doing defibrillators, and I wasn't taking any 
medication." This decision was based on the presence or absence of clinical signs of 
ARVC, or as in several cases, being assigned a low risk due to gender, as recalled in this 
narrative: "I remember the genetic counsellor said that maybe one woman had died from 
ARVC." For some, then, it was the onset of symptoms of the evolving disease that 
determined prescribed treatments, as this participant explained: 
Before I had an attack [cardiac event], I was not on medication. I had a 
defibrillator put in. It was an insurance policy the doctor told me. Since then, I 
have been taking Sotalol [antiarrhythmic drug]. I must say I have been pretty 
good after that. 
The majority of participants accepted the introduction of medications regardless of 
when they completed the testing. They wanted to prevent symptoms of ARVC and avoid 
the onset of factors known to exacerbate heart disease, such as high blood pressure and 
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high cholesterol. This acceptance was credited to several factors. First, being put on 
medications for ARYC was perceived as pragmatic and logical ; it supported existing 
beliefs and knowledge about the appropriate management of heart disease. Second, 
medication was considered to be acceptable because, despite altering lifestyle (e.g., diet), 
participants continued to have signs of ARYC, which they could not control. As was 
reported in previous research, participants started to align beliefs about ARVC and 
genetics with biomedical models of di sease causation. That is, as the meaning of their 
illness was increasingly understood to be caused and controlled by their genes, it was 
assumed that the disease would be responsive only to medical interventions (Marteau et 
al., 2004; Senior et al., 1999; Senior, Marteau & Weinman, 2005; van Maarle, 2003). 
Third, recognizing that ARVC can be fatal and occur without any warning warranted 
preventative treatment. These three factors are reflected in the narratives of two ARVC 
positive participants who, despite modifications in their lifestyle, continued to exhibit 
signs of ARVC, causing them to turn to prescribed medications: 
By the time I had my second appropriate shock [ICD.fi ring] the cardiologist hao 
talked about putting me on SotaJol [antiarrhythmic]. I said, 'No, I don't want to 
take Sotalo l right now', so I didn't. When the ICD fired again I knew it was 
coming. I knew I was going to be put on SotaJol. 
Once I settled down with medications I did not trigger it [ARVC] like I use to do 
before. 
Most participants who received pharmacological treatment for ARYC stated that 
taking medications did not significantl y impact their lives, "It [taking medications] does 
not affect me a Jot because I can still do everything that I done before." On the other 
hand, several participants spoke of the adverse side effects of medications as being an 
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issue. This was captured in a participant's account of taking Amiodarone 
[antiarrhythmic] and going out in the sun: 
I have been to the point that I was ready to toss them [medications] and not take 
any more. It gets to the point that you just get fed up with it. I told [Cardiologist] 
last time I was in to see him that I was going to stop, and he wants me to keep 
taking them until I get my heart catheterization done. Soon there has to be 
something done. I cannot do what I want to do the way that I am here now .... I 
don't know how to explain it but it is the simple things that affect you, such as 
being in the sun. I will go for a run on my skidoo but when I come back I have 
got a job to see anything. It is like someone put sand in my eyes. I can deal with 
the rest of it. I can deal with the attacks [cardiac events] but this is getting to me 
because it is continuous. 
There were two ARVC positive participants who experienced extreme difficulty 
accepting that they needed to take medications to manage ARVC because they did not 
have any physical signs of the disease: 
I am taking a whole Sotalol [antiarrhythmic] which I hate taking. I am taking 
Alsace [antihypertensive drug] which I don't need because my blood pressure is 
not up but it is suppose to have benefits for my cardiovascular system. I am 
taking Crestor [cholesterol reducing drug] but my cholesterol levels are always 
fine. Now I am taking drugs for what I have been all my life ... It changes the 
perception of who I am ... It's crazy ... If you had given me arsenic to take, it 
wouldn ' t have caused me so much stress and anxiety .. . Every time I take that 
blue pill [Sotalol] I can't believe that my heart needs this bloody drug .. . It 
[ARVC] is always there, and Sotalol is the constant reminder, twice a day . .. I am 
not even symptomatic and my doctor had put me on Sotalol [antiarrhythmic]. 
For these participants, it is the meaning assigned to the absence of physical 
symptoms of ARYC that holds the most significance and not the positive genetic test. 
This finding supports the work of Cox (2003) and d' Agincourt-Canning (2005) that 
indicates that it is the personal meaning that one assigns to these conditions (e.g., physical 
symptoms, treatments) that influences risk perception. The construction of the meaning 
of risk is, however, conflicted by discrepancies between lay and expert understandings of 
what it means to be at-risk and the attributing factors that increase risk (as in d' Agincourt 
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-Canning, 2005; Allmark & Tod, 2005; Slovic et al., 1979) and, in the case of ARVC, 
prescribed treatments . 
Although some individuals expressed feelings of dissatisfaction about having to 
take certain medications, they gradually resigned to the necessi ty of following their 
treatment regimes as captured in this comment: 
I have got this condition. There is nothing I can do about it, so I am resigned to 
the fact that I probably have to take this bloody Sotalol [antiarrhythmic] and 
maybe Amiodarone [antiarrhythmic]. I don ' t want to take Amiodarone at all. To 
me that's nastier than Sotalol. 
Another ARVC positive participant spoke of being treated for hypertension and 
hypercholesterolemia when he did not have either condition. In fact, he started to watch 
his dietary intake as if he had hypertension and hypercholesterolemia. This supports 
Nelkin 's ( 1992) description of the pre-symptomatic ill: individuals who are assigned the 
label of being ill start to take on the illness role over time without be ing physically ill. 
Condition 4: Believed efficacy of prescribed treatments: lCD management. 
Participants described their experiences as they were introduced to the ICD as a viable 
treatment option for ARVC, as they assigned meanings to the ICD, and as they gradually 
began to accept the ICD as something they needed in order to survive. 
For some, the initial reaction to being offered the ICD was one of anxiety, as the 
device represented an increasingly serious disease state that could not be managed solely 
with medications. Later, as they gained more experience and knowledge with lCD 
management, the lCD shifted from being something that symbolized an increase in risk 
state to a technology that prevented them from being at-risk. This shift is similar to that 
described in Lupton's ( 1999) work on the embodiment of pregnancy. She explains how 
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risk perceptions are constructed, shaped, reshaped, and regulated by technology and 
experts. In thi s study, participants' experiences were illuminated as they spoke of 
positives and negatives of having an ICD that resulted from the juxtaposition of 
experiential knowledge with scientific knowledge and the conditions (e.g., symptoms of 
disease) that influence risk perception. 
For most participants, having an ICD gave them a sense of solace and comfort in 
that it could prevent the loss of family members in the event of a cardiac episode. Having 
this lifesaving device helped participants cope with having ARVC and restored a sense of 
confidence in their bodies. The negative aspects of having the ICD were that it were 
caused psychological distress as they tried to anticipate, prevent, and understand when 
and why it fired, framed with regards to psychological distress throughout participants' 
narratives. This di stress was shown as they tried to accept that the ICD was something 
they needed to survive. They attempted to anticipate, prevent, and understand when and 
why it fired, as they struggled to anticipate, prevent, and understand when and why it 
fired as they, as they tried to cope with their body image, and as they worried about the 
impact of the ICD on spouses coping with the disease. 
Positive aspects of having an !CD. Regardless of when participants entered into 
the genetic testing process (clinical testing in 1980s; haplotype genetic testing in 1990s; 
and definitive testing in 2007), being offered the ICD decreased psychological distress 
and restored a sense of control in most participants. The ICD was described as being a 
"lifesaver," an "insurance policy," or a "necessity" that instilled a sense of "security" 
assuring them that they were "safe" in the event of a cardiac episode. Similar 
descriptions of the ICD are found in the literature (Bose, Hamilton, Flanagan, Caroll , & 
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Fridlund, 2005; Dickerson, 2002; Kamphius, Yerhoever, de Leeuw, Derksen, Hauer, & 
Winnubst, 2004; Kantor, Bullinger, & Gal, 2012; Morken , Severinsson, & Karlsen, 2009; 
Zeigler & Nelms, 2009). The meanings that participants assigned to their own risk status 
in relation to the ICD (that is, how they believed the ICD would affect their risk status) 
shaped the decision about whether to have one inserted. 
As participants reflected on their experiential knowledge (e.g., family loss, family 
history) and scientific knowledge about ARVC and genetics (e.g. , the sudden onset of 
symptoms), they accepted that they required some medical intervention if they wanted to 
survive. Most participants wanted the ICD implanted as soon as possible either for 
themselves or their children in order to manage and cope with their psychological and 
physical needs as explained by several participants: 
Just imagine if the children never had the ICD. They would not have any chance 
whatsoever [if experienced a cardiac event]. Now you know there is something 
there that will defibrillate them if needed. 
1 could not wait for the time to come for the children to get an JCD because I felt 
it would make me more at ease. 
J wanted to have it [ICD] because of the sudden death [in the family]. ... If there 
was a chance that the defibrillator was going to give me another shot at life I 
wanted it as soon as possible. 
It seems like the JCD has proven itself. 
It [ICD] is a safety net. 
Faith in the ICD' s capabilities was reinforced each time the lCD fired and saved a life. 
As found in the literature (Kantor et al. , 20 12), these episodes provided evidence for the 
participants that they had made the right decision to have the ICD inserted. 
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I woke up in the morning and when I was out in the bathroom I heard a bang. I 
knew my defibrillator had fired, and that my heart was racing. I did not pass out 
this time. I did pass out one other time. Then the lCD did give me a shock and 
brought me back to life. It was only eight months after I had it implanted. 
Adding to the sense of confidence in the ICD was the feeling that even if one were to 
engage in a " risky" behaviour such as physical exercise that evoked a cardiac event, the 
lCD would fire and shock one back into a normal heart rhythm, as this participant 
recalled: 
Another time the lCD fired was when I was helping my husband bring in some 
wood. 1 was feeling tired that day, and I'd been lying around and I was getting 
over a cold. I thought maybe if I go out and do something, go outdoors and get a 
bit of fresh air, I would feel better. I was only out there five minutes, bending 
over picking up one chunk of wood at a time and throwing it in the wheel barrel , 
and the defibrillator fired. 
This metaphor of the lCD as a " li fe saver" had a powerful impact on how 
individuals embodied their risk. This strong sense of faith in the technical capabilities of 
the lCD prompted some women who had received a positi ve haplotype test in late L990s 
to approach health care providers to have an lCD implanted as soon as possible, as this 
woman stated: 
I fought to get the defibrillator. If there was a chance that the defibrillator was 
going to give me another shot at life I wanted it. ... So, I fought to get the 
defibrill ator because I didn ' t really have any symptoms other than the inverted T 
waves. 
These women were shocked by the reluctance of the medical community to treat women 
with ARVC the same as their male counterparts and prescribe an lCD. One participant 
posited that it was only after the media released a story of a woman who wanted an ICD 
because of her extensive family history of sudden cardiac death that the medical 
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community was challenged to reassess the treatment of women from families with 
ARVC: 
I was put on Sotalol [antiarrhythmic], and [Cardiologist] said I was not a 
candidate for a defibrillator because I was a female. Five years later, 
[cardiologist] had a woman who went to the newspaper and insisted that she have 
a defibrillator put in because she had a strong family history of ARVC. The lady 
had the defibrillator implanted and a couple of weeks later it fired and saved her 
life .. . Then all of a sudden I got a call, 'You need a defibrillator.' So I asked the 
cardiologist, 'What changed for me?' After so many years corning here and you 
telling me, 'No you are fine, except for the premature ventricular contractions, but 
it is not putting you at-risk.' I was on Sotalol which made me miserable and all of 
a sudden I am a candidate for and defibrillator?' He said, 'We have changed our 
mind-set on how it affects females.' So I had the lCD put in and gave up the 
Sotalol? 
As in the previous two phases of the genetic testing process (Awakening to a New 
Meaning of Being At-Risk and Deciphering the Meaning of Being At-Risk), the above 
example illustrates how individuals' beliefs about the conditions that infl uence risk shape 
the trajectory of scientific knowledge. 
Negative aspects of lCD. Despite the many positives associated with living with 
an lCD, for some, having the device was not a pleasant experience. Living with an ICD 
has been noted in the literature as causing varying levels of psychological distress, 
including distress related to its management, which negatively impacts at-risk 
individuals' quality of life and that of their spouses (Bosle et al. , 2005; Friedmann et al. , 
2006). Issues related to the management of the lCD that caused the most concern were: 
(a) accepting that the ICD was needed and anticipating its firing, (b) understanding why 
the device had fired, (c) trying to prevent it from firing, (c) body image, and (d) impact on 
spouses. 
31 This is yet a nother example of the gendering o f science and clinical care. See footnote 25. 
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Accepting the lCD and anticipating f irst shock. For many participants it was the 
realization that they needed the ICD to manage ARVC, coupled with the fear of it firing, 
which caused the most distress. Some felt that having the ICD took away their once 
"carefree" attitude and replaced it with a constant state of anxiety, as one participant 
described: 
I had a cardia-version in the shower, so now every time I take my shower; it' s 
pretty much a dribble. I don ' t want to have water going full force because I want 
to be able to get away from the water [if the ICD fires]. 
For some, who had engaged in clinical investigations in the early 1980s and genetic 
testing in the 1990s, being offered a defibrillator meant they that could no longer be 
managed with medications because they were getting sicker: 
It [firing of the lCD] has changed the way I see my future because I think I am 
going to die young. I don' t think that I am going to li ve to be in the 70s ... 
probably ten-years from now I will be gone, anything more than that is a bonus. 
Regardless of the time that pmt icipants received an ICD they all shared a sense of 
dread in anticipation of the first lCD shock, and this caused significant distress. Both the 
children and the adults felt this sense of dread: 
I [parent] have often heard the children say they were afraid that the defibri llator 
would cut in . 
When I [ARVC positive adul t] first had my ICD put in I went home and I was 
fine. After I got home I got nervous. I got nervous about having the ICD. 
I [ARVC positi ve child] was frightened to death [to get a shock] at first! 
For the nine participants whose lCD did fire, the first incident was the most memorable. 
It left them with feelings of anxiety, and made them fear the possible outcomes of 
subsequent shocks, when a shock would occur, and what it would be like: 
I was sitting in a hotel room by myself [when he had the first shock]; there was 
nobody else there .. . So, if I never had the ICD the chances probably are that I 
would not have made it because I was alone [when cardiac event happened]. 
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Nobody real izes what you go through when you have these shocks ... I was scared 
to death. 
That's what scares me: having another shock. 
For one person, the anticipation of having a shock caused panic attacks: " I started to have 
panic attacks, at least one a night there for awhile." Similar feelings of anxiety prior to 
and post-shock have been documented in the lCD literature (Kamphius et al., 2004; 
Zeigler & Nelms, 2009). Two studies have reported that this post-shock anxiety was so 
severe that several participants considered removing it (Dickerson, 2002; Morken et al., 
2009). 
Gradually, as found in other studies, the apprehension associated with the ICD 
firing subsides, as participants become accustomed to its firing and recognize that thjs is 
to be expected (see also Bolse et al., 2005 ; Kamphius et al. , 2004; Wheeler, Pretzer-
Aboff, Hardie, DiSabatino, Saylor, & Lucey, 2009). For the participants in this study, 
having a defibrillator meant there was a high probability it would fire in response to a 
cardiac event. Many had the same opinion reported by participants in the study by Agard, 
Lofmark, Edvardsson and Ekman (2007); the lCD is an insurance policy and having a 
shock is just part of this policy. Living with an ICD eventually becomes "normalized" (as 
in Bourdieu, 1977), as described in thi s comment: 
To me, after 1 had the first shock all the rest of them did not seem to be so bad, 
you do not find they hurt as much. It is probably because you are use to it after it 
happens. The last one was when I was sailing on the deck of the boat and I knelt 
down by a fellow. He told me all he heard was a grunt, and when he looked 
around I was down on my knees. He asked me, 'What happened?' I replied, 'The 
defibrillator just went off,' and I just got up and went on with my work. 
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From thi s discussion it is evident that individuals' understanding of technology 
plays a vital role in shaping ideas about risk and one's ability to cope with that risk. It 
solidifies the fact that an abnormal gene mutation (such as ARYC) can be conceived as 
something normal and the condition can be treated like other normal conditions (other 
heart conditions requiring an lCD). 
Understanding why lCD fired. Over time, as participants adjust to Jiving with a 
defibrillator and consciously make efforts to offset the negative connotations associated 
with the firing of the lCD, they begin to compile a kind of etiology of firing, with 
different styles of firings of the ICD being associated with different meanings of risk. For 
some the firing of the lCD more than twice warranted treatment: "If the ICD fires twice 
in a row you have to go to the doctor and get checked out, to see if there is anything 
wrong with it." For others the events surrounding the firing of the ICD were significant: 
"If you are not passed out it is probably a problem with the machine; whereas if you are 
passed out and it happens twice, it is probably something with your heart." Participants 
reported that as they became more familiar with the workings of the ICD, they soon 
started to assign their own meanings to the shock, the number of shocks requiring medical 
attention, and their risk. 
The first shock we used to panic and go right on to town. Then it kind of 
mellowed . .. Now it's, we' ll call the cardiologist in the morning and whenever he 
can get us in. So we've kind of eased off. 
Revised interpretations of the ICD shocks come after many trips to the hospital post-ICD 
firing, which resulted in no medical intervention. Participants soon realize that the lCD 
fires because it is doing what it is designed to do; it fires to prevent an arrhythmia. In this 
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way, the experience of living with the constant threat of having the ICD fire at any time 
becomes normalized as part of everyday life. Despite this gradual normalization of the 
experience of living with an ICD, several spouses of individuals with ICDs expressed 
concern about the reliability of the lCD, saying, for example, "you still wonder if the ICD 
is going to work all the time." 
Preventing !CD from firing. Participant narratives emphasized the time and 
energy that goes into preventing firings of the lCD. Those who had an lCD seek to 
understand the function of the lCD and significance of each shock: was it inappropriate 
(the result of device malfunction), or was it appropriate (that is, fi red in response to a 
cardiac event) and, if an appropriate firing, what were the precipitating factors? The rate 
of perceived success in managing the disease is measured by the effectiveness at 
identifying the modifiable factor(s) that triggered the lCD to fire and one's ability to 
abstain from the "risky" activity. The need to engage in self-surveillance and in the self-
regulation of li festyle factors to prevent the ICD from firi ng is emotionally draining. It 
requires those with an ICD to resume their role as the lay epidemiologist (described in 
relation to Phase One: Awakening to a New Meaning of Being At-Risk), and to make a 
decision as to whether there is a correlation between the lCD firing and their behaviour. 
Preventing the lCD from firing also has the effect of increasing anxiety about 
one's escalating risk and sense of mortality (a point also made by Palacios-Cena et a!. , 
2011). For some participants, despite modifying the factors identified as "risky," the lCD 
continues to fire, which is very discouraging, as noted in this narrative: 
Since I've had these appropriate [lCD firings], all I do is spend my time 
monitoring my heartbeat, and it 's driving me crazy .. . You get negative 
reinforcement every time you get shocked. 
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Despite attempts to alter behaviours based on evidence gained from previous events, 
repeated firings of the lCD can trigger what has been described in other Eterature as a 
fatalistic attitude (Davison et al. , 1989, 1991 , 1992; Marteau & Lerman, 2001 ; Senior et 
al., 1999, 2000) Participants come to believe that it is futile to try and maintain a healthy 
lifestyle because no matter what is done, the ICD will still fire. Even though the 
participants in this study did get frustrated with the continuous firing of the lCD, they did 
not forego a healthy lifestyle. However, several participants noted that it would have 
been helpful to have some sort of formalized psychological support to help them adjust to 
the lCD firing: "What I think lacks, once you become symptomatic with this like me, is 
counselling." 
Mod~fiable factors . For participants, successful identification of the factors that 
had caused the lCD to discharge was a relief, particularly when the precipitating factor 
was something that could be easily modi fied (for example, by altering sleep, diet, or 
medications). The finding that having a sense of control over the conditions that 
influence risk fac ilitates coping has been similarly reported in other studies (Hallas, 
Burke, White & Connelly, 2010; Howell et al. , 2006; McAllister, Davies, et al. , 2007; 
Senior et al. , 2005; Sobel & Cowan, 2003; Yodermaier et al. , 2010). On the downside, 
knowing that there are factors that could be controlled also led some participants to 
experience an enormous amount of distress, as they spent a lot of time and effort 
monitoring themselves or others for modifiable factors that might cause the ICD to 
discharge. Similar to Kavanagh and Broom' s (1998) findings in women with cervical 
cancer, it is the continuous surveillance required in the ongoing management of ARVC 
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that contributes to participants' anxiety. The examinations of the factors thought to have 
triggered the ICD to fire are compared in order to create some frame of reference as to 
which activities to avoid, as captured in this participant's narrative: 
The first time I triggered the ICD I was running with my dog. If I had not been 
running with my dog, it would never have happened. 1 know exercise can trigger 
the ICD to go off. The second time I set the ICD off was five months later. I 
triggered it through fatigue, and I think fatigue is well documented in the literature 
as causing heart problems. ARVC and fatigue, like a lot of heart conditions, are 
linked. I could have prevented the first shock; and if I had been more careful with 
sleep, I wouldn't have had the second one. 
Similar accounts of the psychological stress that participants endured as they tried to 
predict when the ICD would fire have been reported in cardiovascular literature 
(Dickerson, 2002; Hallas et al., 2010; Morken et al. , 2009; White, 2002). As explained in 
other research, a large pa1t of the ICD related distress could be explained by participants' 
resistance to relinquish control over their lives to the ICD (Dickerson, 2002, Flemme, 
Hallberg, Johansson, & Stromberg, 20 II). That is, they could not understand how their 
health could be so dependent on a machine and so resistant to modifiable lifestyle factors. 
Hence, the experience of being at-risk for ARVC is markedly different from other typical 
cardiac diseases given its resistance to modifiable factors. 
!CD function. A big part of being able to determine an appropriate or 
inappropriate shock and adjust to the ICD was having a good understanding of how the 
lCD functions and an ability to troubleshoot technical problems. Participants spoke with 
ease about the day-to-day functioning of the ICD; they reported having a good 
understanding of the functioning of the ICD, as explained to them by health care 
providers. This inc luded an understanding of when the ICD should appropriately 
discharge, and within which heart-rate parameters. Having a good knowledge of how the 
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ICD functions has been associated with better acceptance of the ICD (Wilson, Engelke, 
Sears, Swanson & Neil, 20 12). 
Your electrical system misfires and you go into ventricular fibrillation and the 
ICD will pick up on this and it will fire and knock you back into a normal heart 
rhythm ... If your heart rate goes up past the setting, like 188 and stays there for so 
many seconds, the ICD is going to defibrillate you whether you are in ventricular 
fibrillation or not. 
Participants al so had a good understanding that technical difficulties with the lCD, such 
as displacement of wires or reprogramming, could cause an inappropriate shock, which is 
nicely summarized in this statement: 
[Child] had his defibrillator put in September 1. On the II thor l51h of September, 
he came out of school [high school] one day and hi s machine went off. So when 
he went to get checked out the doctor noticed that it was not his heart this time; it 
was a wire that had to be moved one centimeter in the heart. So he had to go back 
and get the wire moved. 
Body image. Living with an ICD can be challenging in other ways. Several 
participants described difficulty with adjusting to the weight of the lCD, being nervous 
about having it in their body, having a sense of discomfort (see also Dickerson, 2002), 
and feeling weak and having problems sleeping (also reported by Boise et al. , 2005). 
Participants reported that over time, they came to realize that the ICD did not interfere 
with activities of daily living. One participant, however, argued that the ICD affected his 
body image in such a negati ve manner that he took action to have it removed. The 
following narrative captures this experience: 
After I had the lCD in for six or seven months, I did not want it. I went through a 
lot to get the lCD taken out. I had meetings wi th anyone you could imagine; 
psychiatrists, nurses, genetic counsellors, doctors and members of the medical 
board. 1 had to go through all those steps j ust to prove I knew what I was doing 
and that I was actually sane. Where 1 am a small person it would grind against my 
ribs. Not only that, it was visible, about half an inch outside my body. Everyone 
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kept on saying, 'don't worry about it. .. nobody cares.' But people do care, and 
people will stare, and I didn't like it myself. So I did not want to have no part of 
it. .. Being a gay male, your visual appearance is very important. I could not go 
anywhere without any confidence . .. I would be constantly thinking are people 
looking at it? Are they staring at me? It was constantly on my mind. So my only 
option was to take it out, and if I died that was it. .. It was what I needed for me. 
An alteration in one's body image, due to visibility of the lCD and incision 
scarring, is a factor identified in some literature that has caused lCD recipients 
psychological distress (Hallas et al., 2009; Sowell, Kohl, Sears, Klodell, & Conti, 2006). 
Alterations in body image impacting one's social relationships were also reported in 
individuals living withFAP, a genetically linked CRC wherein polyps develop in the 
intestine that require surgical intervention (Mireskandari et al. , 2009). 
Although the above participant experienced a tremendous amount of anxiety 
related to a disruption in hi s body image, he eventually reassigned his personal meaning 
to being at-risk post-cardiac arrest that rendered him critically ill for some time. 
Following this he had the ICD reinserted. Adjusting to the ICD for this participant was 
an ongoing process where he slowly learned to accept that he needed the ICD to li ve: "I 
have got no choice but to deal with it [having ICD] ... I'd rather not have it, but I have to 
stay alive, so I got to deal with it." A significant part of his adj usting focused on trying to 
embody the lCD by incorporating it into his own body image: 
The new lCD does not bother me as much, where it is less visible. I put on 
makeup to cover up the scars, so it makes it a bit easier. It's not too bad but if I 
touch it I can feel it .. . I can actually cover it up a lot easier now. I put my arm in 
a certain position. 
This participant's experience is very unique as it is the only documented case that 
illustrates an individual with ARVC having the lCD removed due to psychological 
distress because of an altered body image. On one hand, it represents resistance to 
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technology; however on the other, the reinsertion of the ICD following a cardiac episode 
reinforces beliefs about its efficacy and "life saving" capabilities. 
Impact on Spouse. A systematic review by Van Den Broek, Habibovic, and 
Pederson (20 10) examined the literature on the emotional distress of partners of 
individuals with an ICD. That review found that spouses experience a substantial amount 
of psychological distress linked to ICD management. This study supports the finding of 
this review. The psychological distress experienced by spouses is reflected in the 
following narrative of a spouse as she described what happened when her husband 
received a shock that rendered him unconscious and resulted in injury: 
[Husband] came up to wash hands and take his pills, and I heard nothing before I 
heard that bang. I saw [husband] down by the steel corner [of the sink] and the 
blood pouring was pouring out of his head. All you could see was the white parts 
of his eyes. I said, 'Oh my God! [Husband] is dead ! 
It is incidents such as this that remind us that the health of family members impacts the 
entire family unit, not just the affected individual. 
Property 2: Questioning the Accuracy of the Predictive Genetic Test. The 
history of the ARVC gene (see Figure 1.3) depicts the discovery of a definitive test 
specific for the ARVC gene in 2007. A definitive test is one that can determine with a 
high degree of certainty that one has the gene or not. Regardless of when participants 
received a particular genetic test result they all questioned its accuracy. The two 
conditions that account for the variations in participant experiences as they question the 
accuracy of their predictive genetic test are: (l) the news of a more definitive test and (2) 
discrepancies in ARVC management. 
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Condition 1: News of a more definitive test. Participants entered into 
investigations for what became known as ARVC at three critical points; (a) in the 1980s, 
when a diagnosis of heart disease was based on clinical investigations only; (b) in the 
1990s, when haplotype genetic testing was offered but not a definitive test; and (c) in 
2007, when a definitive genetic test for ARVC became available. Evident in participants' 
narratives, regardless of when they entered the genetic testing process, is that risk 
perception changes constantly and is contingent upon the meanings assigned to the three 
contextual dimensions (scientific knowledge, experiential knowledge, and phase of the 
genetic testing process) and the conditions at any particular point in the genetic testing 
process. With each step towards gene discovery, participants were presented with a more 
definitive genetic test. Each offering of another test caused participants to compare their 
objective risk with their subjective ideas and experiences about what it means to be at-
risk. Added to this was the fact that many participants had received their genetic test 
results using haplotype analysis and thought that this was the most conclusive test 
available. 
It was difficult for some participants upon finally receiving a negative test result 
to di sregard segments of their experiential knowledge that conflicted with their assigned 
objective risk: "I guess you' ve lived with it so long you still think maybe you are 
positive." As was the case in the previous two phases of the genetic testing process, 
participants in this post-testing phase used their family stories to create personal theories 
about inheritance and to assign meaning to being at-risk: 
I find it very hard to sleep. I am always wondering, 'Can this be true [I am ARVC 
negative]. Will my sons be alright?' The worry is always there. I don ' t think it is 
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ever going to go away. Since my teens it [the worry] has been there, and now that 
I am at this age, I don't think it is every going to go away. It is still there. 
It [death] is so ingrained in this family that I don 't ever think it's ever going to go 
away, the worry part of it. 
This strong reliance on one's experiential knowledge explains why ARVC negative 
individuals still experienced psychological distress, and reflects what has been described 
in the literature on HD (Codori & Brandt, 1994; Decruyenaere et al., 1999, 2003; 
Gargiulo et al., 2009) and BRCA 1/2 (van Oostrom et al., 2003). This co-existence of 
competing beliefs about being at-risk ("I'm at risk"; ''I'm not at risk"), manifests as a 
sense of disconnect between the embodied sense of being at-risk and the rational or 
objective knowledge of not being at-risk, as the following two narratives illustrate: 
I have had to leave my classroom and run next door to the next classroom. It just 
overcomes me and it still does . . . I got to say, ' Hold on here ! Hold it. It' s not 
real ' . But old habits die hard. 
Panic attacks have happened to me four or five times since the genetic counsellor 
gave me the news [ARVC negative], especially when I talk to my [relative] who 
has a defibrillator. 
In order to cope with this anxiety, participants used knowledge of thei"r objective risk to 
put things into perspective. As noted in the following narrative of one ARVC negative 
person maintaining, this balance was not easy: 
When I talk to [other relatives] that have this condition, I feel the panic welling in 
me. I feel the knot in my stomach. I can feel myself getti ng hot, my heart racing, 
and then I got to stop myself, 'Stop it! This is not you! You do not have this'. 
Those with a negative test also questioned the accuracy of the test. After having 
been so many years without a diagnosis, some could not help but think that researchers 
may have missed something. In fact, many participants still spoke of doubt as to the 
accuracy of the genetic test: 
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There is still a nagging, because you think that maybe the gene is del ayed [that is, 
the individual is in fact positive for the mutation but this has not yet been 
detected] . 
Even now I still got doubt in my mind. Even with what they have discovered ... I 
am still going to carry on worrying over it, over my son and daughter. 
For the one participant who had gone from being 50% at-risk in 1998 to being negative in 
2006, adjusting to this news was difficult. Living with a 50% risk for so many years, he 
found it difficult to embody this new ri sk status, as described in the following narrative: 
They couldn 't decipher my genes, they couldn 't tell me. So I stood for the longest 
time at a 50/50 chance ... And those ten-years were horrid . . . When they told me 
back in 2006 that they had unraveled my genes, that I was low risk . .. and that 
they may follow-up with me every two or three years. I came home and I think I 
cried for three days; finally, I knew one way or the other whether I was high risk 
or low risk. I was ten-years not knowing, so that was like freedom for me. That 
was just marvelous; to know that I had gone from 50150 down to 5%; but, still , it 
was there. It was still there, but I was starting to believe what my husband kept 
telling me: "Somebody has to be like your father. [Participant's siblings] were 
like your mother, but somebody has to have your father's genes." He was trying 
to ease me and get me through these panic attacks and the misery. So I started 
believing that then. I am like Dad and I don' t have this gene, and I don't have any 
symptoms; but then I thought a lot of times women's symptoms don't really show. 
Every now and then it would surface and I'd still have the panic attacks, but not 
nearly like I did. 
The participants' comments in this property remind us that objective risk is not the 
most significant indicator of one's risk perception. As noted in some other research, it is 
how one assimilates knowledge of the genetic test result into one's existing realties, 
beliefs about genetics, and the relevancy of conditions (e.g., physical symptoms) that 
influence risk perception which are of upmost importance (Cox & McKell in, 1999; 
Parsons & Atkinson, 1992; Shiloh et al. , 2006; Richards, 1992; Ozanne et al. , 2010) . 
Condition 2: Discrepancies in ARVC management. Many participants, in the 
period following the receipt of their genetic test result, were concerned that there 
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appeared to be discrepancies, not only in the accuracy of the test result, but also in their 
medical management and follow-up. Participants had difficulty understanding why some 
ARVC negative relatives had follow-up appointments with the cardiologist, whereas 
others did not: "Why do I have to go back and see [cardiologist] again if I am okay 
[negative] ?" It seemed that being negative had different connotations for different 
people. For some, being negative meant they did not require any follow-up; for others, 
haplotype analysis was viewed as not being absolute and being negative still meant there 
was a five percent chance that they might still have the gene, requiring fo llow-up care. 
So, when the cardiologist told them, "You do not have to come back anymore," it was 
very confusing. They could not understand how the cardiologist could make such a 
statement when they only had haplotype testing, which was not considered to be "fool-
proof." They thought statements such as this should be reserved for those who had had 
genetic testing with a more definitive test. Incidences such as these reinforced how 
difficult it was to embody a new meaning of risk when communication was not clear. 
This sense of ambivalence is noted in the following narratives of those who were 
considered ARVC negative: 
Until Jesus Christ himself comes down and says, "No you have not got it 
[ARVC]" I am not totally convinced that it is not going to happen. I mean there is 
nothing 100% proof. 
I am more at ease than I was, but I am not 100% sure if there is not anything 
wrong. 
I wanted them to say 100%, because even with that little bit of percentage, you are 
still wondering if you have it. 
I try to relax with the negative a low risk verdict, but I do have my anxious 
moments with it. 
Category 2: Recognizing the Reality of Living in a Family at Risk for a Genetic 
Disease 
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This category describes how individuals li ving in these at-risk famjJies continue to 
live with the practical challenges of everyday life post-genetic testing, including 
restrictions on their life. It explores the variations in participant responses as they come 
to recognize and accept li ving in a farruly at risk for ARVC. A large part of dealing with 
what one participant described as the "constant cloud of being at-risk" is developing 
effective coping skills and having a good support network. The following three 
properties: (a) facing everyday worries and challenges, (b) coping with barriers to 
resources, and (c) drawing on formal and informal supports capture this experience. 
Property 1: Facing everyday worries and challenges. This property illustrates 
participants ' everyday worries and challenges related to living in a fami ly at risk for 
ARVC. The two conditions that describe participants' varied experiences in this property 
are: (1) living with the restrictions on daily activities (e.g., driving), and (2) being a 
spouse of an at-risk person. 
Condition 1: Living with the restrictions imposed on oneself and others. 
Participants spoke of numerous worries in their everyday li ves as they cope with 
the restrictions imposed upon them by themselves or by others. Despite knowing their 
genetic test result, many still continued to experience psychological distress and feelings 
of losing control over their lives and bodies, as they adjusted to living with ARVC and 
the restrictions of lifestyle. Their narratives expose the fact that technology does not 
always promote autonomy or empowerment but that it can be restrictive; treatments such 
as the lCD are not always perceived as desirable treatments that one would opt for, but 
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are used only because experts have imposed them, presenting them as the only option (as 
in Lupton, 1995). The restrictions that caused the most distress were related to 
modifiable lifestyle factors, including physical acti vity, sleep, diet, driving, education, 
employment opportunities, and social interactions. 
Modifiable lifestyle factors. While participants reported placing restrictions on 
many modifiable lifestyle factors (specifically, physical activity, sleep, and diet), it was 
decisions about whether and how to restrict physical acti vity that caused the most anxiety. 
Restrictions on physical activity were self-imposed, usually on the advice of a health care 
provider. Over time, however, the decision was made to reintroduce physical activity in 
moderation. 
For those who had restricted physical activity in the pre-test "awakening period" 
(described in construct one under the property, the struggle to understand the meaning of 
being at-risk for oneself and others), restricting physical activity to avoid f iring of the 
lCD made sense.32 For one thing, most participants had either personall y experienced, or 
heard stories of a relative who had experienced, a cardiac event that caused the lCD to 
fire which was precipitated by physical activity. Second, health care providers had 
advised participants of the strong correlation between physical activity and the triggering 
of a cardiac event. In keeping with the available scientific knowledge (upon the advice of 
health care providers), and experiential knowledge (witnessing or experiencing a cardiac 
episode while exercising), many elected to forego physical activi ty. This decision is 
32 Restricting physical acti vity out of fear of causing the ICD to discharge has been noted in the literature to 
result in fee lings of a poor quality of life (van Ittersum et a l. , 2003) . 
made by the at-risk person and reinforced by others (such as a health care provider, a 
parent, or a teacher). The following narratives captured this experience. 
The cardiologist told [Son] he is not allowed to do the fitness test that they are 
doing in school anymore. The gym teacher will not let [Son] do the test either. 
I could not go to the gym or do stuff outside in the summer time. I couldn't do 
any of it anymore, in my mind. 
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My other daughter who had an lCD is a jock, or was a jock. She was training for 
a marathon and was a scuba diver. All of her sports activity and her lifestyle have 
changed because of this condition. She was exercising and got her pulse rate up to 
208. The defibrillator went off, knocking her back on her butt. Next thing, she 
was in the ambulance and at the hospital. She was fine but she scared everyone 
else half to death. She has given up the marathon idea. When she is scuba diving 
she cannot go below 50 feet, and she will not exercise without a pulse meter on. 
For most, restrictions on physical activity resolved over time. As participants became 
more accustomed to living with an lCD, became increasingly familiar with its role in 
disease management, and gained trust in its capability to respond to a cardiac event, they 
cautiously began to introduce light to moderate physical activity back into their routines. 
For many of the ARVC positive adult participants, the re-introduction of physical 
activity represented what Morken et al. (2009) referred to as "regaining control" over 
their lives. In this case, reintroducing physical activity is part of adapting to living with 
the lCD, having faith in its capabilities, and incorporating the uncertainty as to when the 
lCD will fire next into the new norm. 
I can sti II be active, go out, socialize; dancing and pretty well do everything that a 
normal person can do. I go to the gym once a week. I walk about two to three 
miles a day. 
It [lCD] never stopped me from doing whatever I wanted to do. If I wanted to go 
swimming, if I wanted to go skydiving, I was going to go. 
276 
Two individuals who had had a negative genetic test described an immediate 
overwhelming sense of relief and, not surprisingly, resumed physical activities more 
quickly than those who were ARVC positive. Having a negative result reinstated a sense 
of confidence in one's body as this participant explained, saying, "I am not afraid now. I 
don ' t hesitate to do something for fear of triggering something and when my heart rate 
goes up I say that ' s good. I'm burning calories." The second of these two participants 
who had tested negative, however, was not as confident and did take a bit longer to adjust 
to the fact that he did not have ARVC and that engaging in physical activity would not 
evoke a cardiac event: 
I played basketball a couple of weeks ago. I played volleyball against the high 
school students twice last week. This was the first time in a long time. I am not 
back there, but I am more confident that I do not have this disease. 
This study found that regardless of participants' carrier status they modified their 
behaviours in keeping with their existing scientific and experiential knowledge at any 
particular time. That is, on the issue of physical exercise, participants deferred to clinical 
knowledge; their experiential knowledge was completely shaped by science and was not 
reshaped by other conditions. For example, when physical activity was considered a 
"risky" behaviour based on their beliefs or upon recommendation of their health care 
provider, they restricted it. Upon receipt of their genetic test result and prescribed 
treatment (medications or ICD), and being told by health care providers that they could 
engage in some level of physical activity, they resumed it. 
Driving. Participants reported that living with restrictions imposed by others, 
such as the removal of one's driver's license, made them feel as if they were being 
punished for something that is out of their control: "It ' s a classic example of negative 
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reinforcement. . . every time you get shocked, and then you get punished when they take 
your driver's license away." For some, not having a driver' s license made them feel 
socially isolated, as they were no longer able to be independent in getting to work, or to 
do the practical activities of running a household, such as picking up groceries. 
Participants understood the rationale behind having their license revoked; what 
was annoying was the lack of consistent protocols surrounding the criteria for removal, as 
this participant explained: 
What I don ' t understand is they will take it from you for six months and you could 
be fine for that entire time but as soon as they give it back to you, two weeks later 
you could have an attack. Now, I am glad [Husband] gets hi license back but it is 
still a danger. 
Knowing that having this disease puts others at-risk, participants imposed dri ving 
restrictions on themselves. It was common practice to drive only when absolutely 
necessary, or to drive slowly and with extreme caution. The following commentary 
summarizes the stress linked to having one's dri vers license removed, getting it back, and 
driving: 
l'd lost my license for eleven months because of those two shocks [firing ofiCD] 
in a row-1 had my license back fo r nine days before I even drove. I wasn ' t afraid 
to drive, but I think you lose your confidence in your own body. You don 't know 
what's going to happen. Even now, since I had another shock in October-and 
I'm still driving because motor regi tration hasn' t asked for them yet-I was only 
driving back and forth to school and keeping on the inside lane, going slow and 
always cautious if I see a pedestrian, and making sure where can I pull off-you 
know, just crazy stuff. 
These findings support other research indicating that individuals with an lCD who have 
had restrictions placed on their driver's license experience feelings of resentment, anger, 
loss of independence, worry that sudden incapacitation while dri ving may pose risk to 
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themselves or others, and in some cases, frustration with not being able to get daily taken-
for-granted chores completed, such as grocery shopping (Shea, 2004 ). 
Social restrictions. Participants' social lives had also been restricted to varying 
degrees. For some, social isolation has become a key issue of concern. One spouse 
spoke about the loss of her husband 's friends once they became aware of his risk for 
ARVC and that he had a defibrillator which actively fires: "A few of his friends don ' t like 
being around him anymore." In contrast, for others this social isolation was self-imposed 
out of fear of the ICD firing: "I was afraid to go out in public. I didn't want to go on the 
bus; I didn ' t want to go to school ; 1 didn ' t want to go to work because I was afraid it was 
going to happen." Similar feelings of social isolation are reported in the lCD literature 
(Dickerson, 2002). The impact of this self-imposed isolation was described by one 
participant as follows: 
There is no spontaneity in my life anymore. I am always worried and 
concerned .... I find it embarrassing for people to know that I have had an incident 
[lCD firing]. I have gone into avoidance .... I spent most of Jul y this year sleeping, 
I would sleep nine, and ten hours a night, and then I would spend the afternoons in 
bed. So I did not do anything. I did not do any gardening or mow the lawn. I 
took my dog for about six walks around the block. I walked once on the beach, 
that was it. The dog has not had a walk since October. All last winter I was afraid 
to take her out. We got a bit of land around our house, and I wouldn't even go out 
in the yard and play with her. 
For the above participant, this self-imposed isolation was in a response to a "Joss 
of confidence in hi s body" and the fear of "being embarrassed" that the lCD would fire 
causing a "scandal. " Comparable accounts of anxiety, depression and avoidance have 
been noted in the lCD literature (Bilge et al. , 2006; Boise et al. , 2005; Bostwick & So la, 
20 11 ; Friedmann et al. , 2006; Hallas et al. , 2009; Lemon, Edelman, & Kirkness, 2004 ; 
Newall, Lever, Prasad, Hornabrook, & Larsen, 2006; Wheeler et al. , 2009) 
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Employment and education opportunities. Participants described accounts of 
psychosocial distress related to the restrictions that having an ICD imposes on 
employment and educational opportunities, as reported by Probst et al., (20 11) and Shea 
(2004). Acquiring gainful employment and having the education to secure employment 
was critical to those for whom it was important to be able to provide financially for the 
family. This concern was obvious in the case of an ARVC positive fisherman who fished 
alone and had to hire another laborer to handle the boat in case the ICD fired and he was 
rendered unconscious. Adding to the stress was that this position was difficult to fill as 
potential candidates were reluctant to take the job knowing that they would be expected to 
respond to a cardiac event: "I got a guy fi shing with me and he is frightened to death all 
the time. That is one change I guess. I had always worked alone. I had to get a guy to go 
fishing with me." IndividuaJs living with chronic heart disease have also voiced similar 
life challenges with employment related to social interactions (Martensson, Karlsson, & 
Frilund, 1998; Nordgren, Asp, & Fagerberg, 2007). 
A Jack of opportunities to enter into a field of interest was noted by one 
participant who felt he would not pass a required medical examination: ''I'd like to be a 
personal trainer but you have got to be able to teach other people to be fit and how can 
you when you are not healthy yourself?" This restriction was self-imposed and supports 
the findings of Rose (2007) who noted that it is the meanings that one assigns to being at 
risk for a genetic condition that influences one's beliefs about how they should conduct 
one's life and, as in this case, place restrictions upon oneself. 
Condition 2: Being a spouse. Living in a family at-risk was also challenging for 
the spouses. The spouses frequently talked about be ing worried over the health of their 
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partners, as described in the cardiovascular literature (e.g., Martensson et al., 1998). They 
reported finding it difficult watching a family member endure the constant firing of the 
ICD unaware of the outcome (see also Hazelton, Sears, Kirian, Matchett & Shea, 2009). 
Some expressed fear that the ICD might not save their spouse every time; however, at the 
same time, knowing that one's spouse had the ICD (in keeping with perceptions of the 
lCD as "life-saving"), gave them some relief as this participant stated: "Since she got an 
lCD, as a husband I feel more relief." Participants noted that it was common practice to 
constantly observe their spouse for any signs of the disease. This constant observation on 
behalf of the spouses was a common topic of discussion in the three focus groups: 
" [Participant A to Participant B]: Do you ever wake up in the middle of the night and 
[Husband] is there making sure you are still alive? Because that is what my husband 
does." 
The concern for spouses did not include significant changes in roles, alterations in 
social life or changes in social relationships, as described in some cardiovascular 
literature (Dalteg et al. , 2011; Hazelton et al. , 2009; Hendriks, et al. , 2008; Pihl et al. , 
2010). This may be because although ARVC is a life threatening condition and can 
impose restrictions, for the most part, participants were able to maintai n employment and 
do activities involved with daily living. Although the spouses did acknowledge that there 
were times that they had to assume added responsibilities, such as dri ving, this was not 
overly concerning. Another factor that may account for the lack of emphasis on role 
changes is that the mean age of the ARVC-positive participants was only 41; thus, one 
might expect that this study did not capture any changes in familial roles and 
responsibilities with such young participants. This may be documented more full y in a 
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follow-up study with older participants. What was frustrating for spouses, however, was 
gaining access to resources (e.g. , health care providers knowledgeable in ARVC, 
treatments, and technology). This is discussed in the next property, coping with barriers 
to resources. 
Property 2: Coping with barriers to resources. This property describes the 
conditions that influence participants' experiences as they tried to access the information 
and resources they felt were necessary to manage and live with being at risk for ARVC. 
These conditions included barriers to (l) human resources, (2) physical resources, (3) 
financial resources, and (4) informal and formal supports. 
Condition 1: Human resources. Formal supports are imperative throughout all 
phases of the genetic testing process. The support of the cardiologist, genetic counsellor, 
and nurse was noted to be instrumental in facilitating positive health outcomes. 
Participants did not focus on the role of health care providers in understanding their 
objective risk; however, many described them as playing a significant role in helping 
them cope with the outcome of the test. The role of genetic counsellors in helping 
individuals cope with their new risk-status is referred to in several systematic reviews 
(Braithwaite et al. , 2006; Butow et al. , 2003; Kaphingst & McBride, 20 10; Meiser & 
Halliday, 2002; Sivell et al. , 2008). 
Participants emphasized that an important component of this formal support 
relationship is trust. For many, the excellent clinical and communication skills of a health 
care provider led to a sense of trust in their abilities. Although participants recognized 
that the cardiologist and the genetic counsellor did not have all the answers as to what the 
future holds for them and their families, they were satisfied, for the most part, with their 
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ability to communicate risk information appropriately. There was an overwhelming sense 
of respect and appreciation for the attending cardiologist who helped them understand and 
cope with the realities of living in an at-risk family, namely, providing them with a sense 
of being "safe" despite the potential outcomes of a fatal disease. Equally important were 
responses to the immeasurable support of the genetic counsellor: "If it wasn't for [the 
genetic counsellor] I would be fooli sh." Similar accounts of formal supports have been 
found in the literature (Boise et al., 2005). 
Although participants appreciate the ongoing expertise of the cardiologist and the 
genetic counsellor simultaneously, they also recognize the need for more experts in the 
field. The general consensus for those li ving in rural communities, as they reflect on the 
posi tives and negatives of the genetic testing process, is that they need someone who is 
familiar with family history and ARVC management to provide continuity of care. In 
fact, participants requested that health care providers familiar with ARVC visit the 
communities on a regular basis. 
The most frequently cited barrier to care identified by participants was human 
resources and the lack of knowledge by health care providers for the diagnosis and 
treatment of ARYC. This finding is similar to that of McAllister, Payne et al. (2007), 
who reported that a lack of diagnosis and inappropri ate care was a key factor that caused 
significant distress to at-risk families. This lack was particularly noted in rural and 
remote areas of the province. The lack of knowledge was both surprising and frustrating 
for participants. Not surprisingly, participants assumed health care providers would be 
knowledgeable about a disease prevalent in the population they service. This expectation 
is evident in these two comments: "I think that all physicians working in every area 
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affected by it [ARVC] should know about it. . . Newfoundland is such a melting pot of 
genetic conditions they need to be educated about these people," and "They [health care 
providers] did not know the family history. They did not know what ARVC is all about. 
They can't help you." Accounts of health care providers in rural settings not knowing 
how to manage ARVC added to the lack of confidence in the abilities of health care 
providers: 
[Son] went in, took his ICD card out at outpatients, and said, "I have a 
defibrillator implanted, and it went off." The lady behind the desk said, "Does 
anybody know anything about one of these thingamajigs? He has one in!" 
I carried mother in to the local hospital and got her checked out. I had to tell the 
doctor what was on the screen . The electronic device on the screen tells you how 
many irregular heartbeats you are having. The doctor said to mom, "You did not 
have any attacks." I had to correct him on it and when he looked he said, "You 
are right." This was the first trip, so that did not go over well with me. 
It is in situations such as those described above that caused concerned families to forego 
local treatment and travel to the city. 
I just get in the car and take my boys to [the city]. The bottom line is they [health 
care providers of smaller centers] are not educated in it, or they are just learning 
about it. . . I want the best there's around. 
Adding to the frustration over lack of access to care in rural areas is the high 
turnover rate of physicians and nurses, poor medical coverage for emergencies, and long 
wait times in local emergency departments in rural communities. In fact, many 
participants felt that they were often left to coordinate their own care: 
The local doctor can be up on this [ARVC] but he is not in the clinic 24/7. I could 
take an attack at one o'clock in the morning and he could be away somewhere for 
the day. This could be his day off. Now what do I do? 
If I have chest pains or anything, I know that I got to go right away. So I don ' t 
want to go up there [hospital] and have to wait in the waiting room for 45 minutes 
to an hour before someone sees me. 
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The people who have worked in the cardiac department for a long time, when I go 
there they know me. They know all about the history, but a lot of those are retired 
and they are gone. So if I went down and had the monitor put on they would 
know what was going on and be able to say to the doctor, "This is [Participant] 
and they have this wrong with them." 
Another barrier related to human resources identified by some participants was the 
lack of access to genetic counsellors and cardiologists. Although participants did 
appreciate those genetic counselling resources that were available, they also recognized 
that there is only so much that can be done given the resource limitations. 
My biggest problem is, if I need anything I've got to phone [genetic counsellor] 
because there is no one else to phone. If [spouse's] defibrillator goes off I can call 
[the hospital] until I am blue in the face, and you won ' t reach anyone. 
The genetic counsellor is not only dealing with me but a lot of other families as 
well. 
Similar frustrations were noted concerning the limited accessibility to the cardiologist 
with the most expertise in ARVC: 
They have a clinic once a month [at local hospital] but that's perfect for someone 
who is not having any episodes. Once you have an episode, automatically, the 
cardiologists want you in [city] to see you. 
There's one thing that I mean to ask every time I go in, but usually when you see 
[cardiologist], you get in, get out. He's so busy and you don 't get time to si t and 
talk. 
Notwithstanding, the consensus was that participants were pleased with the cardiologist' s 
bedside manner, support, and knowledge about and explanations of treatment regimes, as 
summarized in these three narratives: 
[Cardiologist] keeps saying when the girls go in to get rechecked, 'You are fine, 
you are probably going to live to be 98 and die of something else.' [Cardiologist] 
gives you the feeling that, okay, you got this thing [lCD] in, and you can feel good 
and safe. 
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[Cardiologist] gives you a good feeling. It is kind of uplifting to go in and have 
your appointment, believe it or not, with the cardiologist. 
The thing about [cardiologist] is that no matter how knowledgeable he is, he can 
always come to your level and talk to you right. 
The participants' comments about the genetic counsellor shared similar sentiments as 
those above: 
I had a lot of conversations with [genetics counsellor], he is always available if 
you need anythi ng . . . I felt support was available for me at any time . .. when I 
was first tested I felt that the resources were there for me. But how much can one 
person do? How many times do you want to call somebody? 
When you do meet somebody like [genetics counsellor], I felt I could tell him 
anything. 
When I contacted [genetics counsellor] . .. the response was very quick through e-
mail , and I talked to him on the phone. [Genetics counsellor] called me at work 
because I had given my information. I think that quick response sort of tells you 
[genetic counsellor] is trying to help. 
They were fabulous out there at that clinic. The [genetics counsellor] and 
[cardiologist] and the crew [nurses] I can' t thank them enough, and I can' t praise 
them enough. 
Aware of the Jimjtations in human resources, many participants soon recognized 
that they had to be their own advocate in managing their disease. For example, 
individuals have advocated for appropriate blood work to monitor the therapeutic range of 
certain medications, for ARVC protocols to be placed on charts, and for better treatment. 
I am supposed to be tested every three to six months for thyroid and liver and 
everything else when I am on this medication. When I went in and saw 
[cardiologist] we brought it up and told him I never got tested and yet I have been 
on this medication for the last two or three years. Also, I was taking this 
medication for two years before they even put the sticky on it that said I should be 
out of the sun. 
We need an ARVC protocol posted up the local emergency room. 
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The first time [spouse] went up to the clinic with an attack, the doctor said, 'there 
is no good phoning into [city] now because we won't reach anyone in there this 
evening.' I said, 'Look there is a doctor in there on call all the time. This is what 
you do: you phone the main switchboard and tell them to page whatever 
cardiologist is on call.' This is what you deal with all the time. 
Condition 2: Physical resources. In addition to human resource barriers, many 
narratives alluded to the fact that even if there were adequate human resources to meet the 
population ' s needs, there remained a dearth of physical resources. Smaller local facilities 
do not have the technology to download (nor health care personnel to interpret) 
information from the lCD. Therefore, individuals with ARVC who go to a local facility 
either find themselves being told to go home and to come back if the lCD fires again or 
are sent by ambulance to the city. Upon arrival in the city, unless there has been some 
technological issue with the reD itself (such as loose wiring or reprogramming), 
individuals are typically sent home with few or no treatment changes. For many, these 
trips to local medical facilities become futile efforts, and individuals learn to draw on 
their own experiential knowledge about the reo to decipher why it fired and to make 
decisions regarding their actual risk. This situation also solidifies the notion of the lay 
expert (Lupton, 1995), as participants begin to make more decisions about their care. 
Condition 3: Financial resources. The financial implications of li ving in a 
fami ly at ri sk for ARYC were also seen by many participants as a barrier to care and, 
subsequently, a barrier to the ability to understand and (re)assign meaning to the risks 
associated with living with ARYC. Regarding the findings of other research that 
examined quality of life issues of individuals li ving with an reo (Shea, 2004), of 
pruticular concern was the cost of medication , the amount of work time lost due to 
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appointments, and travel expenses related to geographical restrictions on available 
resources. 
For one participant, the cost of medications was unsustainable, and he found it 
necessary to accept social assistance in order to manage: "I am on social assistance 
because I cannot pay for my pills if I work. They are very costly, and they are always 
putting you on different ones." Another ARYC-positive participant spoke of the financial 
strains of treatment and foll ow-up appointments: "It costs money, gas, hotels, meals, and 
then there are work commitments and time off." Given that some participants required 
additional fo llow-up visits to the regular six-month clinic visits, or ambulance services 
that were a chargeable service, care could be pa11icularl y expensive. One participant 
described having made 18 trips to the city in one year. Added to these financial strains 
was the stress linked to poor driving conditions due to the weather; although, as many 
participants noted, this was often a moot point: "we just don' t have what we need in this 
area." Hence, for many, treatment came with a huge financial commitment. 
Be ing diagnosed with ARYC means that li fe and health care insurance may be 
unavailable or unaffordable. Several participants spoke of the challenges they faced 
when applying fo r insurance for their homes, cars, and disability or life insurance. Most 
were fortunate that they had insurance plans prior to being diagnosed, but for some this 
coverage was limited, as in the case of one participant: "I have life insurance. Lucbly I 
had it before I got diagnosed. Other than that, I got nothing. They will [offer] life and 
disability insurance, and [when] I tell them what I have, forget it." For this participant, 
his inabi lity to receive full insurance coverage caused him to worry, "If I get sick 
tomorrow, there is no one going to take care of me; what the hell am I suppose to do? 
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got a mortgage, car payments, and kids going to school." Limited access to insurance 
was also raised as a barrier to affordable care, a challenge that has al so been discussed in 
relation to cardiovascular disease (Probst et al., 2011; Shea, 2004), and BRCA 112 (Lynch 
et al. , 2006; Watson et al. , 2004). Fear of health or life insurance di scrimination was 
cited as a key concern for those at risk for BRCA 112 (Allan, Friedman, & Senter, 2012; 
Peterson, Milliron, Lewis, Goold, & Merajver, 2002) and HD (Bombard et al., 20 12; 
Erwin et al., 2010). 
Overcoming Barriers. Based on the previous discussion it is evident that 
individuals living in families at risk for a genetic condition do experience psychosocial 
distress throughout the genetic testing process and continue to experience it for many 
years after they receive their test results. This fi nding does not support the l arge body of 
literature that states that psychological distress subsides within a year (Almqvist et al. , 
2004; Aktan-Collan et al. , 200 l ; Arver et al., 2004; Codori et al. , 2004; Collins et al. , 
2007; Gritz et al. , 2005 ; Heshka et al., 2008; Meiser & Dunn, 2000; Meiser et al. , 2002, 
2004; Shaw et al. , 1999; Watson et al., 2004). It al so suggests that concerns about one's 
health do extend beyond five years post-testing, as noted in some other studies (Codori & 
Brandt, 1994; Decruyenaere et al. , 2003; Gargiulo et al., 2009; Schwartz et al. , 2002; 
Timman et al., 2004; Meiser et al. , 2002; van Oostrom et al. , 2003). 
For the participants in this study, the level of psychological distress post-genetic 
testing is not constrained by time nor by carrier status as suggested in some studies 
(AJmqvist et al. , 2004; Aktan-Collan et al. , 2001 ; Arver et al. , 2004; Codori et al. , 2004; 
Codori & Brandt, 1994; Collins et al. , 2005, 2007; Decruyenaere et al. , 2003; Gargiulo et 
al. , 2009; Gritz et al. , 2005; Heshka et al. , 2008; Meiser & Dunn, 2000; Meiser et al. , 
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2002; Shaw et al., 1999; Schwartz et al. , 2002; Timman et al. , 2004; van Oostrom et al. , 
2003 ; van Roosmalen, 2004; Watson et al., 2004); rather, it is something that is ever-
present and tends to resurface in response to risk perceptions. At times it is the 
juxtaposing of the conditions and contextual dimensions influencing risk that causes the 
distress; however, in other instances it is the strong presence of one of these factors (e.g., 
the onset of signs and symptoms, another Joss, another ARVC positive relation, the 
presence of a more accurate genetic test), that causes a heightened sense of risk and 
feelings of distress. Similar accounts of how mitigating factors infl uence how one 
perceives and copes with their risk have been reported in other studies (McAllister, 2002; 
McAJJister, Davies et al. , 2007; van Oostrom et al. , 2003). This finding explains why 
some researchers have found that negative carriers do not have any psychological distress 
pre- and post-testing (Croyle et al. , 1997; Lerman & Croyle, t996; Lodder et al. , 2001; 
Reichelt et al. , 2004; Schwartz et al. , 2002). 
Participants offered several suggestions that would help them overcome or deal 
with some of the identified barriers that create thi s ongoing distress. These suggestions 
included the fo llowing: the implementation of standards of practice, such as clinical 
practice guidelines that address ARVC management; an interactive ARYC website where 
they could ask questions; medical alert bracelets; a community support group; more 
devices that can download lCD activity in rural community hospitals and in the home; 
education for health care providers about ARVC; a stronger visible genetics program at 
the community level; and, more access to genetic counseJJors, cardiologists, and 
researchers in times of need or to obtain progress reports on new discoveries. Many of 
these suggestions appear in the fo llowing narratives: 
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A webpage would help that has little bits of information ... where you could input a 
question and somebody would answer you and put your mind at ease. It's 
probably just little things that pop up that you could ask. Things you might think 
it 's important. .. More contact [with researchers] probably would be nice with 
little letters here and there, or progress to date. 
Going to a support group you would meet people who are in the same situation 
you are. 
I don ' t even care if it 's an ID [medical alert] bracelet or whatever, but when we go 
to hospital that you get seen and [health care providers] know what we have. 
Research has found that support groups are beneficial in helping at-risk individuals cope 
with their disease and prescribed treatments (Boise et al. , 2005 ; Dickerson, 2002). The 
experiential knowledge shared helped individuals gain insight into the practical every-day 
management of their disease that could not be acquired at the local doctor's office . 
Finally, several narratives suggested that the need for health care resources post-
genetic testing is critical, as many still have psychological challenges that persist long 
after testing and treatment. 
Yes, I think it [support] is very important because it wasn't my health that was at 
issue. It was my mental health. 
It did not even come to me to go see a counsellor [for psychological help]. But I 
needed to see somebody. I needed two things: I needed someone to help me wrap 
my head around this avoidance that I was getting into, and the anxiety and 
depression. I also needed someone to assure me that it is okay for me to go out 
and walk, like I use to walk; to pick up a bag of groceries and walk up over the 
stairs. To do the normal everyday things that I have avoided doing that I don ' t 
have to be afraid of going out. 
Condition 4: Informal supports. Family and friends were identified as having a 
significant role in balancing feelings of risk with the normalcy of everyday life . For 
many, knowing that other family members were readily accessible if needed was helpful, 
as this participant described: "It was six in the morning, so I phoned my sister and told 
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her she'd better get over here because my defibrillator just fired ... So she got ready and 
came over." Similar accounts were provided by spouses: "[Husband] tried to get me 
through these panic attacks and the misery [of dealing with having a negative test result 
after ten years of not knowing genetic status]. " For young adolescents, it tends to be 
parents, siblings, or cousins who have had similar experiences that are called upon for 
support and to gain a better understanding of prescribed treatments such as the lCD: 
"Before [Son] went in and had his defibrillator he use to talk to [male cousin] about it." 
The knowledge and advice of mature adul t famil y members were reported to be 
invaluable, as these individuals took on the role of the lay experts: "We got the 
knowledge. We li ved through it. When we were diagnosed there were no defibrillators 
and half the medications they got now." T he knowledge acquired by those who li ved 
through the genetic testing process seemed to provide reassurance to others that they, too, 
could cope with this disease, that there was access to someone knowledgeable about 
ARVC, and that they were not alone. The importance of relying on info rmal supports 
from family members contributes to famjl y cohesion and its importance in the 
management of ARVC. 
Category 3: Looking Towards the Future Realities of Living in a Family at risk for a 
Genetic Disease 
This category describes participants' experiences as they start to think about the 
future implications of li ving in a fami ly at risk for ARVC and how they tried to focus on 
the positive aspects of genetic testing and their lives in general despite their concerns for 
the children living in these at-risk families. The two properties: (a) trying to maintain a 
positive outlook and (b) living with concern for at-risk children, describe participants' 
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experiences as they embody risk and look towards the future realities of living in a family 
at risk for ARVC. 
Property 1: Trying to maintain a positive outlook. This property explains 
participants' efforts to maintain a positi ve outlook on life post-genetic testing. The two 
conditions that capture this experience are: ( I ) the positi ves of predictive genetic testing 
and (2) being able to deal with adverse events. 
Condition I: Predictive genetic testing: Positive aspects. Post-predictive genetic 
testing participants tried to maintain a positive outlook and focus on the good qualities of 
their lives. In doing so, participants highlighted the positive aspects of the predictive 
genetic testing process. Many recognized that they need to focus on preparing for their 
own future and the consequences of living with the disease. A large part of maintaining a 
positi ve attitude meant acknowledging the positives of knowing one's genetic status, of 
having the ICD, informing others about the benefits of genetic testing, and being able to 
identify the good qualities in one's life. 
In order to sustain a positive outlook for the future participants focused 
considerable attention on the benefits of knowing their genetic status. In keeping with 
previous research on other inherited cardiovascular conditions (Aatre & Day, 2011; 
Andersen et al. , 2008; Christiaans et al. , 2009; Marteau et al. , 2004) and BRCA 1/2 
(Butow et al. , 2003), knowing one's genetic status was viewed as something 
advantageous. This information was considered valuable because it could be used to 
make life decisions and alleviate the psychological distress of not knowing one's ri sk 
status, as summarized in this comment: 
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Now they [researchers] know what causes ARVC, I think it eases people's minds 
one way or the other. Because if you don ' t have it, they ' ll tell you that you don ' t 
have it; whereas, before we weren't really sure we had it or not. 
Knowing one's risk status was also helpful in that it helped participants prepare 
for future management of ARYC, which instilled in them a sense of control over their 
lives: "It [genetic testing process] is positive because the more we know about ARVC, the 
more prepared we are." Successful disease management, as noted in the literature, 
requires individuals to be able to anticipate symptoms, prepare for future consequences of 
the disease, and engage in disease prevention and management strategies (Anderson et al., 
2008; Decruyenare et al., 2003; Dine & Terzioglu, 2005; Esplen et al. , 2001; Gritz et al., 
2005; Heshka et al. , 2008 ; Hodge, 2004; Shaw et al., 1999). Thus, many participants 
availed of the opportunity to know their risk status, to prevent the onset of ARVC and 
receive proper treatment (such as the lCD), prior to having physical signs of the disease. 
This was the case for the three younger participants who did not have any signs of the 
disease but had an lCD, " [Children] did not have any symptoms of the disease. They 
only knew because of the DNA testing." 
Cases such as the one above emphasize the fact that most pa1ticipants believed 
that the opportunity to prevent a sudden cardiac death outweighed any negative aspects of 
genetic testing, and made participants feel as if they were being taken care of: "I think it 
[genetic testing] was very positive. While it was being done, I sort of felt safe." Given 
the opportunity to relive their choice to be genetically tested, most participants agreed that 
they would do it again as this participant noted, "It [genetic test result] gave me piece of 
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mind which I haven' t had .... since 1983."33 In keeping with some other studies 
(Anderson et al., 2008; Hendriks et al., 2005; Smets et al., 2008), those who have made 
the decision to get their children tested did not regret it. Overall , participants were so 
confident in the benefits of having genetic testing they constantly reiterated to other 
family members the importance of having genetic testing done in order to plan for their 
future health: 
I made them [children] aware of the history. I made them aware that they need to 
take responsibility. I think they're going to take responsibility when it comes to 
their children. They probably don't talk about it a lot, but I think they know deep 
down within them. 
I was trying to tell my son, "go in to see the doctor and get tested.' 
I am going to push them to do it [have grandchildren tested]. ... We know it is in 
our genes so we need to get it checked. 
Being able to focus on the good quality of one's life. In order to maintain a 
positive mind-set, individuals aligned their perception of health with having a "good 
quality of life." The meaning of "good quality of life" expressed in participant narratives 
emphasized daily life activities, accepting that one cannot control all aspects of the 
disease (and, in some cases, comparing one's situation to others less fortunate with their 
health), and accepting that living in a family with a genetic condition means not having 
100% control over one's fate, as described by one participant: 
I am not living life for ARVC. I am living life the way that I want to .. . If the 
lCD is going to go off, it 's going to go off anyway. I am not going to sit at home 
33 For the most part all the participants in thi s study wanted genetic testing. I did not interview anyone who 
declined genetic testing. It is important that future research include this group to determine if there are 
alternative opi nions that contradict this study 's findings and findings of other research that show eager 
uptake of genetic testing. This point is discussed in the conclusion. 
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and grieve myself to death because I got this problem. I'm going to do what I can 
do until the day comes that I can' t. 
To successfully cope with ARVC, individuals took the position that they must 
appreciate what li fe has to offer and move on with their li ves. This appreciation meant 
that participants had to reassign the meaning of the firing of the lCD from being 
something "risky" to something "normal" ' that saves their lives. As noted by Dickerson 
(2002) and Boise et al. (2005) living with the lCD means getting on with one's life, 
accepting the restrictions imposed by the ICD, and appreciating life a it is li ved.34 
Similar sentiments are reflected in these commentaries: 
You have to li ve with it [having ARVC and ICD] . You have to li ve every day to 
the fullest. There is no good to grumble about it, or complain about it. .. You 
know the seven times that you passed out [from lCD firing] you got another ten or 
fifteen times yet. 
You can go in now and you can get this test done; it won' t stop the progression of 
the disease yet, but it' ll g ive you a second chance if something were to happen, 
once you have the lCD in ... so this kind of research got to continue. 
For many, the meaning of what constitute a "good" level of health was determined by 
comparing one 's ex isting health with the potential negative health problems associated 
with ARVC. As the use of the lCD becomes normalized during the illness process, 
participants come to accept it as critical to maintaining this "good" health, a finding that 
is supported in the li terature on the lCD (Fiemme et al. , 2005). 
Participants also made downward comparisons with other individuals and 
families, similar to those described by Farrimond et al. (20 10) in order to cope with living 
in an at-ri sk family and to confirm that they had a "good" level of health. A downward 
3~ Be ing opti mistic as to the lCD capabilities has been identi fied in the li terature as an e ffective coping 
strategy to deal wi th the stress of having the device implanted (Fiemme, Johansson. & Stromberg, 20 II ). 
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comparison is a social comparison where individuals compare themselves to others less 
fortunate in order to judge their own circumstances. In doing so, individuals are often 
able to see the positive aspects of their situation. In this study, participants drew upon 
stories of other families who experienced numerous losses to put the "good qualities" of 
their own lives into perspective. " [Family X] is a real horror story. They have lost seven 
generations of males from ages 17 upwards" and " [Cousin] lost three brothers. It is 
horrible!" Likewise, for one ARVC-positive participant, downward comparisons were 
used to confirm that he was coping well: "I just charged ahead and did what I had to do; 
[whereas sibling] quit work, lay around, and got depressed." For several participants, 
discussions with non-famjly members gave them the opportunity to make comparisons 
amongst individual situations and to gain insight into how others had handled the news of 
be ing positive. For one participant, just knowing that other families were dealing with 
similar things, such as concern for the wellbeing of the children, gave him a sense of 
relief in knowing that what he was feeling was "normal," and reconfirmed that he was 
indeed living a good quality life in comparison to others. 
Condition 2: Being able to handle an adverse event. Efforts to be positive about 
one' s life and surrounding circumstances were also described by the younger participants 
(ages 15, 16, and 18). Although they understood the potential negative outcomes of a 
cardiac episode, they described a sense of confidence in their abilities to handle such a 
situation. Embedded within the narratives is a message to parents to stop worrying about 
them because they "have things under control." For these individuals, this confidence is 
empowering, as noted in this narrative that described an incident where one participant's 
defibrillator fired and the other two had to respond: 
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Our parents are worried about us going out alone. I remember one time when we 
were all in the pit hanging around and [Cousin] was there and his defibrillator 
went off and all of us were around. We knew what to do. We took care of him 
and called his parents, and waited for them to come. We knew he was going to 
wake up. 
None of these young participants described any psychological distress with the 
genetic testing process other than the initial anticipation, anxiety, and fears related to the 
lCD firing and follow-up care. As described previously, these concerns gradually 
resolved as participants became more familiar with the lCD firing and more comfortable 
with management of the lCD. Similar to some earlier studies of adolescents with an lCD 
and their parents (Zeigler & Nelms, 2009), the younger participants in this study 
emphasized how they tried to live a normal regular life. A significant part of this 
"normality" is the firing of the lCD, as one participant summarized, "I was afraid at first 
[of the lCD firing], but now I let it slide by." 
Property 2: Living with concern for at-risk children. Threaded throughout the 
entire genetic testing process is concern for the health of the children. This property 
builds on the parents' concern for their children specifically, their future wellbeing. 
Explicit within participants' narratives, once they knew their own genetic status, was a 
shift in concern from oneself to one' s children, which was also reported by McAllister, 
Davies et al. (2007). This property describes the two conditions that influence 
participants' concerns for the future wellbeing of the children. These two conditions are: 
(I) physical signs and symptoms of ARVC and (2) children' s knowledge of ARVC. 
Condition 1: Physical signs and symptoms. Despite the appearance of coping 
well with their child' s potential risk, any subtle change in a child ' s physical status caused 
parents to interpret the event as being "risky," indicative of ARVC, requiring immediate 
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attention. The assignment of something as being "risky" forced the parents to 
momentarily reconstruct their ideas about risk and to respond to the event in a pragmatic 
manner; removing the child from school , seeking medical attention, monitoring the 
children, and try to maintain a cohesive family. Coinciding with parents reshaping of the 
meaning of risk were familiar feelings of anxiety and fear about their child's future, as 
noted in this parent 's comment: 
My son had some kind of flu-induced asthma. So I phoned the hospital and got 
the pediatrician on the phone and said, 'Now this is one of my children, and I want 
his checked out right away'. He was okay ... but I have warned the school if he 
complains of chest pain, call me. You are always afraid they will have chest pain. 
Concern for the wellbeing of the children often led parents to remove them from 
school in order to see the family doctor or to simply to watch over them until they no 
longer were considered ill , as several parents noted, they were "not taking any chances." 
One mother's account of removing her child from school due to health concerns and 
receiving a note from the teacher inquiring about why he has rn.issed so much time is 
captured this experience: 
I received a letter from the school complaining because he has been so ill with 
chest congestion, and I am so afraid to take a chance that it is just chest congestion 
and not something e lse. He said he fee ls his heart pounding and he feels tightness 
in his chest. I'll take him to the doctor instead of school. He has missed so much 
school that I got a letter from the school now because I have taken him out of 
school so often getting him checked out. 
The perception that others (such as teachers), are criticizing a parenting decision to 
exercise caution with regard to risk of a cardiac episode adds to the distress experienced 
by caregivers in families with ARYC. 
Concerns about the future wellbeing of the children were common amongst the 
parents whose children have not had genetic testing for ARYC, but exhibit physical signs 
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of the disease. This is evident in the narrative of one ARVC positive parent who placed 
restrictions on the physical activity of her ll year old son. 
My son was playing hockey up until last year. He is 11 now. He has not been 
tested and he passed out in the gym the other day. 
The worry about the children 's' future wellbeing in this phase of the genetic testing 
process is similar to that described in construct one: Awakening to a New Meaning of 
Being At-Risk. That is, the worry knowing that ARVC can cause a sudden cardiac death 
without any warning. In order to alleviate some of this anxiety many felt they needed to 
keep a watchful eye over the children. Research has also identified similar accounts of 
anxiety with having a child at-risk (Andrews et al. , 2006; Dine & Terzioglu, 2005; 
Duncan et al. , 2007; Farnsworth et al. , 2006; Hendriks et al., 2005). This anxiety has 
caused parents to maintain constant surveillance of the children's whereabouts and 
physical state (e.g., Featherstome, Bharadwaj & Clarke, 2006; Hendriks et al. , 2005), 
regardless of age. These feelings are captured in the following narratives: 
You just have to know where they [children] are. My daughter says, 'I'm 15 years 
o ld . Why can ' t I go [to a friend 's house]?' She doesn't understand that you have 
to know wherever she is all times. 
I know he is 29; but if he is going in the woods wi th hi s buddies overnight, he 
needs to phone and let me know. 
If my son and his wife go out of town ... I say to him, 'phone me when you get 
there. ' 
It seems like you are always looking for it [ARVC], not wanting anything wrong 
with them, but always looking at them. Anything that happened out of the 
ordinary, I would always think, could it be ARVC? 
This concern for the children coupled with an awareness of the potential negative 
outcomes of this disease (that is, sudden death), has created a strong sense of fami ly 
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cohesion. As a result family members do tend to spend a lot time on family outings and 
celebrating special occasions. These interactions serve two functions:; ( l ) to provide a 
sense of security that they are not alone in case one of them has a cardiac event; and (2) to 
spend as much time together creating memories in case of an untimely death. These 
thoughts are threaded throughout several participants' narratives: 
It is no good for me to go somewhere with him [ARVC positive husband] by 
myself, because I run [if husband has a cardiac event] . I just panic over it [cardiac 
episode]. They [brother and sister in-law] have a cabin just up the pond from us, 
just up the road. I will not go to our cabin unless they are at their cabin. I brought 
walkie-talkies so that we can be in touch. They keep their radio on and I keep 
mine on. So if anything happens I will call [sister-in-law] to come down. 
We have always been close, the three boys, and us. My oldest son just turned 30 
in August, and we still had to have all the family together to celebrate his birthday 
... Whether it's Christmas, New Years, Mother's Day, Father's Day, Easter we 
are together. I don ' t know if I should be doing it but I try to drill it into the boy, 
who knows where we are going to be next year. 
Knowing the whereabouts of the children and creating a strong sense of family 
cohesion as methods to cope with the uncertainty of having a child at risk for a fatal 
disease has also been described in the cardiovascular literature (Fansworth et al. , 2006; 
Hendriks et al. , 2005) and in relation to HD (Sobel & Cowan, 2003). 
Condition 2: Children's knowledge of ARVC. Concern for the children' s' future 
wellbeing prompted many parents to educate them at an earl y age about ARYC, its 
symptoms and appropriate management strategies. For some parents, educating the 
children about ARYC was imperative to ensure that they were prepared for testing and 
aware of any signs of the disease. Parents felt that educating their children about ARYC 
was fu lfilling their parental responsibility. This gave them a sense of solace in that that 
they had prepared their children to deal with the disease in a proactive manner, as this 
parent explained: 
I've tried to educate them on it. I don ' t know if I overstepped. I was trying to 
stress the importance of being aware of the disease, and keep a step ahead of it. 
You look after yourself your children and your grandchildren. 
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Educating the children about ARVC served another purpose: to relieve the parents of the 
guilt felt for passing the ARVC gene on to them. This narrative noted, "There is a lot of 
guilt attached to that [passing ARVC on], even though I didn ' t international ly give it to 
them." Similar accounts of guilt have been found in the literature on genetics (Howell et 
al., 2006). 
A large component of informing the children about ARVC is in anticipation of the 
difficult choices that they foresee their children having to make in their future, as they 
mature into adults, get married, and are faced with life decisions, such as whether to have 
children themselves. This is evident in one participant 's account of educating a child 
about ARVC and then observing that same child make life decisions: "She [daughter] had 
chosen not to have kids until she found out she didn ' t have the gene." 
Chapter Summary 
Participants' experiences in the final phase of the genetic testing process, 
Embodying a New Meaning of Being At-risk, is captured in three categories. The fi rst 
category, adjusting to living with or without a genetic condition , described how 
pa1ticipants started to adjust to and assign meaning to prescribed treatments 
(pharmacological and lCD). The meaning assigned to treatments and one's willingness to 
adhere to them was based on the presence or absence of signs and symptoms of ARVC, 
one's genetic test results, and perceived efficacy of the treatment. A lot of effort went 
302 
into trying to understand the need for treatment, as they weighed the negatives and 
positives of those proposed. The challenge faced by participants as they tried to adjust to 
living with or without ARVC was that they were not totally convinced of the accuracy of 
the genetic test results. Adding to this were the discrepancies noted in the management of 
ARVC. As a result participants continuously juxtaposed one's experiential knowledge 
and scientific knowledge against each other in order to assimilate new information into 
existing beliefs about genetics and construct their perception of being at risk for ARVC. 
Category two, recognizing the realities of living in a family at risk for a genetic 
disease, describes how participants live with the practical challenges of everyday life 
such as restriction related to lifestyle, driving, education, employment, and social 
interactions. A large part of coping with everyday life is identifying, coping, and 
overcoming the barriers related to human resources, physical resources, and financial 
resources. Informal and formal supports make coping with one's risk tolerable. 
Suggestions to dealing with identified barriers included providing more supports at the 
community level, more access to resources in rural settings, more practitioners familiar 
with ARVC management, financial planning, and help with coordinating care. 
Category three, looking towards the future , highlights the realities of Jiving in a 
fami ly at risk for ARVC. It is here that participants focus on maintaining a positive 
outlook about the future for themselves and their children. To maintain a positive outlook 
in this context means that participants must accept and focus on the good aspects of their 
Ji ves. That is, they must accept that they have thi s condition, accept that many facets of 
this disease are out of their control , accept that it can be fatal, and accept that it can be 
passed on to their children. In order to do so, attention is shifted to the benefits of 
303 
knowing one's genetic status, which contribute to what many have come to appreciate as 
a "good quality of life." These benefits include being able to prepare, manage, and get 
treatment for the disease prior to its onset. All participants hoped that their children could 
have a similar "good quality of life." Hence, as part of their parental responsibility, they 
constantly informed the children about the risks of ARVC, monitored them for the signs 
and symptoms of ARVC, and tried to help them prepare to make future decisions about 
their life, wellbeing, and genetic testing. 
In this final phase of the genetic testing process, the continuous juxtaposing of the 
contextual dimensions and conditions and the outcomes of this juxtaposition determine 
responses to risk and account for the variations in participants' experiences. Figure 8.3 
summarizes the conditions that influence the process of Embodying a New Meaning of 
Being At-Risk. 
304 
Figure 8.3. Rubik's Cube Model: Summary of the Conditions that Influence the 
Psychosocial Process of Embodying a New Meaning of Being At-Risk. Rubik's Cube® 
used by permission of Seven Towns Limited, www.rubiks.com. 
CHAPTER9 
CONCLUSION 
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This study examined the experiences of individuals living in a family at risk for 
Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Cardiomyopathy (ARVC) as they moved through the 
predictive genetic testing process. A grounded theory methodology, drawing on the 
tenets of symbolic interactionism and pragmatism, was used to discover the substantive 
theory, Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk. This theory describes how 
participants assign meaning to being at-risk and make subsequent health care decisions 
based on these meanings. Three theoretical constructs, (1) Awakening to a New Meaning 
of Being At-Risk, (2) Deciphering the Meaning of Being At-Risk, and (3) Embodying a 
New Meaning of Being At-Risk, capture the psychosocial process of constructing risk. In 
this final chapter, I provide an overview of the key findings. Threaded through this 
discussion are recommendations for future research, practice, education, and health 
policy. Limitations to the study are addressed. 
Findings 
Throughout each phase of the genetic testing process, participants' ideas about 
risk are shaped and reshaped as they juxtapose the three contextual dimensions (scientific 
knowledge, experiential knowledge, and phase of the genetic testing process) against each 
other and relevant conditions (e.g., age, gender, and so on). These contextual dimensions 
influence how individuals assign meanings about risk to the conditions. The reverse is 
also true; the meanings they assign to the conditions in turn (re)shape the ways in which 
the contextual dimensions influence risk assessment. Given that the conditions are not 
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the same for everyone, and that participants have varying lived experiences, the meanings 
assigned to being at-risk will not be the same for everyone. 
This study demonstrates that one's sense of embodied risk is pragmatic, transient, 
and fluid. It is pragmatic in that participants draw on contextual factors in their everyday 
lives in order to understand risk. It is transient in that the meaning one ass igns to risk 
fluctuates in relation to the contextual dimensions in one's life and the relevant conditions 
surrounding it. It is fluid in that risk perception is not static but something that continues 
to evolve and get reshaped with each new interaction or experience, with new scientific 
advancements, with each phase of the genetic testing process, and as one experiences 
each condition. 
At a basic level , this study supports the work of other scholars who have argued 
that experiential knowledge, rather than an objective understanding of risk or biomedical 
models of disease causation, is the most significant factor in assigning meaning to being 
at-risk (Cameron et al. , 2009; Cox, 2003, d ' Agincourt-Canning, 2005; Etchegary, 20 10; 
Lock & Ngygen, 2010; Lupton, 1999; McAllister, 2002, 2003; Norris et al. , 2008; Shiloh 
& Saxe, 1989; Smith et al. , 2002; van Oostrom et al. , 2003). 
A cross-cutting theme found in this study is that risk construction is a family 
affair. Ideas about risk are constructed in relation to interactions with other family 
members. This is not surprising. Within families many of us carry the same genetic 
material and have many reminders of this. Many participants in this study felt that having 
family support throughout the genetic testing experience helped them cope and make 
decisions. Moreover, the concern related to risk goes beyond the affected individual and 
to the children. Hence, genetic counselling services and psychological supports should be 
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offered to all members of the family. During these sessions specific attention should be 
paid to clients' sense of relational responsibility and concern for the children. Although 
this study did not specifically address the ethical considerations of genetic testing, health 
care providers need to be prepared to address questions surrounding thi s. 
This study found that risk perception was a key factor in influencing how 
participants made the decision of when to undergo genetic testing. For many the decision 
to engage in genetic testing was a non-decision; for others, it was something that 
developed over time. By being more aware of the decision-making process, health care 
providers can better recognize and assess critical events or conditions that may change 
clients' decision to engage or disengage in genetic testing and can better support clients 
to make this transition. Finally, further studies that explore the experiences of those who 
refuse genetic testing are imperative if we are to gain a complete picture of the 
relationship between experiences of risk and decisions about genetic testing. 
Previous scholars have demonstrated that individual representations of risk vary 
greatl y and that it does not suffice to provide information about risk; rather, health care 
providers need to explore these representations and move towards a more collaborative 
understanding of risk in order to facilitate informed decision-making for those 
considering predictive genetic testing (Cox & McKellin, 1999; Ozanne et al., 20 10; 
Parsons & Atkinson, 1992; Richards, 1992; Shiloh et al. , 2006; ). My findings support 
that work and point specifically to the need to create a relational space (e.g., common 
meeting place), wherein the users of genetic services (perhaps including those who 
choose not to avail of genetic services), clinicians, and scientists can "freely" discuss 
competing ideas about risk using a multidisciplinary approach. This relational space is 
308 
one where ideas about risk are discussed collaboratively amongst laypersons and experts; 
where the contextual nature of risk can be discussed; and where the implicit and explicit 
meanings of risk can be scrutinized and used, altered, or dismissed during care plan 
decision-making. This plan needs to be fluid ; it needs to account for how individuals' 
ideas about risk shift and evolve. The failure to create such a relational space can result 
in disengagement in the genetic testing process. 
Another finding of this study is that-even though science has proven that ARVC 
does affect women-laypersons as well as experts continue to associate ARVC as being a 
male disease. Further research into the gendering of geneticall y linked conditions would 
provide a fuller understanding of how the gendering of a disease infl uences risk 
construction. 
A theoretical understanding of risk provides a framework that can guide 
fundamental questions about how individuals at risk conceptualize risk. This knowledge 
is critical in order to anticipate, identify, and provide interventions for those factors that 
may negatively influence health outcomes. From a theoretical standpoint studies such as 
this one provide a model that health care providers can use to become aware of how 
individuals at risk for other genetically linked conditions and chronic diseases assign 
meanings to their own risk and make subsequent decisions related to that risk. 
Specifically, this study provides further insights into the role of technology in 
constructing the sense of risk. In light of new genetic advancements (e.g., 
nanotechnology and genetic engineering) this knowledge will be beneficial in resource 
planning and implementation. 
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FUither, my study highlights the importance of having psychological counselling 
services available to members of at-risk families throughout all phases of the genetic 
testing process, regardless of genetic status or length of time since receiving one's test 
results. Likewise, knowing that one's behavioural responses to being at-risk are 
constructed in a pragmatic manner-participation in healthy behaviours, genetic testing, 
or prescribed treatments depends on how one's beliefs about genetics and risk fits within 
the proposed model of care (as noted also by Condit, 20 10)- access to psychological 
supports is imperative. Psychological support (informal and formal ) in this study was 
noted to have facilitated coping as participants reshaped risk perceptions, made informed 
decisions about their health, and adjust to a new meaning of being at-risk. Finally, given 
that one's beliefs about inheritance are continuously being shaped, it is important that the 
psychological supports provided reflect the client's current existing reality of risk; 
otherwise, the probability of disengagement in the genetic testing process will be high. 
At a deeper level , this study moved beyond previous studies on the psychological 
and social contexts of predictive genetic testing, illustrating the complexity of those 
contexts. Previous research has tended to be cross-sectional and thus not sensitive to how 
the meaning assigned to being at-risk is pragmatic, transient, and fluid. My findings 
illustrate how, as the contextual factors affecting one's risk perception changes, so does 
the meaning assigned to risk and one' s responses to the risk. For example, as scientists 
moved closer and closer to discovery of the ARVC gene, participants were invited to 
engage in genetic testing at various stages throughout this process. Each time they were 
invited to testing, their decision to participate was reflective of the contextual nature of 
their lives and knowledge at the time. Hence, the decision to engage in genetic testing for 
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those in the 1980s, 1997, and 2008 were significantly variable, as was the meaning 
assigned to risk. Evident throughout this study is that risk is saliently embedded within 
participants' lives and contextual in nature. 
FUJther, this study found that, although the relevancy of the conditions influencing 
risk perception does vary from person to person and is dependent on one's experiences, 
there are several conditions that significantly impact risk perception (e. g., physical signs 
of the disease). Figure 9.1 provides a synopsis of the key conditions that can shape and 
reshape how participants construct ideas about their risk. That is, as individuals move 
closer to assigning meaning to their risk, they move closer to completing the metaphorical 
Rubik 's Cube puzzle. Being aware of these speci fic conditions, practitioners can assess 
for their presence and provide resources to help participants decipher thei r true relevancy 
and meaning in terms of the framing of risk. Also, knowing that the ex istence of certain 
conditions (e.g., approaching age of disease onset) can heighten one's sense of risk, 
providing access to psychological supports during these critical times is important. 
Knowledge of these conditions can be used in future research to both develop 
psychometric tools that assess for the presence of these conditions and provide 
appropriate resources to deal with any concerns. The metaphoric model of the Rubik' s 
Cube can be used as an assessment tool to help practitioners understand the conditions 
that influence how users or non-users of genetic services construct ideas about risk and 
make subsequent health decisions. This model can be useful as a focal point during 
discussions with individuals in order to identify conditions that hold relevancy at any 
particular point. Future research is needed to test the appl icabili ty of this model to other 
genetic and chronic conditions. 
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One important incidental finding that emerged out of this attention to the specific 
conditions that shape risk perception was the variation between children 's and adult's 
responses to being at-risk. We can draw on the findings of this study to shed light on why 
research has found that children living in at-risk families do not have a high level of 
psychological distress. For children, ri sk is not a relevant concept in relation to a genetic 
disease that will develop later. It is only as these at-risk children mature and are faced 
with decisions about their lives or start to have clinical manifestations of the disease that 
they revisit the meaning of being at-risk. Given that these findings emerged only 
incidentally in my study (when two children participated in focus groups at the request of 
their parents), and that the stories of the older participants were retrospective, further 
research is needed to confirm this assumption. 
A second incidental finding, again related to the focus on how the specific 
conditions may shape risk perception for the individual, was that a treatment modality 
itself might significantly shape or reshape risk perception. A significant fi nding of this 
study is that participants spent a considerable amount of time worrying about the actual 
need for treatments (particularly in the case of those with no visible signs), the efficacy of 
treatments, and the management of treatments, particularly in terms of the lCD. A 
considerable amount of psychosocial distress was related to receiving an lCD, warranting 
further research on the impact of adjusting to li ving with a new and complex treatment 
technology. Further research will help to identify whether and how coinciding 
psychological resources should be available to help individuals become knowledgeable 
about the purpose, capabilities, and management of novel treatment devices. 
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This research also led to important information about how absent or inconclusive 
test results may shape the understanding of risk. A key finding in this study was the 
dissatisfaction among at-risk individuals when scientific knowledge over a span of many 
years remained unable to provide them with answers as to why family members were 
dying so young of heart conditions. In fact, even when there was a more definitive test, 
many still questioned its accuracy and experienced psychological distress, regardless of 
carrier status, for many years. This finding-that clients themselves may question the 
assumption that evidence produced through biomedical research is an objective and static 
truth, as it, too, evolves over time- is significant for our understanding of how risk is 
understood and reshaped in light of scientific advances. Added to this was the fac t that 
existing treatment modalities were inconsistent, and many felt they had to be their own 
advocates for care. Based on these findings it is important that laypersons are included as 
part of the research team at all stages of new gene discoveries as "lay experts." Only by 
understanding the contextual and historical factors of their everyday lives, captured 
through their stories, can health care services be reflecti ve of the needs of at-risk 
individuals. 
Findings specific to ARVC and its management within the NL context were also 
noted. First, the emphasis among participants on pragmatic but varied approaches to 
coping with the disease is significant for health services delivery. Individuals drew upon 
the coping mechanism that best fit with their ex isting perception of risk. For example, 
several participants tried to normalize the firing of the lCD as a routine occurrence given 
the nature of ARVC. Knowing that ARVC has a sudden onset, many spent considerable 
time surveying their bodies and that of their children for signs of ARVC. T he diverse 
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coping mechanisms that have proven effective throughout the genetic testing process to 
help participants cope with living in a family at-ri sk can be offered as suggestions to other 
at-risk families. 
Second, this study identified specific significant barriers to genetic testing related 
to human resources, finances, and physical resources that hold relevance for future health 
policy surrounding genetic services, particularly in rural communities. Currently there is 
a lack of dedicated genetic services in central or western NL. Access to health care 
practitioners with an expertise in genetics is needed in the rural areas. Technology may 
be the most efficient way to address this gap, such as telehealth services. Another option 
to deal with identified gaps in knowledge related to ARVC management is the further 
development of ARVC clinical practice guidelines. In addition, I recommend that 
continuing education about ARVC management be provided for health care providers, 
particularly locum physic ians. Orientation programs could include the required 
information on this condition and associated treatment. These suggestions were noted by 
participants to be essential for safe, competent, consistent, and timely care. 
In particular, geography was a barrier to effective care. Living with ARVC can be 
financially challenging. Given the geographical constraints related to access to health 
care in NL, policy makers need to consider making the costs incurred while accessing 
genetic services and obtaining medications an insurable benefit. The implementation of 
more physical resources within the community-specifically, access to the technology to 
download information from the ICD- would offset travel costs. A qualified health care 
practitioner could then review this information by remote access and give timely advice. 
Not only would this solution alleviate financial costs but also the psychological distress 
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that comes with not knowing why an lCD fired. Being at risk for ARVC also means that 
life and health insurance may not be available or that it may be too costly. Given that NL 
has become known for its myriad of genetic conditions, it is important that health policy 
makers spend time developing guidelines for insurable services that avoid genetic 
discrimination. This includes regulations around driving restrictions post-firing of the 
lCD. 
This study, by examining how ideas about risk are constructed alongside new 
genetic discoveries, provides direction to best practices for introducing and applying 
novel genetic technologies. Evident throughout this study is that the concept of risk is 
best understood within the nexus of social, historical, and biological relationships. 
Unfortunately, these factors that motivate individuals to participate in genetic testing 
seem to be discussed in silo in the literature. In order to understand how risk is 
constructed, it is important to acknowledge the intersection of these three contextual 
factors. To discuss either of these factors in silo will fragment our understanding of how 
individuals construct their meanings of risk and make health care decisions. Individuals 
in thi s study juxtaposed scientific knowledge against experiential knowledge and specific 
conditions. 
An important finding of this study that requires further research is that experiential 
knowledge shaped the trajectory of scientific knowledge to some extent. It is therefore 
important for health care providers and researchers to actively engage laypersons in the 
research process, the implementation of best practice guidelines, and the development of 
health care policy. 
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This study demonstrates that qualitative research is the most appropriate method 
to di scover and understand the needs of at-risk families, to discover the psychosocial 
process of how ideas about risk are understood and constructed, and to offer suggestions 
about allocation of health care resources. Qualitative studies such as this also challenge 
the static construction of risk that emerges from quantitati ve studies. The majority of 
studies on the psychosocial impact of genetic testing are either quantitative or cross-
sectional , and hence they do not capture the social process of genetic testing and can often 
fragment the experience. Cross-sectional studies are not sensitive to changing concepts 
over time such as relevancy, which was shown to have a significant impact on risk 
perception in thi s study. Qualitative longitudinal studies would be a more appropriate 
means to capture the transient nature of risk perception. Many of the tools used to study 
risk are one-dimensional in nature, have been adapted from other measurement tools, and 
borrowed from other disciplines such as psychology, which may not be sensitive to 
measurements of risk perception in genetic conditions. Also, many psychometric tools 
are used at inconsistent intervals, thus capturing different realities of ri sk, and may miss 
critical transient events that shape ri sk perception. Risk as shown in this study is a 
multidimensional concept that persists for a long time after receiving one's genetic test 
result, regardless of carrier status. More qualitative longitudinal studies are needed to 
gain a fuller understanding of how risk is shaped and reshaped in relation to scientific 
knowledge, experiential knowledge, and conditions that impact risk. 
I believe that the concepts discussed in this study (three contextual dimensions 
and conditions) have conceptual generalizability (as discussed by Green & Thorogood, 
2009) to other at-risk populations or those living with a chronic condition. That is, how 
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an individual constructs ideas about their risk is dependent on the interactions between 
the three contextual dimensions and the conditions that have been experienced in 
everyday life. Although the components of the contextual dimensions and conditions 
may change, the process remains the same and can be used as a framework for 
understanding risk. The Rubik's Cube model can be used as a way to understanding how 
individuals at ri sk for a geneticall y linked condition or another chronic condition move 
towards puzz le completion, or, in other words, a greater understanding of their risk. 
Limitations 
As with every study there were limitations to my research, many related to 
constraints of time and geography. 
Sample 
There were six limjtations related to the sample. First, the majority of participants 
were of English or irish descent (in keeping with this founder population), middle class, 
employed, and had completed high school education. Thus, the perspectives of 
individuals living under lower social economic conditions may not have been fully 
captured in thi s study. Second, the fact that the majority of participants lived in small 
rural communities may account for the numerous references related to barriers to health 
care services. These barriers may not hold true for those closer to tertiary care centers. 
Third, there were no participants between the ages of 21 and 30; hence the voices of this 
population were based on retrospective accounts of the older participants, who may not 
remember re levant details of their experience with predictive genetic testing. This may 
be significant given that many momentous life choices (e.g., career choices, marriage) 
often happen in that age group and may not be adequately represented in this study. 
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Fourth, there was only one ARVC negative male, which may predispose the study to 
some gender bias. Fifth, there were only two younger participants (ages 14 and 15); 
hence, this study did not fully examine the experience of this population, which warrants 
further research. Finally, although I did have one individual who refused the ICD, I did 
not have any participants who refused genetic testing. Further research with this 
population of resistors would add to the understanding of the relationship between risk 
construction and uptake of genetic services. 
Method 
Another critique of this study is that I used focus groups as a data collection 
method. It has been argued that focus groups are not as useful as individual interviews in 
grounded theory, as they do not usually provide a rich source of data (Morse, 200 1). In 
contrast Carey and Asbury (2012) argue that through the use of focus groups researchers 
are enabled to get the most of the interactions between participants and as a consequence 
"enhance the collection of deep, strongly held beliefs and perspectives" (pp. 17). 
Therefore, I argue that the use of focus groups was more appropriate for this particular 
topic given that genetics has to do with the shared nature of genes and has implications 
for all family members. By using focus groups I was able to capture how ideas about risk 
were made in relation to others. More importantly, I was able to observe the fluid nature 
of risk first-hand by listening to at-risk family members tell their stories to other members 
of the group, as risk for many was reshaped during this very encounter. Finally, there has 
been a dearth of literature looking at the experiences of spouses and other family 
members living in an at-risk family; by using focus groups I was able to fi ll this gap. 
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Regarding the actual data analysis and collection, I faced two challenges. The 
first was in relation to research bias. Given my clinical experience as a nurse, I found that 
I had to consciously bracket my own personal thoughts from those of the participants. As 
discussed in chapter 5: Methodology, I created diagrams and memos and labelled them 
"ME." This helped me to situate myself within the research process and be cognizant of 
my own preconceived ideas about predictive genetic testing in order to a llowed 
transparency of the emerging theory, Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk. 
The second challenge related to method was in regards to the practical aspects of 
recruitment for the focus groups. Two of the focus groups occurred within one day. This 
limited my abi lity to reflect on the interviews and data analysis prior to the subsequent 
interview. Also, although I knew for the most part who would be participating in each 
group, I was not aware that the two young participants would be coming; thus, I did not 
follow " true" theoretical sampling for focus groups. Ethical approval was given to 
include the two young participants; however, in order to fully capture the experiences of 
children, more re earch using this population is needed. 
Final Reflection 
This study provided invaluable insights into how ideas about risk are constructed 
throughout the genetic testing process. This study is unique in that it examines the 
historical and contextual evolution of risk for a new genetic condition. The Rubik ' s Cube 
is proposed as a framework that health care providers can employ to gain a fu ller 
understanding of how the key contextual dimensions and conditions fit together and 
influence one's sense of being at-risk. It is only by gaining a fuller understanding of how 
at-risk individuals juxtapose their experiential knowledge against their scientific 
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knowledge and specific conditions in their everyday lives that adequate resources to meet 
the needs of this population can be developed. 
Figure 9.1. Rubik's Cube Model: Summary of the Conditions that Influence the 
Psychosocial Process of Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk. Rubik's Cube® 
used by permission of Seven Towns Limited, www.rubiks.com 
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Appendix A 
ARVC Diagnostic Criteria 
. Cnteria for du~gno.us of ngJu tlettmtular dysplasia 
I Global aadlor reP.:,ul d~f'uu(tioo and ~ 
akeralioas' ~· . 
M.I\IOR. 
Sevt.tt dilatation and reduction of right ve:nrricular e~ction 
fraction wim no (or only mild) LV impainnent 
Localiud ript ventricular anruryt~ms (akinetic or dyslrinc-tic 
areas with dianOJic bulging) 
Severe segmental dilatation of me right ventricle 
,\tn Oli. 
Mild global right ventricular dilatation and/or eje-ction fnrtc.t1on 
reduaion with normal left vmmd e 
Mild tqmeo.u l dll.lltTIIbon of the riaht vcntncle 
Re&i<mal riaht vcntncular h)'Jl(lkincsl:a 
MNOR 
Fibrof.atty repla~ment of m~"OCardium on endomyocardii.al 
biop~y 
MJXOil 
lnvated T wn•es i:o right prcco.rdia.l lcad5 (V2 and V3} 
(people aged more th.a:n I 2 yr; in a~ence of ripr bundle 
brand\ bl<>dt.) 
1\' DepolarlaadoDicoad.u.cdon aba.onnalldes 
M.'\IOJI. 
Eptiilon waves or ~oc:ahsed pr-olongliDon (> I I 0 ms} of the 
QRS compk x in right precordial lead~ tVI - V3) 
/I.UNOJ\ 
Lite pott:ntllll$ ( iKMI a\'~;t:T~~Ko::d ECG. 
MJXO R. 
Ltft bundle branch bkxk cype ~o.enuicular ta.cbycu'dta 
susuin.~d and non-!iustained) (ECG, Holter, exercise 
tcstin&}. 
Frequent ventricular extrasystolc-s (more th.an 1 000,'24 h) 
Holter) 
VI Family history 
,\\A,fOR 
Famibal disc::~ confumed at nttrops • or surgery 
MINOR 
Familial histOt"}' of premature sudden death ( <35 ~'T) due to 
suspected right ~'("]]uiculu d~pllnia . 
FamJbal ni5t()l1' (dlmCill dl:agn-osi3 based on pr~ent criteria) 
·Oc~.t:cted by echocudiograpb , an giography, magnetic resonance imaltin K, or radiunucbde !ielntlgr:tphy . E.CG, d c:ctrocardio-
g:ram; LV, left veo.tricle. 
From: McKenna, W.J ., Theine, G., Nava, A., Fontaliran, F. , Blomstrom-Lundqvist, C., Fontaine, G. , 
et al. ( 1994 ). Diagnosis of arrhythmogenic right ventricular dysplasia/cardiomyopathy. British 
Heart Journal, 71(3), 215-218. This is the diagnostic criteria used to diagnose ARVC in this 
study' s participants. This diagnostic criterion was revised in 2012. 
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Appendix B 
The Theory: Constructing the Meaning of Being At-Risk 
Construct 1: Awakening to a New Meaning of Being Risk 
Category 1: Making Sense Out of Numerous Losses 
• Property l: Living in a Family Familiar with Loss . 
• Property 2: The Struggle to Understand the Meaning of Being At-Risk for Oneself and 
Others. 
Category 2: Struggling to Break the Cycle of Uncertainty 
• Property l: Making Sense of and Living Through Early Clinical Investigations and 
Prescribed Treatments. 
• Property 2: Acknowledging a Possible Genetic Origin to Risk . 
Construct 2: Deciphering the Meaning of Being At-Risk 
Category 1: Taking the First Steps of the Genetic Testing Process 
• Property 1: Being Offered a Predictive Genetic Test. 
• Property 2: Making the Decision to Participate in Predictive genetic testing . 
Category 2: Building One's Risk Portfolio 
• Property 1: Waiting for Predictive Genetic Test Results . 
• Prope1ty 2: Receiving Genetic Test Resul ts . 
Construct 3: Embodying a New Meaning of Being At-Risk 
Category 1: Adjusting to Living with or without a Genetic Condition 
• Property I : Accepting and Assigning Meaning to Treatments Regimes 
• Property 2: Questioning the Accuracy of the Predictive Genetic Test 
Category 2: Recognizing the Reality of Living in a Family at risk .for a Genetic Disease 
• Property 1: Facing Everyday Worries and Challenges 
• Property 2: Coping with Barriers to Resources 
Category 3: Looking Towards the Future Realities of Living in a Family at risk for a Genetic 
Disease 
• Property I : Trying to Maintain a Positi ve Attitude 
• Property 2: Living with Concern for Others at-risk 
Appendix C 
Amendment for E thical Approval 
He-~lth Resea ch 
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Appendix D 
Recruitment Script 
I just wanted to let you know that there is a new study starting that is looking at the 
experiences of individuals in families with a history of ARVC. This study is funded by a 
group called Genome Atlantic. It's being conducted by a PhD student at Memorial who's 
working on the experiences of individuals in families that have ARVC. 
If you want to be part of this study there would be two face to face interviews. The 
interviews would take place at a time and location of your convenience. If you give 
permission the interviews will be audiotaped and later transcribed to written form. Your 
identity will be kept confidential throughout the study and when the results are published. 
You are in no way obligated or expected to participate in this study. But if you do want to 
be part of it, then I will pass on your name and phone number to the researcher, April 
Manuel. 
Are you interested in participating m this study? If so I' II pass on your contact 
information to April , and she will contact you and explain the study and answer any 
questions that you may have. And then when you' re talking to her and have found out 
more about the study, you can decide whether you want to participate. 
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Appendix E 
Research Study Cover Letter 
Experiences of Individuals with Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Cardiomyopathy 
(ARVC) in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador: A Grounded 
Theory Study. 
March 18, 2008 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Thank you for taking the time to look at the attached materials that explain this study. The 
goal of this study is to hear your ideas on what life is about being in a family with a 
history of ARVC. The purpose is to help health care providers know what services people 
with ARVC need. 
If you choose to participate you will be interviewed two times about your experiences of 
being in a family with ARVC. The first interview will take about one hour and the second 
will take about 30 minutes. The interviews will be done at a time and place convenient for 
you. 
In the attached package you will find a description of the study and a consent form. Once 
you have read them please feel free to contact me, April Manuel, the main researcher, at 
1-709-777-6319, or at the toll free number 1-877-222-63 19 with any questions you may 
have about the research study or your participation. 
I will be contacting you by telephone about two weeks after you get the research package 
to confirm your interest in participating in this research study. 
Thank you for your interest. 
Respectfully, 
April Manuel BNMN 
Primary Investigator 
Doctorate of Community Health and Humanities Student 
Newfoundland and Labrador ARVC Study 
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Appendix F 
Summary of the Research Study 
Title: Experiences of Individuals with Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular 
Cardiomyopathy (ARVC) in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador: 
A Grounded Theory Study. 
Investigator: April Manuel 
Purpose of the study: 
The main purpose of this study is to understand your ideas about what it is like to be in a 
family with a history of ARVC. The second purpose of the study is to see if your 
experience is similar to other people who belong to families with heredi tary disorders. 
Rationale for the study: 
Health care workers need to know what the experience is like to have ARVC in the 
family, in order to provide the best service. It is thought that because of the seriousness of 
ARVC people deciding to have genetic testing may find it stressful. This study will look 
at how you learned that there was a possibility that you might have ARVC and how it has 
changed your life. 
Description of study: 
This study will look at people's experiences with genetic testing for 
ARVC in Newfoundland and Labrador. You will be asked to talk about how you learned 
that there was a possibility that you might have ARYC and how it ha changed your life. 
The study will take place at a time and location of your choice. There will 
be two interviews in this study. 
At the first interview will last about one hour. At the start of the first interview I will 
explain the purpo e of the study, answer any questions that you have about the study and 
your participation. I will then ask you to sign a consent form. 
The second interview will take place at a later agreed upon date. You will be asked to 
look at a summary of interview one. You will be given time to ask questions about the 
study or to add ideas that may help me to understand your experience with genetic 
testing. 
Proposed starting date: December, 2008 
Appendix G 
Consent Form 
Consent to Take Part in Health Research 
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TITLE: Experiences of Individuals with Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular 
Cardiomyopathy (ARVC) in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador: A Grounded 
Theory Study. 
INVESTIGA TOR(S): April Manuel BNMN 
SPONSOR: Atlantic Medical Genetics and Genomics Initiative, Genome Atlantic 
You have been invited to take part in a research study. It is up to you to decide 
whether to be in the study or not. Before you decide, you need to understand what 
the study is for, what-risks you might take and what benefits you might receive. 
This consent form explains the study. 
The researchers will: 
• discuss the study with you 
• answer your questions 
• keep confidential any information which could identify you personally 
• be available during the study to deal with problems and answer questions 
If you decide not to take part or to leave the study this will not affect your usual 
health care or normal treatment. 
1. Introduction/Background: 
Many families in Newfoundland and Labrador have been affected with ARVC. Genetic 
testing is routinely offered in these families. You have been invited to join this study 
because you were offered genetic testing for ARVC. 
Health care workers need to gain a better understanding of the experiences of people 
living in fam ilies with a history of ARVC, how the decision was made to have genetic 
testing (or not) and the impact of this decision on everyday life in order to meet the health 
needs of these families. This study will look at how you learned that there was a 
possibility that you might have ARVC and how it has changed your li fe. 
2. Purpose of study: 
The purpose of this study is to gain a better idea of how living in a fami ly with a history 
of ARVC affects your everyday life . I am interested in hearing how you learned that you 
might have ARVC, how you decided if you should have genetic testing, and how you feel 
that decision affected your life. Another purpose of this study is to compare your 
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experience of genetic testing with other individuals who have been offered genetic testing 
for other hereditary disorders. 
3. Description of the study procedures and tests: 
You will be asked to participate in two face to face interviews. Both interviews will take 
place at a time and location that is best for you. In the first interview you will be asked to 
talk about what it is like to be in a family with a history of ARVC. You may be asked 
about how you learned that there was a possibility that you might have ARYC, your 
decision about whether to have genetic testing, and how that decision has affected your 
life. 
In the second interview you may be asked to explain or talk more about what you said in 
the first interview. This is to be sure that I have understood your experience. 
4. Length of time: 
The first interview will take about one hour. The second interview will take about 30 
minutes. 
5. Possible risks and discomforts: 
You may find talking about your experience stressful. At any time you may decide to stop 
the interview and leave the study. Then the audio-files and notes will be destroyed 
immediately. You have the choice to take a break at any time during the interview or 
postpone it for another time. I will be prepared with the telephone number of the Director 
of the Provincial Medical Genetics Program if at any time you would like to talk about 
concerns regarding your experience with genetic testing. 
6. Benefits: 
It is not known whether this study will benefit you. 
7. Liability statement: 
Signing this form gives us your consent to be in this study. It tell s us that you understand 
the information about the research study. When you sign this form, you do not give up 
your legal rights. Researchers or agencies involved in this research study sti ll have their 
legal and professional responsibilities. 
8. Confidentiality: 
Confidentiality and privacy of your personal information and interview will be 
maintained at a ll times. The only people who will see the interview are: the person who 
types the interviews to paper, and my supervi sory committee. The interview and consent 
form will be locked in separate cabinets in my locked office where I will be the only 
person with a key to the cabinets. Any computer files will be password protected. Your 
personal information will be removed from your interviews by me. Each interview will be 
given a code so that you will not be identified. 
There is a possibility that you may have others in the room during your interview. In this 
case confidentiality will be discussed with everyone present prior to the start of the 
interview. 
9. Questions: 
If you have any questions about taking part in this study, you can meet with the 
investigator who is in charge of the study at this institution. That person is: 
April Manuel1-709-777-6319 or Toll Free Number :1-877-222-6319 
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Or you can talk to someone who is not involved with the study at all , but can advise you 
on your rights as a participant in a research study. This person can be reached through: 
Office of the Human Investigation Committee (HIC) at 709-777-6974 
Email: hic@mun.ca 
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Signature Page 
Study title: Experiences of Individuals with Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular 
Cardiomyopathy (ARVC) in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador: A Grounded 
Theory Study. 
Name of principal investigator: April Manuel 
To be filled out and signed by the participant: 
Please check as appropriate: 
I have read the consent [and information sheet]. 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions/to discuss this study. 
I have received satisfactory answers to all of my questions. 
I have received enough information about the study. 
I have spoken to April Manuel .and she has answered my questions 
I agree to have my interviews audio-taped 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study 
• at any time 
• without having to give a reason 
• without affecting my future care 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
Yes{ } No { } 
Yes { } No { } 
I understand that it is my choice to be in the study and that I may not benefit. 
Yes { } 
I agree to take part in this study. Yes { } 
No { } 
No {} 
-----------------······· · ······-------------
Signature of participant Date 
To be signed by the investigator: 
I have explained this study to the best of my ability. I invited questions and gave answers. 
I believe that the participant fully understands what is involved in being in the study, any 
potential risks of the study and that he or she has freely chosen to be in the study. 
Signature of investigator Date 
Telephone number: 
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Appendix H 
Sample Interview Schedule/Questions 
I was wondering if you could please share your experience of what it was like to have had 
genetic testing for ARVC? You may start wherever you want and talk about any 
experiences, thoughts and feelings that you feel is important for us to gain a better 
understanding of the process of genetic testing. 
Examples of Probes/Questions to Facilitate the Interview and Enrich Data 
Could you please tell me about growing up in your family, did you know anybody 
sick? 
(Probes: Did you have any relatives die at an earl y age? Where there any unexplained 
deaths in your family?) 
Perhaps you could reflect on how you became aware of the possibility of some 
genetic condition in your family? How did you become aware of your potential for 
having ARVC? 
(Probes: Have you been healthy? How did it make you feel when you learned that there 
was a high probability that you may have ARYC?) 
Did you have any thoughts at that time on what it meant to have ARVC? 
How did you become aware of what it meant to have the gene for ARVC? What was 
your understanding of ARVC? What was your understanding at this time of 
treatment protocols and recommended screening for ARVC? 
(Probes: What was your perception of being at risk for ARVC? Do you feel you had a 
good grasp on what it meant to be at risk for ARVC? Could you please guide me 
through your thoughts at this time? When did you become aware that ARVC was a 
genetic linked disorder? What was your perception of having a genetic linked disorder? 
What were your thoughts when you realized that if you have the gene for ARYC it could 
be passed to your offspring?) 
Who was the first person who alerted you that you might have a hereditary disease? 
Who provided you with the information on ARVC? 
(Probes: Do you feel that you had a good understanding of what it meant to be at risk for 
ARVC after discussion(s) with this person? After this discussion how did your perception 
of being at risk for ARYC change. What were your immediate concerns/thoughts when 
you learned that you might have a hereditary disorder? Did this knowledge change your 
perception of everyday life or how you carried out your activities of daily living? Where 
there any particular incidents during your discussions with this individual(s) that comes to 
mind that impacted your understanding of ARVC? Why was this inc ident so significant?) 
How did the probability that you and your family may have the gene for ARVC 
affect the family and everyday life? Who were included in your support network? 
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(Probes: Was there a disruption in the family everyday functioning? Where there times 
that were particularly stressful on the family when you suspected that you or members of 
your family may have the gene for ARVC? Was there anyone outside your immediate 
family that was a support person(s) for the family? How did members of the family 
support each other? Are there any incidents that stand out in your mind you feel happened 
because of the uncertainty surrounding the risk of having ARVC? 
Could you describe what it was like to have to wait for genetic testing? Could you 
tell me about your decision to participate (or not) in testing for ARVC? When/How 
did you learn about the availability of testing for ARVC? What were your initial 
thoughts when you became aware that testing was available for ARVC? 
Who do you think made up your support network during this decision? Did you feel 
ready to participate in genetic testing? 
(Probes: What thoughts went through your mind while you were waiting to be tested for 
ARVC? What factors impacted your decision to participate (or not) in genetic testing? 
Did you experience any thoughts associated with re luctance to genetic testing? Where all 
the famj Jy tested at the same time? Where there any discussion in the family surrounding 
not getting tested? Did you feel you had adequate knowledge regarding the procedure for 
genetic testing?) 
How did you prepare for testing? At this time what meaning did genetic testing have 
for you and your family? Did you have any thoughts on the consequences of testing 
positive or negative? Could you please tell me about what thoughts went through 
your mind when you were waiting for the test results? What was your 
understanding of your risk of having ARVC and passing it on to your offspring? 
Did you discuss with your children any information on ARVC? Who provided you 
with support during this time? 
(Probes: Did you have any thoughts on how you would deal with the test results? What 
did you understand were the treatment options? Who did you share your thoughts and 
ideas with thorough out this experience? Where there any immediate or longterm 
concerns that came to your mind?) 
Where there any specific moments or images that comes to mind that you might 
recall as significant though out the testing process? 
(Probes: Where there any times that you felt particularly sad or relieved through out the 
testing process?) 
After you received your tests results what were your thoughts? How do you perceive 
your tests results? How did you cope with your test results? How do you feel your 
life has changed? Do you feel satisfied with the decision to participate (or not) in 
genetic testing? 
How do you feel the test result has impacted your family? Do you have any 
suggestions for others who may be facing a similar situation? How supportive is 
your family and friends? 
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(Probes: How do you feel that your family responded to your tests results? (Probes: How 
did you reveal the results of your test to the rest of your family? How did this make you 
feel? What factors affected your decision to disclose your tests results to your family? 
How did your family members respond? Were there any immediate concerns that 
impacted the family?) 
Has this experienced changed your life or the way you look at life? Do you perceive 
these changes in your life as positive or negative? What do you do to stay positive? 
(Probes: How has genetic testing for ARVC changed the way you for see your future? 
Has this experience impacted your livelihood? Has this experience impacted your 
relationship with your children?) 
What is your understanding of treatment for ARVC? What is your understanding 
of recommended screening protocols? 
Do you think that this experience has altered your feelings towards genetic testing? 
Do you think your offspring should have genetic testing? 
(Probes: Was your experience and positive or negative experience? Could you please give 
me an example of some positive or negative experiences?) 
How helpful are health care providers involved in your care? Do you have any 
thoughts on how health care professional support could be improved? 
Do you have any concerns regarding barriers to accessing genetic information, 
testing and screening that your might have experienced? Could you give me an 
example of a concern that you have had? 
(Probes: Do you feel you were given enough education about ARYC prior to making the 
decision to participate (or not) in genetic testing, and post-test results? Did you have any 
concerns regarding access to necessary resources for your care? How has geography 
(where you li ve) impacted your experience? What are your thoughts on health care 
professional ' s communication skills when discussing genetic screening and treatment 
options? 
Overall, how would you describe your experience with genetic testing? Are there 
any particular areas that you would like to see changed, improved or implemented? 
Do you see any benefits from becoming involved in supportive groups? Having 
access to up-to-date information such as news letters or web sites? Having ongoing 
contact with individuals involved in ARVC testing, research and counselling? 
Is there any area of the genetic testing experience that you would like to make a 
comment on or discuss? 
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Appendix I 
Ethics Approval 
... h. \pl d i\ I.JnJJ ·J 
\ I ·n h" 1;.1 t ·Jll·,n-.t t \ ,f \! •.• , ''" nh iiJ 1J 
...,,.h .. u l td '\ur'llt)! E TER!::O (i.._ , .3i:OI 
Tfu-. ''· II ;Jd..rtm Jco, l~c \ ' •ur l.C(IJT ''I"''H.l ' l <l'<' d ar..-J. :v;p[L' I IIhL"J rr •. .:'HI I - "hL'l <' lll ·'"ll d .tn l \ 
,,,~,,-, ,JJ Jd l' fl>l rJ,· a ,·r 1p1 h•r 1 ••ur rL·,o::. tr ch ,rud ) en1 ttktl •· E t lll' rit· u ct...., of I rt<l h idua l' " ir h 
( ; t' Jit"tk-linkt·t.l \ nh~·t hmogcn i t' ri:: ht , .t'nlrk u la r rardium~uJHI!h~ 1 \ fn ·() in tht' 
p r mint•c fJf :'\t·nfo u nd laull u ncl L 1thnnlor : .\ ( ; r·o u utlt•d lh t·or~ '-t ud_1 ". 
·\ tLc tii<'L'I n_c l1dd oon . \ u~'"' 1 ~>. _lilt - . ih..: Ullll.tl r .:-1 tL'" ,J.,l-" ·>I 1111 ,,,,.J, lh,· II L.n ~otn 
hl\ L' ''' "'" "•-•11 ( lllll l lll lL"(" tl II< I J~r L'oc< l l hat ih.: r '' I lhL" ~•'U kl I IL'\ I L' \\ ··d I>\ ro, · l ,,_, fl. II I '• 
,oll..:L 1f fell Ill I a.:c:epc.d:-•k. full ;tpp " "'-' 1 u l ihl' . ru, l) h ,· !:'~'" lli<'J 
r , ,. t n -( h.ur' ,,, h. I IlL fl'\ 1{'\\<' tl \ •>llr l "liiJ<."'f'•·llJL'IICe . ;IJ'J't'l'\ ed rhc· ;c"llpt and . und ·r thL' 
dllt"L"i !l •ll " ' Ill•· ( ''lll llliHc·c. ~· r.tnk'tf lid/ t1pp nwol o ·_, Hur r·,,·,u ~ h ' l t•J.' Thh \\ I I! b.: rq>,•rt<'d 
r, , th<.' li:I JI Hum;!JJ lni<'' ' ' ·I.!.JIH•n c.. ·,,lllll lllit'c' . t<.•r 1h c·1r Jn l"n ll ,li ltJ it .11 Jill· llJCL'Im~ ,,.l,,·,l:Jic·.f t,, r 
c ' •' IL'h '' 1 1, .::on- . 
f- ill <lj'J'I'CI \ a J f l.!' ht' L'Il ).!!..JIIJL'd [01 OIIL' ~ " <11 \ "L: \\ IJif 'lc' L"<l lll :l<.: l e d II> L'• llilf' ' L' JL' l f~L· ~111H .. 11 
l •>rn1 11pJ,n~ at 'rr"\II JL:Jid~. """"" ' t>dto J<c" ih<' <I J'I'"''·" "J fi l. 'l"'" on \ u g u q l tt. ~ OIIX 1: " 
'•HIIr re"l"~' l hl h!/ , , ~, Ill ~lhtlh: rha~ l hc I L' I I~ \.\ 41! r ... n nr .... r~ II""\\ ~IIJ<t~L ~ [+,.J lliL' rl l< •.Jt rilL' li P ( J... .. ., l ll ,i!· 
1 t t ~ 1. 1 :~:-. pt tl'r hi ! Ill· l l'II " \\ ~L l J .. JI I.' t•t f" ' l.''• IL'\~ il HJ •IJ rnH ~iJ lo L. ••l)"l l.l' l ' lh e -~~Lh.h l 11t...· uf~L.l. d 
I'L"n l'\1,,!1 l•.•rrn .,_;ut h L' t fc l',\ ll J ~ •Jt!l.·d lri.•JIIIht;" lf ll \'oL+•-\ IIL' 
' If' '\ ., .,.. ' ll ,:~ i ~~~~~~ . ~ .1 Ut ~:- dn". t·l, ,.!d' \ 11 1111_.: 1!.' ' ,_: ,II J' -.1. ~ '- ' . ·,, IJ " , ,., d, '\ 
f'lt c 1/um<~n / , ,.,.,f;,,uioll ( 'o m miflct• ,,,f& ·i,n Til -1 r I r J U { 00 \ 0 I ,-,.,"''" 1/r.- .omp/,·r, ·d 
. ,., '114' 1t '((/; 
) ' •,'fJ t ,•.•',• •t \ t~'/)/''''• ' u/ II ,' // / .. ;/toll 
} ••) I •r/,' ht •'t't.ji'I'IJ,,/ J!,·\,f·,{J ,, ,, , ,, ,._ ,'J,J,t.'~,'.r, 
) o 
1
o'J II •' 't },', o,f .1,.(• i·'l /lf 1Jo' t( :1 / o I ' ( \ .. , ,.,• ·' : .'. ~ o r,, ,}l ,'II,'',, I rJ11 I'~", ',•''• • • o,'.''o,' 'l t 1 ,' 1 
oo'/ ':' ' ' ' "1 , / .'tl otn./, ,1 o' oo'lot ·'i" \,',l,•, /1 l t r.)Jo, 
390 
{u wWjcjcl/l, rlw 1/uurau b m •\ljj!<llioy < ·owmicrn · ... ;u iuWrm the <lllpr'Ot>r jucr rwtl!orjtin Tr• 
, .,J,ttrc t.t ro''''f urtion ,._, tl'l&fll: tire qqnr"nl'i!lce ofljriul"' wjU br notUi('d I•J 1r ntinqlf ltttffli''" 
\ J odi tl c:ll ion~ of l ht· JH'OIIH:ul. l'Om t•n l arc nor pumi rl t·t.l "illwul pritll- :aJlpnn al from 1 h e 
1-llunan ln1 n ligal ion ( 'omm iltct•. lm p lc·mt•nr i ng rh angt·~ in 1 h t· J.lniWc:n l . {(>ll ~t' lll "ilhmH 
Ill (' :I IJJH'O\;Iilll ~l ~ rt'~u ll inlht· :lJlJl l'O\ :.JI of you r· r.-~ .. a rdl ' 'ml~ lwin g r clol\t·d . 
llt'(' t'S~ ir al i n~ n-~, ar lo rr of all r l'lal d nsear h afll\ i r~. Rt'IJ Ut·~t fn r mndifit'al iou lo lht· 
p rolol'ol (UII~t· n r mu~ r he nut lin t·d on a n :t mt ndmt·n l form (;.~ , ·ai l :a hlt• on lht' Il l ( ' ' "'l' irt· l 
a nd ~ubmillt'd tu rhc HI ( fo•· re1·i " . 
J L>l ,, hu~prt11i- l J'>.: I >ll•l~ . 11 " your n·~pousl bi li ll ro sr·c k lh {· nt't't'~ :Jf\ :l&HII'U' :al fru rn 
bhrt·r n lf t'~l llh and '4U o r her hosp il ill h<l;.~rd ~ u ~ uu prnprial t· 
I h1' l~l''L'.n rh him·~ B11:1rd 1 he HI< I ih rc1 ll'l'.t·J ;mJ ;lpJml'<:d ·h . tppfloC.t iiL•ll .lli<l <.: < t n,~ n! 
ft>r"ll rv r rho.: >l tlll> "ltio.:h ~~ ru l-.c ,.,liHJU t:I'Ll y ~ uu .1, the qu:rl1ri.:d Ill\<: , 1;1:.11 ur 11-tl:lL'd :~~"> • >I t: 
a lhl' ~PI."I Iil'J :>!ud:, ~11 •. T h1, ;!ppr.na l J ll d rho: "n' ~ <>f lhi' R c:;<:: tr, h l- th1··-. !J,,;, J l1:t\ L' 
l ·.:n diXL.rnerrt<:J m '"iring. In add11i<ll1. pkaso.: be :JLh 1"::d rhal the Hum.1 11 1 11\ t'.,! l ~:llhJn 
l'ontl ll lllc cum:ntly • 'rc-r.J!c~ ;1,;corJ rng l•' til l· l 11- ,>un..:rl P.>IH::. !-. .1 ·mcnt .11 1J :lJij'll..::~bk 
1.1 '•', .111d rcg ul all<>n~ Th.: members hap ol ! h i~ 1 e~c:.reh e1hic ' ho;1rd '' ''llll'l le' ,., li lt til<' 
rn,·ntl'l'J Shll I 'LJUi rcm·n• ~ fo r rc:;car ·h l' lhi\:S board, de li nrd I ll Dl\ ' ' 1<1 n 5 " ' the ro.•d and 
llrr 1,!; Rq; u I.H1u n, . 
'\ t>l \\ 1 h>l i llldl n~;t the -'1 p1 Ln:J i t•f thc Ill< , 1h.: 1 runar\ IL'~P< •fbth rfll \ f•> r t hl' ,· th l,·al Ct•llduo.: l <>f 
1lw 111\'t:,n~all,, n 1 ·malll, '' u lt , .,lu. 
k d111 ll 1-l cuncrl. 1\ID. f Rf Pt ' 
l ·o Cl1a11 
I h .r 1. 111 Jrr, ··~t i !':H II m ( ·.,mllllltL·~· 
t ••-( 'h.m 
llnnt an ln1 ,·,lr:.:at:, •n l 111:1' 1lll t,·,· 
P 1 (.' L t•olllh, \ 1.~ - Prt: ' I•IL·n : I Kt''-\\ II'L'h t. \ll "-
\lr \\ \ l ri Jt: l . C'lL'll i •U D l rL'<' I•'r. < ''l'J 11 :Ht' S1r :J1 '~\ .\:. R ·, ' .tl , ll. l ·.hic'lll H t· .. lrh 
391 
Appendix J 
Research Approval: Eastern Health 
Eastern 
Health 
Decomt>er 4 , 2007 
Ms Aprrl .·tanJal 
MUN Sch<JOI of Nursrng 
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